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The Institute of Governance Studies has the pleasure of presenting the fourth edition of its flagship publication, 
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2009 Report. The first three Reports focused on the institutions and 
politics of Bangladesh from a governance perspective.  The present Report is a departure from the examination 
of cross-cutting macro themes to that of sectors, and in this Report we have examined the state of play of 
governance in four critical areas – energy, food security, e-government and international labour migration. 
One of IGS’ major activities is to undertake research on governance, and since its inception in 2005 IGS 
has endeavoured to break new ground by undertaking in-depth research with a particular focus on public 
policy. IGS strongly believes that research has a significant role to play in terms of reviewing existing policies, 
development of new policies and also, how policies translate into effective implementation. 
The 2009 Report is also the first opportunity for IGS to examine the achievements of the new government 
vis-a-vis the mandate given by the electorate – the citizens of Bangladesh. The last general elections took 
place at the end of 2008 and the landslide victory of the Awami League has put the new government in 
a very strong position to fulfill its promises. Furthermore, after three years of assessing the governance of 
institutions and politics of Bangladesh, IGS felt that there was a need to shift the focus to citizens, especially 
the vulnerable. This citizen-centric approach is also reflected in the now IGS-trademarked triple-barreled title 
of such Reports – Entitlement, Responsiveness, Sustainability. We, as citizens, have certain entitlements, and 
governments need to be responsive in ways that effectively addresses these legitimate claims: policy-making, 
implementation and institution building. But both entitlement and responsiveness have to be sustained 
over time. This brings us back to good governance principles and practices. This virtuous cycle, which is 
presently missing, needs to be established in Bangladesh. In this Report IGS has put forward many ‘doable’ 
recommendations for promoting good governance in Bangladesh. We urge the leadership and policy-makers 
to consider them in earnest.
I am delighted to inform the readers that the present Report was fully produced in-house by an IGS team 
of young scholars under the able and strong leadership of Ms. Irum Shehreen Ali. I also would like to put on 
record the fact that for the first time this year IGS has successfully published summary reports on the four 
sectors in both Bangla and English prior to the publication of the full Report. The summary reports were 
meant for a media launch, which has taken place and was a success. Both print and electronic media have 
given the 2009 Report extensive coverage. I would like to express my deep gratitude to our well-wishers in 
media for their encouragement and support.
Unlike the previous three Reports we have not included a chapter containing quantitative analysis of 
governance but we intend to bring out a separate report on this – we feel that such a quantitative report can 
unfairly takes away attention from a qualitative report of this nature. As it is customary, I thank the team who 
produced this Report, a Herculean feat given IGS’ constraints, and the many other people and organisations 
whose contributions were indispensable in assuring the standard and quality of this Report. I would like to 
express my appreciation to the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands who has financed the printing 





The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2009
1 The purpose
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2009 is the fourth annual report published by the Institute of Governance 
Studies (IGS) at BRAC University. This Report is the product of an ongoing, long-term research programme on 
governance in Bangladesh initiated by the Institute in 2006. IGS views the concept of governance as the sum 
total of the institutions and processes by which society orders and conducts its collective and public affairs. 
The Institute’s mission is to identify, promote and support effective, transparent, accountable, equitable and 
citizen-centric government in Bangladesh and South Asia. In pursuit of this mission, the Institute is dedicated 
to understanding the strengths and weaknesses of governance in Bangladesh and South Asia through 
academic and policy-focused research. It prides itself on being the only governance report on Bangladesh, 
from Bangladesh. 
The State of Governance in Bangladesh reports traditionally focus on the current state of public, political and 
private institutions in Bangladesh, highlighting core governance successes and gaps within these institutions. 
They are committed to providing well-researched, balanced analyses of Bangladesh’s governance arena: 
searching for, and highlighting successes, but also unequivocally and objectively engaging with areas 
of concern. Previous Reports have concentrated on the predominance of partisan politics in all areas of 
governance and the performance of accountability mechanisms. The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006 
laid out the fifteen-year context of the governance debate in Bangladesh, portraying how the penetration 
of partisan politics into public institutions, local government and even civil society ultimately undermines 
formal accountability mechanisms. Following a year of political upheaval and change that brought political 
parties under greater public scrutiny than ever before, The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2007 documented 
reforms to political governance. It focused on the reforms undertaken by the Caretaker Government aimed 
at ending partisan capture of state institutions; analysing changes to the legal frameworks, formal rules and 
procedures dictating governmental affairs, as well as institutional restructuring. It noted that while there was 
limited success regarding institutional reforms and anti-corruption activities, the scope and implementation 
of reforms created new significant gaps in government accountability and had a detrimental effect on short-
1CHAPTER Overview and Executive Summary
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term economic activity. The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2008 built on the findings of the previous reports 
but narrowed the perspective to focus on reducing the high stakes of politics through an accountability 
framework, arguing that effective, accountable and transparent mechanisms in the political, parliamentary 
and judicial arena were vital, though absent, in making Bangladeshi democracy functional. 
It is against this backdrop that The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2009 presents its findings. While previous 
reports have focused on more ‘traditional’ areas of governance, this Report marks IGS’ first foray into analysing 
sectoral governance. With its central theme Entitlement, Responsiveness, Sustainability, this Report reflects 
the shift in the global governance focus from institutions to citizens. The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2009 
contextualises and examines governance, understood as policy planning and institutional implementation 
for citizen service delivery in key national sectors such as food, energy, e-governance and migration. These 
sectors have been chosen because they are either key components of citizens’ welfare, in the case of food 
security and consistent energy provision, or because they are of increasing importance to national life, as with 
migration and the prospect of e-government. In the architecture of national governance, these sectors are 
essential building blocks to ensure long-term good governance outcomes for citizens and strengthening them 
is an essential task. As in previous years, the Report optimistically notes Bangladesh’s high levels of sustained 
economic growth and advances in overall development. It also notes that Bangladesh has taken encouraging 
policy initiatives, created successful short-term sectoral programmes, addressed key legislative weaknesses 
and drawn up long-term visions in these sectors that have and will ultimately benefit its people. However, the 
lack of coordinated policy planning and implementation, penetration of partisan political interests dictated 
by the five-year political cycle and lack of accountable, transparent and stable institutions and mechanisms of 
policy implementation severely jeopardise the quality of governance in these sectors, resulting in poor quality 
service delivery for citizens. The Report not only examines the historical context of sectoral performance, but 
also looks at key trends in 2009 and their effects, which are tracked until mid-2010.  
2 Context
The State of Governance in Bangladesh initiative’s annual reports traditionally take as their starting point 
relevant political and institutional events in the year under review and focus on how these have affected the 
quality of governance within chosen areas of the political and public domain. After undertaking a fifteen-year 
governance review in 2006, this approach has been particularly relevant in 2007 and 2008, when Bangladesh 
faced an interruption to parliamentary democracy. The upheaval, which resulted in the declaration of a state of 
emergency on 11 January 2007, the cancellation of elections, the installation of the Caretaker Government and 
the eventual holding of elections on 29 December 2008 necessitated the analysis of reform and governance in 
this period through a primarily political lens. The previous Reports examined the deepening hold of partisan 
politics over all aspects of public life as well as the lack of functioning accountability mechanisms in both the 
state and private spheres. The Reports argued that overcoming these institutional governance deficiencies 
was the key to advancing development and establishing a functioning, ultimately flourishing democracy. 
The election to office of the Awami League through a landslide victory in December 2008 at the end of the 
Caretaker Government’s tenure re-established a democratically elected government and began another five-
year electoral cycle. Given that the incumbent government’s tenure intended to focus on the improvement 
of citizen’s quality of life via far reaching institutional reforms in the nation’s vital sectors, the time seemed 
appropriate to turn the lens away from assessing governance in the traditional political, parliamentary and 
institutional spheres.
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As a research goal, IGS concerns itself deeply with the way in which governance affects the everyday reality 
of Bangladeshis. The Institute understands that the key to enhancing citizens’ quality of life is the presence 
of functional, transparent and accountable institutions that can meet their needs and achieve development 
objectives. It is with this in mind that The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2009 undertakes analysis of sectors 
that are vital to the provision of citizens’ welfare and have been the centre of intense political interest and 
media attention since the last general elections:
•	 Energy: A consistent, reliable and affordable energy supply is a key driver of economic development 
and an instrument for raising people’s standard of living.
•	 Food security: The achievement of food self-sufficiency is an important step in national development, 
guaranteeing the fulfilment of the most basic of people’s needs.
•	 e-Government: The establishment of e-government facilities are a way of harnessing information, 
communications and technology tools to further development and strengthen poverty reduction by 
improving citizens’ ease of access to government services. 
•	 International labour migration: The flow of labour migrants to other nations is a crucial feature of 
the economy, as a source of income for both migrants’ families and the nation itself.
The sound functioning of these sectors, among other interests will result in improved development indicators 
and the overall improvement of national wellbeing. The current Report provides the required contextual 
background to understand the importance of these sectors for the nation, before undertaking extensive 
analysis of the governance outcomes in sectoral performance and reform. It uses evidence-based research to 
provide specific recommendations aimed at improving sectoral performance.
3 Methodology and report structure
The Institute views the analysis of governance as the examination of the processes by which the institutions 
charged with achieving development accomplish their objectives.  This includes non-governmental 
organisations, civil society organisations and private firms as well as the public sector or state. In this vein, 
the Report takes a multidimensional view of sectoral governance that aims to go beyond policy plans and 
implementation indicators to contextualise governance outcomes in how they impact citizen welfare and 
quality of life. This multidimensional view of governance determines the Report’s research strategy. Given the 
contextual nature of governance and the variety of the sectors under review, there is no single theoretical 
framework or analytical model that appears suitable for all sectors. Thus, this Report takes an evidence-based 
multidisciplinary approach where relevant frameworks are employed in each chapter.
The Report’s chapters are primarily based on a review of the published literature, including grey literature 
and newspaper sources, in conjunction with a large number of semi-structured key informant interviews with 
officials from government agencies in the relevant sectors, as well as academics and members of civil society. 
These interviews serve to validate secondary data and explore in greater detail dimensions of governance 
that may not be covered extensively enough in the available literature. The preparation of each chapter 
entailed detailed thematic guidance from experts in the field and extensive comments regarding content 
and analysis from academic reviewers who are themselves engaged in research in the area. Specifically, each 
chapter aimed to engage with both the governance successes and gaps that characterise regulatory and 
accountability mechanisms in a particular sector from both an institutional and citizen-centric point of view, 
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i.e. highlighting issues of access, quality, reliability, consistency and participation. For this Report, we not only 
examined contextual and historical information regarding each sector, but also analysed the trends in sectoral 
performance between 2009 and mid-2010. 
As previously mentioned, this is the first time that IGS has undertaken sectoral governance analysis. Thus, it 
was important to establish the sector’s historical, legislative and policy context against which an analysis of 
governance of the sector could be carried out. Each chapter begins with a detailed overview of the contextual 
background and prevalent governance scenario, before moving on to a description of the legislative framework. 
This is followed by a summary of the government’s policy goals and a description of the organisational 
framework for policy implementation in the sector. The chapters then examine sectoral reforms, analysing the 
outcome of reform initiatives in terms of both good and bad governance, as well as analysing the success or 
failures of institutional structures. The chapters conclude with sector-specific recommendations to improve 
institutional accountability, engage political support, enhance policy implementation, provide more citizen-
centric services and ensure long-term sector sustainability. There are slight variations in this general structure 
according to each chapter’s specific objectives and analytical approach.
The four chapters included in the Report are: 
•	 Energy crisis: Planning Deficit, Policy Failure and Reforms for the Future.
•	 Food Security: Increasing Availability, Diversifying Access and Strengthening Governance.
•	 Digital Bangladesh: The Beginning of Citizen-Centric e-Government?
•	 International Labour Migration: Making Migrant Worker Welfare Central to Governance. 
The Report’s concluding chapter summarises the crosscutting themes across all the sectors analysed and 
presents a set of executive recommendations specific to each sector.
It remains IGS’ intention to build local research capacity, and to this end the Report highlights the work of a 
new generation of Bangladeshi researchers who contributed to the dynamic debate over the Report’s shape 
and findings. This Report has been produced in its entirety by IGS’ in-house team of researchers. More so 
than has previously been the case, the Report has been an opportunity for younger scholars to develop their 
research, analysis and writing skills. And it is this report team that takes full responsibility for the contents of 
the Report. 
4 Thematic framework and cross-cutting findings
The theme of this year’s report is: Entitlement, Responsiveness, Sustainability, reflecting the citizen-
centric nature of the research. It is with this overarching framework that the Report analyses governance 
successes and gaps in the four sectors under scrutiny. The Institute believes that one of the basic premises for 
a democratically elected government is that citizens have entitlements that are manifested in the meeting 
of basic needs via equitable service provision. The sectors in this Report all deal with services that citizens are 
entitled to:
	The provision of a consistent and affordable energy supply. 
	The provision of basic food supplies, in both times of crisis and not, as well an enabling environment 
for food provision.
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	The provision of countrywide access to government services and easily accessible information 
regarding government policies, in this case via e-government facilities. 
	The provision of a safe, fairly priced and well-regulated migration process that allows Bangladeshis 
to work abroad, be assured decent working conditions and the ability to safely and easily remit their 
earnings home.
Governments have a duty to be responsive regarding the entitlements of its citizens when designing legislation, 
envisioning long-term policies or building institutions able to implement them. Ensuring citizen entitlements 
in the long term is only possible if institutions and policy implementation systems are stable and free from 
partisan influence. This creates a cycle of good governance that feeds back into outcomes for the people.
Our research revealed findings that were specific to the functioning of each specific sector. Nonetheless, and 
keeping the above framework above in mind, the following general findings were common to all sectors:
a) Enabling environment exists: The state recognises the entitlements of citizens in all the sectors 
studied, and often enshrines this in legislation that clearly calls for the provision of these entitlements. 
In all the sectors we see the presence of, or the steps being taken towards creating an enabling 
legislative environment and/or to review outdated legislation. The state also often takes the next step, 
i.e. designing policies that prioritise citizen-wellbeing and development. Additionally, there are some 
noteworthy and successful policy initiatives across all the sectors, such as the creation of regulatory 
bodies, short-term responses to sectoral crises and stand-alone pilot policy initiatives. However, there 
is a substantial gap between legislation, policy and implementation.
b) Ineffective regulatory bodies present: While the legislation to guarantee citizen entitlements exists, 
all sectors are characterised by weak and unresponsive regulatory bodies. These institutions lack the 
capacity, incentives, transparency, accountability, autonomy and coordination to implement policy in 
an efficient and equitable manner. Officials responsible for regulation and ensuring service delivery 
are rarely incentivised to perform well, nor have they the technical skills required to implement policy. 
In addition, many ministries and regulatory bodies have overlapping responsibilities and barely any 
performance monitoring.
c) Policy design and implementation with a populist approach: While legislation takes a long-
term view, the policy planning that underpins its implementation is short-term. Governments plan 
according to the 5-year electoral cycle, which, while politically expedient, is not the most sustainable 
means of ensuring development, especially in sectoral governance. In addition to short-sighted 
planning, policy implementation decisions are made with the vote bank in mind, so that electoral 
returns become far more important that good governance. The government is often reluctant to 
take politically unpopular decisions that are for the overall good of the nation. In terms of policy 
implementation on the ground, political consideration also plays a part in ‘who will benefit’ from 
service provision, as it is those who have political connections to the party in power who benefit the 
most. Previous State of Governance (SoG) reports have commented extensively on the ‘winner takes 
all’ mentality of Bangladeshi governance, meaning that the party in power has all the traction in terms 
of policy decision-making and can concentrate rewards on its functionaries and supporters.
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d) Institutions matter: This Report argues that a main reason why citizens’ needs are not met is the 
fact there is no political will to address the problem of failing institutions that are neither responsive 
nor sustainable. Institutions are the best system by which a state can ensure service delivery and 
citizen-welfare. However, across all sectors there is a lack of political commitment to the institutional 
reform necessary to build efficient institutions. This is partly due to the fact that a mandate to 
comprehensively overhaul the institutional framework may be politically unpopular within the public 
sector. As a result, the majority of reforms have been superficial, without truly moving institutions 
towards better governance.
5 Findings 
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2009 is cautiously optimistic about the prospects for good governance 
in the sectors examined, noting worthwhile progress, especially in the form of substantial commitment 
to addressing legislative weaknesses, formulating promising policy initiatives and the success of one-off 
programmes within sectors. While it is hard to generalise across sectors, the Report takes the view that in 
each of them there is often the presence of an enabling legislative framework and adequate regulatory 
institutions that would allow for policy implementation and monitoring in a manner that is consistent 
with good governance outcomes. However, it argues that it is the lack of commitment to long-term policy 
implementation, limited coordination between policy implementation bodies, dearth of able, accountable 
and transparent regulatory institutions and the focus on politically motivated decision making that greatly 
effect quality of governance in these sectors. The key findings related to each chapter are briefly presented 
below, with the Report’s policy recommendations summarised in the conclusion. 
Chapter 2 – Energy Crisis: Planning Deficit, Policy Failure and Reforms for the 
Future 
This chapter argues that Bangladesh’s development efforts are constrained by an energy crisis characterised 
by a growing deficit in power and gas supply. Rapid industrial development and consistent economic growth 
call for an uninterrupted supply of energy on a large scale, which can be currently provided only by using 
electricity and gas. While the nation has sustained high levels of economic growth over the past years (5 
to 6 per cent), unless the increasing energy shortfall in electricity and gas is addressed, it will slow down 
industrial operations, jeopardise trade and economic growth, trigger political instability and cause significant 
deterioration in citizens’ quality of life. The chapter does not attempt to examine all pertinent areas of the 
energy sector where governance plays a pivotal role, but focuses instead on how governance, or lack there of, 
impacts the institutional and policy framework, supply constraints and reform implementation in the power 
and gas sector. The findings suggest that the quality of governance in the energy sector is marred by a number 
of factors: (a) decision making led by partisan considerations instead; (b) the short term planning horizons of 
successive governments; (c) the lack of incentives for enhanced staff performance in public sector energy 
bodies; (d) the dearth of an appropriate operational environment for private sector energy companies and (e) 
the absence of an effective regulatory body. 
When specifically examining the current situation in the electricity and gas sector separately, the chapter 
makes more nuanced arguments regarding the reasons for and outcomes of governance gaps. The chapter 
notes that poor electricity sector performance over the past two decades has been due to the unavailability 
of domestic capital for financing long-term investment, lack of institutional capacity for efficient production, 
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poor management procedures, limited specialised knowledge in key policy making positions, and low 
employee commitment. It singles out increased private sector participation in electricity production and the 
establishment of the Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission (BERC) as the two main positive outcomes of 
electricity reform, observing that both of these developments are potentially transformational for the sector. 
However, the analysis shows that the precedence of political considerations over operational efficiency, the 
lack of bureaucratic incentives for accountable and competent job performance and the absence of effective 
regulation have hampered performance in the sector. The electricity crisis is closely linked to a severe 
shortfall in gas, the most important source of commercial energy in the country. It is the lack of incentives for 
international oil and gas companies (IOCs), bureaucratic planning failures and adoption of misguided policies 
and once again, the primacy of electoral considerations driven by a populist agenda that impedes efficient 
gas production and distribution.
The government has so far taken a mix of long, medium and short-term measures to tackle the energy 
crisis. With regards to increasing gas supply, it has initiated the process of natural gas exploration in offshore 
boundaries and withdrawn a nine-year injunction on inland gas explorations by international oil companies 
under production/profit sharing contracts (PSCs). While these steps are positive and will ultimately result 
in augmenting the national gas supply, they are unlikely to ameliorate the short-term gas shortage. The 
power shortfall is being addressed via the implementation of upcoming power generation projects (many of 
which are surprisingly, gas based) and marginally increasing the electricity tariff to provide greater sectoral 
income for the government. However, price increases generally are not an effective supply-side response to 
a shortage. Additionally, the government is engaging in energy management through a variety of measures, 
such as holding bilateral talks with other countries regarding energy import and trying to attract foreign direct 
investment through international road shows. These energy management strategies have been described as 
ill conceived and unlikely to have long-term effect on the energy crisis, whereas the impact of the road shows 
is yet to be publicly disclosed. 
Although the current government inherited the energy crisis, its initiatives have not addressed the core problem 
of poor governance of the sector at all levels. While it may be still early to state whether or not the government 
will be successful in fulfilling their vision for making electricity available for all by 2021, there exist some serious 
concerns regarding the current state of the sector. Firstly, the implementation of the Annual Development 
Program (ADP) allocation in 2009-10 by the Power Division has been disappointing, bringing to light the urgent 
need to improve implementation capacity and quicken service delivery. Secondly, we are yet to see a full 
commitment towards the politically challenging decision of redressing energy under-pricing. Thirdly, although 
the government has expressed concern over the excessive use of gas for generating power, it contradicts itself 
by continuing to permit installation of gas based power plants and CNG stations, while keeping existing ones 
shut for a number of hours each day. Fourthly, political considerations that influence decision making within 
the energy sector undermine the institutional autonomy of bodies such as BERC, which is crucial for achieving 
an effective and responsible regulatory mechanism. Fifthly, there is a need to formulate a pragmatic long-term 
plan to help guide the reform initiative and take into account the bureaucratic and IOC incentive structure, so 
that their role in the energy sector is more assured and service-oriented. Lastly, a major policy shift is needed in 
order to address the underlying problem of primary energy shortage. At present, there is no clear indication as to 
how the government would like to diversify the fuel mix for power generation. Many global bodies and national 
governments are looking towards renewable energy sources as a means of diversifying their fuel mix and reducing 
reliance on fossil fuels. In Bangladesh, research and praxis in this area is in its infancy, especially government-
sponsored initiatives, despite the widespread use of biomass fuels by the majority of the population.
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Chapter 3 – Food Security: Increasing Availability, Diversifying Access and 
Strengthening Governance 
Bangladesh’s progress in poverty reduction and towards food self-sufficiency in the last decade has been 
noteworthy. But while numbers hint at a success story, a more nuanced look at the story behind the numbers 
may bring little dis-comfort. Unprecedented shocks to food security are not new to Bangladesh. Its history is 
dotted with famines, cyclones and floods, which have elicited mature responses in dealing with food crises. 
The consequences of the recent global food price hike have been severe in Bangladesh, as have been the 
effects of two cyclones, Sidr and Aila. Over 40 per cent of the population still live below the food-consumption 
based poverty line and lack the income and assets to protect themselves against livelihood fluctuations, 
disease, monga (lean season hunger) or natural disasters. Food insecure households typically respond by 
decreasing diet diversity, consuming smaller food portions, reducing the number of daily meals and taking 
on unmanageable levels of debt to procure a minimum level of food. The hardest hit are fixed-income 
earners and rural households experiencing crop failure. This chapter finds that food security governance is 
characterised by the following: (a) inconsistency and non-functionality of key policies, with relevant institutions 
lacking capacity to carry out essential reforms or undertake actions to ensure food availability; (b) despite 
government commitments regarding land distribution and tenancy contracts to increase crop productivity, 
implementation is absent; (c) lack of monitoring and presence of corruption and rent-seeking behaviour in 
many government institutions related to food and (d) despite the evolution of a more pro-poor focus in the 
Public Food Distribution System (PFDS) and in Social Safety Net Programs (SSNPs), high levels of leakage and 
imperfect targeting mechanisms weaken outreach and impact. Overall, while there is a willingness to ensure 
food security, the Government is not deeply committed to implementing the steps required to reach this goal 
by avoiding politicisation of food policies and programmes.
Food security as understood by the Government of Bangladesh rests on three important pillars, i.e. availability, 
access and utilisation of food. This recognises that the government should, firstly, produce, make possible the 
production of and/or ensure sufficient quantities of food either through domestic production or through 
imports and food aid. Secondly, it should ensure people’s economic and physical access to food through 
boosting household income and government transfers. Finally, it should ensure proper utilisation of food 
through dietary diversity and health care. This framework was used as the chapter’s analytical lens. However, 
while the chapter explores availability and access to food in detail, it does not address food utilisation due to 
space constraints and the fact that the major governance concerns are in the areas of food production and 
distribution. 
An analysis of food availability in Bangladesh finds that attempts to incentivise production by increasing access 
to land have mostly been ineffective. Redistributive land reforms have been unsuccessful, with government 
lands which landless people are entitled to either being expropriated by both corrupt officials and influential 
citizens, or left undistributed. In addition, tenancy contracts are discriminatory, favouring landowners over 
tenants. With regard to increasing the productivity of land, though fertilisers and seeds are more available 
in the market following Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) reforms, there remain significant distortions in 
pricing and in the quality of these agricultural inputs. Fertiliser is the key agricultural input and production 
is critically affected by price variation, subsidies, quality, quantity and distribution. Fertiliser management in 
Bangladesh is characterised by high prices: inelastic demand, unscrupulous hoarding and international price 
volatility means that fertiliser prices have increased substantially. Although the government sets factory gate 
prices of fertiliser, it lacks the capacity to enforce and monitor whether the dealers maintain the set price, 
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allowing for distortion by unscrupulous dealers and corrupt politicians. Bottlenecks in fertiliser supply mean 
that farmers cannot access an adequate amount of fertiliser during August-October and January-March, the 
growing seasons for the main rice crops like aman and boro, partly due to the severe shortage in the supply of 
electricity and gas to production facilities, the inability to meet demand because of poor production capacity 
and misguided demand calculation and supply management. There is a lack of enforceable legal mechanisms 
to protect the quality of fertilisers, leading to the distribution of low quality and adulterated fertiliser resulting 
in lower quality and quantity of crop yield for farmers. While good quality seeds can increase rice yield by 8 
to 10 per cent, the government agency in charge of seed production and marketing has largely been unable 
to ensure efficient seed delivery and secure the active participation of private and public actors, thereby 
hampering the possibility of maximising productivity. Lack of good governance within the seed production, 
marketing and distribution system has meant that existing seed prices do not incentivise production. Neither 
are the seeds subject to strict quality control to avoid weeds, pests and disease. The lack of coordination in 
research, development and promotion of new seed varieties also limits productivity severely. The government 
procurement drive each year does not meet the target because of low price offers, high rent seeking behaviour 
and lack of storage and collection capacities. Various government bodies that are tasked with ensuring food 
availability are hampered by weak monitoring mechanisms and poor institutional capacity.
Hunger is not just caused by a reduction in the availability of food, but also by the inability of the people to 
get access to it. Regardless of whether they are food producers or not, many poor and vulnerable households 
do not enjoy food security as they are unable to afford a minimum basket of nutritious food items through 
their own production, cash earnings, market purchases and other resources. Transitory food insecurity 
caused by sudden natural disasters and price hikes have a direct detrimental effect on people’s livelihoods, 
manifested by indebtedness, sale of assets and loss of cultivable land, all of which further limit their ability 
to access food. The focus of government policy has gradually expanded to ensuring accessibility of food at 
the household and individual level by increasing purchasing power and people’s access to food. This is done 
through transitory shock management, effective implementation of targeted food assistance programmes 
and employment generating income growth. The access section of this chapter focuses on targeted food 
assistance programmes, beginning with an analysis of the hub of all food distribution activities, the PFDS, and 
follows an examination of the financing, allocation, administration and level of leakage in SSNPs. Given the 
availability of data on the Vulnerable Group Development Programme, its targeting performance, leakages 
and impact on beneficiaries can be evaluated. Findings suggest that though the PFDS has evolved a more pro-
poor focus, its distribution channels do not reflect this. Despite increasing budget allocations for SSNPs, the 
targeted interventions are not pro-poor and targeting mechanisms in general have been found to be weak with 
high levels of leakage. SSNPs in general are characterised by poor institutional governance and lack of policy 
implementation. However, the VGD programme showed no major abnormalities in its targeting mechanisms, 
though leakages were found at multiple levels. Overall, its impact on income and nutrition was quite positive. 
Lastly, beneficiaries felt that the government’s response to the 2008 food price hike, the 100-Day Employment 
Generation Programme (100-DEGP), was a success despite facing many administrative and implementation 
problems, such as, inaccurate targeting, under-coverage of beneficiaries and fund misappropriation. 
Chapter 4 –  Digital Bangladesh: The Beginning of Citizen-Centric e-Government?
The incumbent government’s unprecedented political initiative to ‘make Bangladesh digital’ provides 
an opportunity to use Information and Communications Technology (ICT) tools to further development, 
strengthen poverty reduction and improve citizens’ quality of life. The Digital Bangladesh (DB) vision is 
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being developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) funded Access to Information 
(A2I) Programme and is based in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). It envisions utilising ICT tools to foster 
socio-economic development by the year 2021, and consists of 4 pillars: developing human resources for 
the 21st century, connecting citizens in ways that are most meaningful, taking services to citizens’ doorsteps 
and making the private sector and market more productive and competitive through the use of ICTs. Given 
that the primary goal of governance is to improve citizen wellbeing, quality of life and ease of access to 
government services, this chapter focuses on the two citizen-centric pillars of the DB vision and asks how and 
what is required to achieve the goal of using technology to enhance pluralistic and pro-poor service delivery. 
The chapter argues the following: (a) the DB initiative is noteworthy and has the potential to change the way 
in which citizens access services; (b) existing legislative and regulatory frameworks, though subject to recent 
reforms, are inadequate to support the proposed types of service delivery under the DB agenda and (c) the 
flagship initiative of the DB implementation programme, the Union Information and Service Centres (UISC), 
while commendable, is not sufficiently accessible to and does not adequately cater to the rural poor. There is 
a need for more incremental, sustained steps if Digital Bangladesh’s citizen-centric mandate is to become a 
reality.
The chapter notes that the incumbent government deserves praise for providing unprecedented political 
support to the development of ICT tools for citizen empowerment through the Digital Bangladesh agenda. 
However, it argues that it has achieved mixed results regarding its willingness to implement the citizen-centric 
initiatives that the DB vision and strategy proposes. In its current state, ICT development and infrastructure in 
Bangladesh is woefully inadequate to support the DB goals. The government’s new regulatory and institutional 
initiatives — in particular passing the ICT Act 2009 and establishing high level committees devoted to the 
proliferation of ICT— are positive steps. However, much depends on whether new legislation is effectively 
implemented and whether these committees are successful in mainstreaming ICT at both governmental 
and citizen access levels. While many of the 53 initiatives will bring benefits to citizens in terms of providing 
information and specific services such as bill payment, 30 of the initiatives will most likely not translate in any 
significant changes or improvements to the existing system and only about 24 (13 of which will be in citizen 
services, and 6 in database development) may bring about some improvements to government infrastructure 
and systems. In order to create an enabling environment, there is not only a need for a change in legislation, 
but also for reform within the institutional structures that oversee the implementation of legislation.
The main initiative under the Access to Information Programme, the Union Information and Service Centre 
(UISC), is intended to realise the two citizen-centric pillars of the DB agenda –that is, connecting citizens and 
delivering services to the citizens’ doorsteps. As of 2009, a hundred UISCs have been established and there 
is a strong political impetus to establish a thousand more by the end of 2010. While these centres aim to 
bring information to the people by connecting citizens and providing services, initial observations from site 
visits indicate that they are not sufficiently accessible to the poor and do not have adequate rural-relevant 
content. Despite the fact that this is a government initiative, local government support is critical for the 
centres to survive and thrive, and financial sustainability is a concern since the money UISCs currently earn is 
not sufficient to break even without external assistance. The information and services provided by UISCs have 
not changed citizens’ accountability relationship with the government, and community awareness is essential 
if citizens are to engage meaningfully with the technology available to gain access to government services.
Although the current manifestation of DB may allow Bangladesh to enter the interaction and transaction 
phase of e-government maturity, this will be severely compromised unless the necessary infrastructural 
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initiatives such as business process re-engineering, adequate data and security provisions are implemented. 
In addition to comprehensive institutional and process reforms, a truly transformational view of e-government 
encompassing government-to-citizens, government-to-business and government-to-government backend 
initiatives is necessary to truly attain ICT enabled development outcomes. Furthermore, a long-term 
commitment to creating an ICT policy implementation road map and to institutional restructuring and 
capacity building is essential. A real threat is the discontinuation of the DB agenda beyond the tenure of the 
current government, given its highly politicised nature. 
Chapter 5 – International Labour Migration: Making Migrant Worker Welfare Central 
to Governance 
International labour migration is a crucial feature of the Bangladeshi economy –both as a driver of economic 
development and a means of livelihood for migrants’ families– and has been hailed as an economic success 
story. Government data shows that since the mid 1970s an estimated 7.5 million Bangladeshis migrated all over 
the world for economic reasons, while other sources claim that currently there are 5.4 or even 6 million out-
migrants, highlighting the paucity of accurate figures. Remittances from migrants have been rapidly growing 
over the past decade and a half, amounting to USD 10.72 billion in 2009, i.e. approximately 11 per cent of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). These have contributed significantly to economic growth and substantially 
improve the nation’s Balance of Payments (BoP) position. However, the recent global recession has caused 
dramatic loses in employment opportunities for Bangladeshi migrants in many countries, not only in the form 
of reduced job availability but also in the form of massive layoffs among the current labour force. This not only 
has a negative impact on the economy but also severely endangers the livelihoods and wellbeing of migrants’ 
families who depend on remittances. Additionally the costly and complicated migration process, the poor 
treatment that Bangladeshi migrant workers are subject to while they are abroad and their lack of protection 
by the Bangladesh government are also causes for severe concern. Against this backdrop, this chapter argues 
that governance in the international labour arena is characterised by: (a) a legislative framework that has 
recently changed its paradigm to see the state as a facilitator of international labour migration and a protector 
of migrant welfare; (b) weak and inadequate regulatory institutions that are unable to manage and monitor 
the complex migration process and ensure compliance with the sector’s fiduciary and procedural regulations; 
(c) an extremely long and complicated migration process where Bangladeshi migrants often pay double of 
what their counterparts pay in neighbouring countries; (d) the poor treatment, unfair payment practices 
and often inhumane working conditions that migrants are subject to abroad and (e) the poor response from 
successive governments regarding negotiating better terms for migrant workers and their general failure to 
protect their welfare.
The chapter focuses on the governance of international labour migration, primarily to the Middle East and 
South East Asia, the key destinations of both official and unofficial labour migrants from Bangladesh. In 
examining the legislative and regulatory framework regarding international labour migration in Bangladesh, 
we can conclude that there have been substantial improvements in the legal framework for labour migrants. 
The government now acknowledges the state’s role in supporting rather than opposing those who intend 
to leave the country, reflected in renaming of the relevant ministry in 2001 as the Ministry of Expatriates 
Welfare and Overseas Employment. Legal provisions have been made to protect migrants’ legal rights; their 
entitlements have been strengthened and welfare schemes have been established. December 2002 saw three 
new sets of rules framed regarding the migration process, the agents and bodies involved in migration and 
the provision of workers’ welfare. The Overseas Employment Policy of 2006 further elaborated workers’ rights 
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and welfare issues, while the pending threat of the global economic recession motivated the government 
to formulate in 2001 a new nine point strategy that considered the urgent need to both increase migration 
through bilateral agreements with receiving countries and improve governance in the sector. However, 
despite an enabling regulatory framework, the complex process of labour migration management is often left 
in the hands of a confusing multitude of public institutions that lack the capacity or the incentives to ensure 
regulatory compliance.
At a national level, labour migrants’ contributions have been widely acknowledged and the risks and 
malpractices of labour migration have been disclosed and publicly debated. However, the process of labour 
migration is extremely cumbersome, involving interface with multiple agencies and institutions, and becoming 
difficult to negotiate and often expensive for the potential migrant. The convoluted nature of the process 
also means that it is inefficient and poorly governed, with corruption and vested interests coming into play 
at almost every operational level of the migrant’s recruitment, administrative and departure processes. This 
creates serious governance issues that not only make the migration journey more challenging for prospective 
migrants but also make it extremely difficult to regulate, damaging the whole industry’s credibility and 
efficacy. 
The chapter argues that the core problematic feature of the labour migration process as it exists is that the 
private-government nexus reaps most of the profits, whereas workers bear the heavy costs, as well as risks 
and uncertainties. Systematic malpractices against prospective and current migrants are rife both amongst 
public and private migration facilitators. In recent years, malpractices by private recruitment agencies and 
local agents, have been highlighted, discussed and addressed quite frequently by the media, the state and 
as well as civil society organisations. However, despite the diverse mechanisms set in place to enable this, the 
state’s inability to hold licensed agencies and unlicensed sub-agents accountable has led to a continuation 
of abusive and exploitative practices that negatively impact migrant workers, and thus the industry as a 
whole. From a governance viewpoint, the low availability of credit and easy remittance facilities for migrant 
workers presents a bottleneck that creates further governance malpractices. While policy makers have been 
quick to extol the virtues that the remittances make to the national economy, they have yet to implement 
meaningful measures that financially facilitate migrants’ departure and family welfare. However, private 
sector intervention, mainly by some banks and telecom companies has improved the accessibility of financial 
services. The chapter also studies the treatment of migrant workers by their foreign employers. While the 
latter are theoretically required to comply with international and national minimum wage and working 
conditions regulations, they often ignore them. The main difficulties reported by migrant workers are low, 
delayed, partial or prolonged non-payment of salaries, as well as maltreatment by employers, extremely poor 
working conditions, abuse from employers and lack of welfare provision or help from Bangladeshi missions 
in the receiving countries. In addition to the difficult working conditions, female migrant workers face the 
increased threat of physical and mental abuse in the form of rape and sexual exploitation, as well as high risks 
of exposure to sexually transmitted infections and HIV/AIDS. The media, human rights watchdogs and civil 
society generally agree that it is the responsibility of the state and regulatory bodies to ensure that migrant 
workers, who contribute so greatly to the national economy, are not ‘punished’ for their weak social positions 
by manipulation, mistreatment and abuse.
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6 Conclusion
The efficient, inclusive and sustainable functioning of the energy, food, e-government and migration sectors is 
essential to ensure long-term good governance outcomes and improvements in citizens’ welfare and quality of 
life. Analysing the governance successes and gaps in these sectors is a vital part of making them more citizen-
centric and institutionally accountable. The Report optimistically notes that Bangladesh has taken some 
notable and encouraging policy initiatives, created successful short-term sectoral programmes, addressed 
key legislative weaknesses and drawn up long-term visions in these sectors. However, the lack of coordinated 
policy planning and implementation, the penetration of partisan political interests motivated by the five-
year electoral cycle, and the lack of accountable, transparent and sustainable institutions and mechanisms 
are some very serious shortcomings in establishing good governance in Bangladesh. After the sectoral focus 
of chapters 2 to 5, chapter 6 completes the overview with a set of crosscutting themes emerging from the 
analyses and summary recommendations on each sector.
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Bangladesh’s development efforts are constrained by an energy crisis characterised by a growing deficit 
in power and gas supply. Unless addressed, this will slow down industrial operations, jeopardise trade and 
economic growth, trigger political instability and cause significant deterioration in citizens’ quality of life. This 
chapter finds that the quality of governance in the energy sector is marred by: (1) political considerations; (2) 
short term planning horizons of successive governments; (3) lack of incentives for bureaucrats and the private 
sector and (4) the absence of an effective regulatory body. It does not attempt to examine all pertinent areas 
of the energy sector where governance may play a pivotal role, but focuses instead on how governance, or 
lack thereof, impacts the institutional and policy framework, supply constraints and reform implementation in the 
power and gas sectors. Even though the majority of the nation relies on the consumption of traditional biomass 
fuel, electricity and gas access is essential to industrial development, economic progress and improvements in 
household quality of life. The abundance of literature, data and multiple sources of information regarding the 
power and gas sector facilitate a detailed analysis. 
This chapter is primarily based on a review of the published literature, including grey literature and newspaper 
sources as well as a large number of key informant interviews with officials and staff of government agencies 
in the energy sector, as well as academics and members of civil society. It begins with a detailed contextual 
overview of the governance crisis in energy before moving on to a summary of energy sector policy goals 
over last 15 years and a description of the organisational framework for policy implementation. Secondly, it 
examines power sector reform, analysing the outcome of electricity reform initiatives in terms of good and 
bad governance. Given its prevalence and media scrutiny, a special section on ‘load shedding’ studies the 
causes and impacts on citizen welfare and economic development. Thirdly, it tackles the various aspects of 
governance failure that led to the shortfall in gas supply. Fourthly, in an effort to look at how the current state of 
the sector can be improved, it then assesses the short and long run prospects of enhancing energy production 
by reviewing current initiatives undertaken by the government, before offering a set of recommendations to 
strengthen the sector’s governance focus for a more citizen-centric approach to service delivery. A separate 
section on renewable energy acknowledges the importance of biomass fuel as a source of energy for the 
2CHAPTER The Energy Crisis: Planning Deficit, Policy Failure and Reforms for the Future
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majority of the nation’s households and look towards new forms of energy production. Lastly, the chapter 
concludes by highlighting the major findings and making recommendations for improving governance.
1 The context of the energy crisis
Before briefly outlining the background to the energy production and consumption crisis in Bangladesh, the 
following section examines the reasons for this chapter’s focus on electricity and gas. Bangladesh’s primary 
energy consumption comprises of 47 per cent commercial energy and 53 per cent renewable energy, which is 
mostly biomass (Technoconsult International Limited 2009). Of the commercial fuels, natural gas accounts for 
almost 75 per cent while the remainder is made up of imported oil, coal and hydropower. Biomass or traditional 
fuels include crop residues, animal dung and fuel wood (Asaduzzaman, Barnes and Khandker 2009). Although 
biomass is a vital energy source in rural Bangladesh, rapid industrial development and consistent economic 
growth calls for an uninterrupted supply of energy on a large scale, which can be currently provided only by 
using electricity and gas. Scaling up of renewable energy to match the productive capacity of electricity and 
gas would require an as yet unplanned capacity building at national and regional levels.  
That electricity enhances the quality of life and serves as a key component for economic growth is universally 
accepted (Khandker, Barnes and Samad 2009). However, only 40 per cent of the total population and less 
than 30 per cent of rural residents in Bangladesh have access to electricity or gas (Asaduzzaman, Barnes and 
Khandker 2009). A vast majority of the rural households and businesses can benefit significantly from moving 
up the energy ladder. Therefore, an analysis of the power and gas sectors becomes essential for finding ways 
to increase access. 
Growth in power generation has been negligible since 2002, with the existing power supply being increasingly 
inadequate and unreliable to meet the needs of a growing economy (World Bank 2009). Concurrently, demand 
for power continued to increase at the rate of over 500 megawatt (MW) per annum (World Bank 2009). As one 
of the lowest energy producers in the world, with average per capita electricity generation of 184 kilowatt-
hour (kWh), Bangladesh’s available power generation capacity of 3,600-4,300 MW is insufficient to satisfy 
demand of about 5,200 MW (Kabir 2010, World Bank 2009). Unofficial estimates place the level of electricity 
shortfall on a given day at 2,000 MW (‘Outage mounts as gas runs low’, The Daily Star, 28 March, 2010). IGS’ 
own survey research and key informant interviews also highlight low access to energy, regional discrimination 
in access provision (the lowest share of electrified households in the poorer northern districts) and the high 
degree of consumer dissatisfaction with the energy situation (IGS forthcoming)1. Generation capacity deficits 
result in frequent power failures which have impeded economic growth and industrial development; and most 
importantly, affected the general population’s quality of life. Frequent outages have prompted industries, 
shops and households to install their own back-up power supplies, pushing up the cost of living and doing 
business. Estimates equate the cost of electricity shortages at two percent of annual gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth (World Bank 2008). Indirect negative impacts of the power crisis, such as temporary closures of 
several fertiliser plants to divert natural gas to electricity generation could raise costs by much more. 
As the size of the population and economy continue to grow, total demand is projected to increase to 9,786 
MW by 2012 and 13,993 MW by 2020 (Bangladesh Power Development Board [BPDB] 2008). The incumbent 
Awami League-led government has projected the provision of an additional 9,000 MW by 2014-15 (Majid 
1 See Annex 1 for a map of district-wise access to electricity.
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2010). This means that the potential total power generation could approximately be 13,000 MW in another 
five years. These targets are highly unrealistic given the pace of implementation of ongoing and planned 
generation projects (Centre for Policy Dialogue 2009). 
 
Power shortages are mainly caused by ageing power plants and, more importantly, an inadequate supply of 
gas which fuels 85 per cent of Bangladesh’s power generation capacity (Asaduzzaman, Barnes and Khandker 
2009, Centre for Policy Dialogue 2009). Demand for gas has escalated in recent years, spurred by the growth of 
captive power plants and the use of compressed natural gas, and is predicted to rise. This is due to absence in 
availability of any other major energy source and due to an undeveloped coal sector. Even though Bangladesh 
has been producing gas for over three decades, the major gas fields remain underdeveloped and exploration 
activities have been almost stagnant in the last decade (Technoconsult International Limited 2009). While 
public sector resources are limited and unable to meet the scale of required investment for gas sector 
development, there has been little effort at creating an enabling environment for mobilising private sector 
involvement. Until and unless there is a major breakthrough, all future activities have to be based on the 
existing, fixed and recoverable reserve of 7.2 trillion cubic feet (TCF) (Petrobangla 2008). Assuming that an 
alternative fuel has not replaced gas, to meet the projected demand for gas in 2020, an additional 24 TCF of 
gas is required. This necessitates a massive investment of USD 8 billion for further exploration, development 
and production and a further USD 1.5 billion for transmission and distribution (Petrobangla 2008). 
 
1.1 The assessment of energy governance
Poor public service delivery arising from lack of citizen-centric institutions has been a popular governance 
discourse in Bangladesh (World Bank 2009, World Bank 2008, General Economics Division 2005). This chapter 
assumes that weak public service delivery in the energy sector is more to do with governance aberrations 
than supply factors. Symptoms of bad governance in the energy sector are marked by high levels of system 
loss, poorly maintained plants, financial insolvency of energy entities, low public and private investment, weak 
accountability of service providers, malpractices in procurement and contract award process etc. The eventual 
cost of bad governance is borne by the citizens through higher cost, unreliable energy supply and lower 
quality of living. Generating good governance is an essential part of energy sector development and without 
identifying and removing existing governance bottlenecks, investment alone cannot solve the energy sector 
crisis. This chapter uses four parameters for assessing governance in the energy sector. Based on an already 
existing framework developed by Ivanyna and Shah (2010), the four dimensions of governance outcomes 
are:
(I) Responsive governance – The extent to which the government promotes and delivers services 
consistent with citizen preferences.
(II) Fair/equitable governance – The extent to which the government focuses on consensus building, 
inclusiveness and protection of the poor, minorities and disadvantaged members of the society.
(III) Responsible governance – The extent to which the government authority is carried out following 
due process with integrity, reliability, fiscal prudence and concern for efficient service delivery.
(IV) Accountable governance – The extent to which the citizens can hold the government accountable 
for its actions.
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These parameters were chosen over others, such as the Overseas Development Institute’s ‘World Governance 
Assessments’ and the World Bank’s ‘World Governance Indicators’, because all four take a citizen-centric 
approach. This simple framework captures the quality of governance by assessing how the outcomes of 
various measures undertaken by the government in the energy sector “serve, preserve, protect and promote 
public interest based upon values and expectations of the citizens” (Ivanyna and Shah 2010, p.5).
2 Sector overview: policy and institutional framework
Major weaknesses in the policy and institutional frameworks of the power and gas sectors have led to bad 
governance. Firstly, ‘good’ policy goals have remained unmet over many years and mistaken policy targets do 
not get rectified. Secondly, the institutional arrangement for policy implementation appears to be diverse and 
complicated, leading to inefficient coordination between the two sectors. 
2.1 Energy planning
 
Successive governments have acknowledged the importance of energy sector development and their 
commitment is manifested in the form of various planning documents outlining their vision and policies for 
the power sector. These documents include: Power Sector Reforms in Bangladesh (1994), National Energy 
Policy 1996 (NEP), 2000 Vision and Policy Statement for Power Sector Reforms and the Power System Master 
Plan Update (2006). Some key objectives for the sector are summarised below:
The 2000 Vision and Policy Statement for Power Sector Reforms made the following vision statements (Power 
Division 2000):
•	 Make electricity available for all.
•	 Ensure reliable and quality supply of electricity.
•	 Provide electricity at a reasonable price.
In line with the vision statements, power sector reform objectives included:
•	 Provision of electricity for all citizens by 2020.
•	 Improvement in management and financial viability of the sector.
•	 Increasing private sector participation. 
•	 Use of natural gas as a primary fuel for generation and exploration of the possibility for power 
export.
This policy period was marked by a temporary surplus in the supply of gas and the only goal that was 
successfully attained was the development and use of natural gas as a primary fuel. Unfortunately, this policy 
also encouraged rapid and uncontrolled use of gas, which ultimately created the existing gas crisis. Private 
sector participation was partially allowed only in power generation. 
The Power System Master Plan Update (2006) had the following objectives, reiterating some from previous 
policy documents (Nextant 2006b):
• Make electricity available to all by 2020.
• Ensure reliable and quality supply of electricity.
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•	 Increase the sector’s efficiency.
•	 Develop demand management and energy efficiency measures.
•	 Develop alternative/renewable energy sources.
•	 Base new generation on a least cost expansion plan.
•	 Expand transmission in balance with the generation capacity
Unfortunately, most of these objectives remained unfulfilled at the end of the successive government’s term, 
indicating slow progress in policy implementation and major shortfalls in meeting long term goals for 2020. 
Moreover, the document did not recognise the impending gas supply shortage that was to become apparent 
in 2007. Nevertheless, the document recommended the need to ensure fuel availability for upcoming power 
plants.
The current Awami League-led government in their election manifesto of 2008 pledged to increase total 
power generation to 5,000 MW by 2011 and 7,000 MW by 2013 (Bangladesh Awami League 2008). Their 
related visions include:
•	 Making electricity available for all by the year 2021.
•	 Ensuring a reliable and quality supply of electricity.
•	 Providing electricity at a reasonable and affordable price.
•	 Making Bangladesh free of load shedding2 beyond 2013.
Given that all previous governments set policy goals during their tenure that remained unfulfilled, these 
visions and goals are blatantly overambitious. The end result is that after almost two decades of undertaking 
a planned approach towards energy development, development goals continue to be unrealistic. In a 
drastic move away from earlier policy emphases on increasing gas use, the incumbent government has now 
announced the urgent need for using alternative primary fuels such as coal, imported oil and even nuclear 
energy both in its election pledge and in the 2009-10 Budget Speech (Finance Division 2009). However, policy 
shift has come at a time when the country is already facing a severe gas crisis. Given the enormous lags 
between planning and policy implementation, it may be a while before actual steps are taken to implement 
such plans for fuel diversification.  
2.2 Organisational structure of the energy sector
Attaining energy policy objectives depends on the role and performance of various institutions concerned 
with energy development in the country. Over the last 15 years, the energy sector has evolved from a 
“government department to a series of state owned, business-oriented companies focusing on different lines 
of business (generation, transmission and distribution)” (World Bank 2009, p.4). However, there is a general 
feeling among government officials working in the power sector that the government may have created ‘too 
many companies to handle too little power generation and transmission’, leading to gaps in coordination and 
expertise (‘PDB’s hasty bid process unnerves power bidders’, The Daily Star, March 13, 2010). 
2  Load shedding refers to the intentionally engineered power outage on certain lines when the demand for power 
becomes greater than the supply (Nextant 2006b).
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Overall sector management is undertaken by the Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources, which 
has two divisions, the Power Division and Energy and the Mineral Resources Division giving overall policy 
directions to the power and gas sectors. The Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission (BERC) regulates 
energy sector activities. Established through a legislative act of the National Assembly in 2003, BERC did 
not become fully functional until 2007-08. BERC’s key responsibilities include issuing licenses for electricity 
generation, distribution and marketing; approving tariff revision; approving standards; initiating energy audit; 
and taking remedial action against dishonest business practices (BERC 2010). According to BERC officials, its 
achievements to date include: (a) revised bulk power tariff in October 2008; (b) revised retail power tariff in 
March 2007 and March 2010 (‘Power tariff raised from 4 to 7.62 pc’, New Nation, March 3, 2010); (c) issuance 
of 847 licenses in the power sector and 138 licenses in the gas sector and (d) increased gas prices in certain 
customer categories. 
I.  Power sector
Key power sector entities and their functions are as follows (Asaduzzaman, Barnes and Khandker 2009):
a. The Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) operates most state owned power generators 
and some urban distributors. The BPDB acts as a single buyer of electricity from public and private 
generators and sells to other distributors. 
b. The Power Cell initiates power sector reforms.
c. There are five regional power distribution companies, and the Rural Electrification Board (REB) 
undertakes nationwide rural energy distribution. 
d. The Power Grid Company of Bangladesh operates the national transmission grid. 
e. The Independent Power Producers sell electricity to the transmission company. 
f. The Chief Electrical Inspector and Electrical Advisor’s office ensures standards and provides licenses to 
power sector entities (Nextant 2003).
II. Gas sector
Key gas sector institutions and their functions are as follows:
a. The Bangladesh Oil, Gas and Mineral Corporation, also known as Petrobangla, is a monopoly supplier 
of fuels to power plants (Nextant 2006b).
b. There are three state-owned gas production companies, one of which is also engaged in gas 
exploration activities3. 
c. International Oil and Gas Companies (IOCs) are private sector, foreign owned exploration and 
production entities operating under Production Sharing Contracts. 
3  Bangladesh Petroleum Exploration Company, Bangladesh Gas Fields Company Limited and Sylhet Gas Fields Lim-
ited.
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d. The Gas Transmission Company Limited receives gas from public and private production companies 
and delivers gas to various distribution companies.
e. There are four state-owned, regional distribution entities4.
f. The Rupantarita Prakritik Gas Company Limited is a CNG marketing entity.
It is obvious from the plethora and complexity of the organisations involved in the production, sale, purchase, 
distribution and regulation of the electricity and gas sector that effective governance is a tall order. 
 
3 Governance and reform in the electricity sector
3.1 Why initiate reform?              
By the end of 1990s, the majority of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries 
(OECD) and over 70 developing and transition countries had adopted initiatives towards reforming their 
electricity sectors (Bacon 1999). The reforms occurred under a broad paradigm shift from centralised 
organisation of infrastructure and state ownership to market oriented structures, public regulation and 
private ownership often identified with the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programs (Joskow 2002). For 
developing countries the reasons for reform were due to dissatisfaction with prevailing arrangements such 
as the fiscal burden of energy subsidies, low service quality, weak tariff collection, high network losses, poor 
service coverage and growing demand for energy (Joskow 2002). 
3.2 Electricity reform in Bangladesh
Bangladesh’s power sector performed poorly throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The main sectoral constraints 
were: (a) unavailability of long-term domestic capital for financing investment, (b) lack of institutional 
capability for efficient operation, (c) limited foreign exchange debt service capability of the country, (d) poor 
management systems and procedures and (e) low employee commitment (Nextant 2006b). Consequently 
there was a demand for reform from various quarters leading the Power Sector Reforms in Bangladesh (1994), 
which outlined a reform process to address these constraints (Nextant 2006b). In 1996, the National Energy 
Policy was developed.
The subsequent power sector reform process has been gradual (Power Division 2008a). First, separable 
technical functions were unbundled into generation, transmission, and distribution. Second, private sector 
participation in generation was allowed. Third, state enterprises, mainly in distribution, were corporatised. 
Fourth, the BPDB became the owner of some of the corporatised and decentralised bodies of the previous 
state-owned subsystems5 and began to operate as a single buyer of electricity. And lastly, in order to separate 
sector regulation and operation, BERC was formed to monitor downstream operations (sale and distribution), 
while upstream operations (exploration and production) fell under BPDB and Petrobangla regulation.      
4  Titas Gas Transmission and Distribution Company Limited, Bakhrabad Gas Systems Limited, Jalalabad Gas 
Transmission and Distribution Company Limited and Pashchimanchal Gas Company Limited.
5  BPDB has 4 subsidiary companies (BPDB 2010)
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3.3 Good governance outcomes associated with reform
 
These reform measures have contributed to some good governance outcomes that are described below and 
their impact on the overall quality of governance is assessed using the four governance parameters introduced 
earlier.
 I.  Increased private sector participation
In a move away from the dominant state involvement of the past, the reform programme allowed a more 
conducive climate for private investment in electricity generation. This has led to positive governance 
outcomes by promoting private sector participation in electricity generation, directly addressing people’s 
need for increasing generation and improving access to modern energy. As of 2008/09 the cumulative installed 
capacity of independent power producers (IPPs), including small power plants and power rental companies, 
stood at 2,100 MW. This is 35 per cent of overall installed capacity of 6,033 MW (Majid 2010), indicating that 
in the future the private sector holds significant prospects for adding capacity to the national grid if provided 
the correct incentives. Figure 1 illustrates the sharp increase in private power generation in terms of gigawatt 
hours (GWh) from 1998/99 to 2002/03, after which there was a marked reduction in the rate of increase as no 
new major generation capacity was added since then (WB 2009). 
   
Figure 1: Energy generation
Source: Bangladesh Power Development Board 2008
 
II.  Establishment of a regulatory body 
The electricity sector regulatory body BERC has taken a number of positive steps towards enhancing 
governance. It is in the process of implementing a unified system of accounts for energy utilities, which is 
expected to create a more transparent, consistent and comparable system of financial recording. A substantial 
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portion of BERC’s budget was covered from its own earnings in 2007-08, signifying its growing financial 
independence. The government allocated Tk.10 million as budget support for BERC, but it independently 
earned Tk.34 million through various fees and charges (Finance Division 2008). According to its senior 
management, the Commission has by now become entirely independent, signalling the potential to conduct 
operations free from political interference. In order to be more responsive to the concerns of citizens, BERC 
has introduced open meetings and public hearings, typically for the review process of tariffs and license 
applications, providing citizens with the opportunity to voice their suggestions and complaints. These public 
sessions involve wide stakeholder participation by consumer group representatives, business associations, 
energy sector entities, the media and NGOs among others. It has also started an outreach programme at the 
district level, which involves senior officials responding directly to complaints from local energy consumers. 
Although regulatory decisions by BERC are not ultimately based on these public interactions, it is nevertheless 
a first step towards building a sustainable and transparent process in which public service providers can be 
held accountable for their actions. 
3.4 Governance factors undermining reform outcome
Despite some encouraging positive outcomes, the broad objectives of the power sector reforms agenda 
remain unfulfilled (Khan 2010). While reform initiatives were essential, they were not sufficient to bring about 
the necessary improvements. The major obstacles to reform implementation and improving governance 
outcomes are outlined below: 
  
I.  Political considerations 
According to expert and key informant interviews, political considerations and interference constrain the quality 
of governance in multiple ways. Lack of understanding of the fundamentals of reform and an unwillingness 
to be politically unpopular has led to tariff under-pricing by successive governments. Given the five-year 
life cycle for political parties in power, incumbent governments are reluctant to raise the price of electricity 
for fear of upsetting the vote bank. The artificial pricing mechanism is supported by a market structure that 
follows the single buyer model, where the BPDB is the sole buyer of electricity. Figure 2 compares the average 
billing rate charged by the BPDB to distribution companies to the BPDB’s per unit supply cost of electricity 
over time. It highlights that the BPDB’s average billing rate remained almost unchanged over two decades: it 
was Tk.2.3 per kWh in 1990-91 and Tk.2.4 per kWh in 2007-08. Meanwhile, the per unit supply cost of electricity 
increased steadily over the last decade, from Tk.2.2 per kWh in 1996-97 to Tk.2.9 per kWh in 2007-08 (BPDB 
2008). Consequently, the subsidy means there is a widening gap between the power tariff and cost of supply 
in recent years. Despite mounting BPDB losses, its average billing rate actually declined during 1991-92 to 
1994-95, 2003-04 and 2005-06, presumably due to political pressures.
Due to this chronic under-pricing, sectoral reforms failed to correct the financial losses of state-owned entities, 
slowing down coverage expansion and service improvement, and ultimately placing enormous pressure on 
the national budget. While BERC has raised bulk and retail power tariffs, these were moderate increases and 
not sufficient to fully cover costs. So although the fiscal pressure on the government has declined in recent 
years, it is still significant. Among the energy entities, the BPDB has the largest net financial losses of Tk.9.8 
billion in 2007-08 (BPDB 2008). Given its large outstanding balances in unpaid customer electricity bills, it has 
failed to meet its debt service obligations to the government over many years. In 2007-08, the BPDB’s long-
term liabilities amounted to Tk.65.5 billion, of which government loans were Tk.42 billion and foreign loans 
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were Tk.23.5 billion (BPDB 2008). The government is forced to service power sector debt out of its revenues, 
thereby continuing to provide large sectoral subsidies that enable high levels of inefficiency in operation. In 
terms of the consumer, the main beneficiaries of these subsidies are not the poor who do not have electricity 
coverage, but the urban middle and upper-middle class households with access. Because utilities have been 
insulated from market pressure for so long they are unresponsive to customer needs, ultimately resulting in 
poor governance outcomes. 
Figure 2:  Trends in the BPDB’s average billing rate and electricity supply cost
Source: Bangladesh Power Development Board 2008
The quality of governance is also marred by the deep mistrust and historically non-cooperative and adverse 
relationship between the two leading political parties. With one party blaming the other for the energy 
crisis, the focus is taken away from the goal of delivering power to the citizens. There is also no meaningful 
parliamentary engagement on energy policy matters. This drastically slows down the policy implementation 
process. Interviews with rental power plant bidders revealed that political considerations are often pivotal 
in awarding contracts to private actors for electricity production, meaning that they often do not go to the 
most able companies, rather those with political connections. In addition, the politicisation of labour unions 
and day-to-day political interference in operations has delayed improvements in the commercial operations 
of utilities. 
II.  Lack of bureaucratic incentives
Bureaucrats play a critical role in determining how state-owned bodies function and what policies are 
adopted. Any electricity reform that aims to inject competition and reduce the discretionary power of 
bureaucrats will face tough opposition in implementation. A donor agency representative comments that this 
became apparent when BPDB staff resistance to power sector reforms led to the creation of a separate reform 
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implementation entity called the Power Cell. Absence of the right incentive structure has created a system 
that lacks support from bureaucrats and has low accountability, leading to expensive delays in decision-
making and policy implementation. A 10-year delay in the implementation of a Tk. 3.4 billion power project 
incurred the government an additional implementation cost of Tk.5.4 billion (‘Delay to cost govt Tk.536cr’, The 
Daily Star, April 20, 2010). Bureaucratic incentives and responsibility structure is hampered by: (1) Frequent 
transfers that create discontinuity in senior management and prevent reform effectiveness and ownership; (2) 
Centralised decision making and interference by the Ministry on matters of staff appointment, promotion and 
transfer; (3) Appointment of unmotivated and unqualified staff; (4) Lack of autonomy and fiscal freedom of 
the operating companies and (5) Low salaries compared to equivalent jobs in the private sector. This results in 
a sector that is managed by often inefficient, unengaged and politically influenced bureaucrats who may not 
always have the optimal operation of the organisation or the maximisation of public satisfaction in mind. 
III.  Absence of effective regulation 
BERC’s regulatory process has often failed to create a governance environment that is transparent, inclusive 
and citizen-centric. According to several consumer group representatives who are also regular participants at 
BERC’s public events, following a change of government in 2009, there has been a slide in the Commission’s 
effectiveness and ability to work as an autonomous and impartial agency. They disclosed that alleged political 
interference in the changing of the organisation’s leadership and scope of work, e.g. when and how BERC 
should respond to retail tariff applications have compromised its moral authority to function independently 
(World Bank 2009). The Commission’s rationale and impartiality in awarding licenses was also questioned when 
it continued to approve installation of CNG stations and gas-fired power plants at a time when the country is 
experiencing an unprecedented gas crisis (‘BERC okays installation of 22 more CNG stations: approval comes 
when existing ones face gas crisis’, New Nation, January 20, 2010). A consumer group member claimed that the 
verdicts of BERC’s hearings, intended to improve transparency and accountability of the regulatory system, 
are actually decided in an arbitrary manner. 
BERC’s autonomy is weakened to a large extent by its continued dependence on the Ministry. Key informant 
interviews reveal that the Ministry undertakes appointment and removal of senior management without 
following due process. Moreover, the introduction of the government pay structure for BERC staff does not 
provide incentives for the appropriate mix of qualified workforce6. To date the most serious form of protest 
against BERC’s actions has been in the form of a legal notice served by a consumer organisation in 2009 
challenging the government for what the organisation considered an ‘illegal’ appointment of a senior staff, 
in contradiction to provisions laid out in the BERC Act 2003 (‘Govt served with legal notice to cancel ‘illegal’ 
appointment of BERC member’, New Age, May 26, 2009). To what extent consumers can hold BERC accountable 
remains to be seen.
In addition to the above weaknesses in power sector governance that ultimately lead to poor outcomes for 
energy consumers, the power crisis is largely a result of the power sector’s heavy reliance on gas for primary 
fuel and the failure to effectively govern the gas sector. These are discussed in greater detail in the next 
section. Box 1 below, outlines, contextualises and analyses the on-going problem of electricity load shedding 
that severely affects citizen’s quality of life and impinges on business efficiency and industrial productivity. 
6  The Chairman and Members are under a separate compensation structure.
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This problem was critical during 2009, especially in the summer months, and the situation has continued to 
worsen, negatively impacting national life during the current year. It has received a lot of media attention and 
is a source of public frustration across the nation.
The cause of this intensified load shedding regime has been the slow effort towards increasing power supply. 
The last major addition to generation capacity was in 2002, when the power sector witnessed a dramatic 
improvement in supply and lowest level of recent load shedding (WB 2009). While it is clear from this chapter’s 
analysis that increased power generation capacity is vital, the government’s ad hoc demand management 
measures have done little to ease the suffering of consumers.
Box 1:  Load shedding
Load shedding refers to the intentionally engineered power outage on certain lines when the demand for 
power becomes greater than the supply (Nextant 2006b). Load shedding generally results from insufficient 
power generation capacity or inadequate transmission infrastructure to deliver sufficient power to a certain 
area, and is done to avoid a total blackout of the power system. Routine load shedding is a staple of daily life 
in Bangladesh, despite promises by successive governments to eradicate it. This year has been particularly 
severe due to the increasing shortfall in gas supply for the power plants and the shortage in rural electricity 
supply to power irrigation systems in the planting season. Many areas across the country face acute load 
shedding, during both day and night, with rural customers affected more disproportionately. Many rural 
farmers and residents interviewed report having access to electricity sporadically and often only  a few hours 
in the day. Although in cases of planned load shedding the government informs consumers in specific areas, 
many parts of the country and Dhaka city continued to experience unplanned outages. 
While the problem was severe in 2009, the situation worsened in March 2010 with the government imposition 
of two-hour long load shedding every two hours in Dhaka. This replaced the regular practice of load shedding 
at every alternate hour in order to convince the public that there were fewer outages (‘Two hour load shedding 
to resume today’, New Age, March 28, 2010). However, the new schedule was met with strong criticism and 
resentment from electricity consumers who felt that they were worse off. Households and businesses with 
stand-by generators found it difficult and expensive to run their generators for two hours at a stretch. The 
previous schedule of one-hour long load shedding every alternate hour resumed in April (‘PM asks for load 
shedding every alternate hour’, The Daily Star, April 8, 2010). Official estimates calculate the load shedding 
shortfall at 1,500 MW. However, unofficial estimates hover around 2,000 MW, demonstrating that the situation 
is worse than the government is willing to admit.
4 State of governance in the gas sector
4.1  The demand-supply gap: reasons for the governance failure  
The electricity crisis is closely linked to a severe shortfall in gas supply. Bangladesh started fuel switching from 
oil to gas in the early 1970s, when an oil embargo forced all countries to look for alternative fuels (Petrobangla 
2008). Two and a half decades later, gas has become the most important source of commercial energy in 
the country. Figure 3 illustrates that from 1980-81 to 2008-09, annual gas production rose from 49.9 billion 
cubic feet (BCF) to 653.9 BCF, representing an exponential growth in the country’s gas producing capacity 
(Petrobangla 2008). Figure 4 shows the increase in number of consumers from a little over 400,000 to almost 
2 million during this period (Petrobangla 2008). Government estimates place total proven recoverable 
reserves at 15.6 TCF, of which 8.4 TCF have already been produced and 7.2 TCF remain as recoverable reserves 
(Petrobangla 2008). 
 Figure 3: Total gas production                       Figure 4:          Growth of customer base
                            Source: Petrobangla 2008                        Source: Petrobangla 2008
Since the late 1990s the gap between demand and supply of gas widened rapidly. The current daily gas supply 
shortfall is estimated at 300 million cubic feet (MCF) (‘Energy crisis puts economy at risk’, The Daily Star, April 
4, 2010). A bureaucrat interviewed commented that in absence of a relatively cheap alternative fuel, demand 
for gas grew beyond what was projected, mainly led by industries wanting to take advantage of cheap energy. 
However, rising demand could not be matched by uninterrupted and sustainable supply. Gas supplies have 
not been augmented due to a variety of reasons. Neither the government nor the IOCs have carried out 
significant new exploration activities since 2001. Petrobangla’s projections estimated that existing proven 
reserves would support gas-based activities at the current rate of demand until 2011 Petrobangla (2008). 
However, the shortfall in gas supply occurred much earlier in 2007, implying that the demand-supply gap was 
widening faster than predicted. Unless new gas reserves are discovered or a viable alternative fuel is used in 
its place, all future gas-based activities will have to be based on the remaining but depleting volume of gas 
(Petrobangla 2008).
In key informant interviews, sectoral experts claim that deteriorating quantity, quality and access to public 
sector delivery of gas reflects a failure on the part of successive governments to make bold decisions on 
matters of national priority, and their continued inability to address some basic citizen needs. The gas crisis 
can be attributed to the following governance shortfalls: 
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Box 1:  Load shedding
Load shedding refers to the intentionally engineered power outage on certain lines when the demand for 
power becomes greater than the supply (Nextant 2006b). Load shedding generally results from insufficient 
power generation capacity or inadequate transmission infrastructure to deliver sufficient power to a certain 
area, and is done to avoid a total blackout of the power system. Routine load shedding is a staple of daily life 
in Bangladesh, despite promises by successive governments to eradicate it. This year has been particularly 
severe due to the increasing shortfall in gas supply for the power plants and the shortage in rural electricity 
supply to power irrigation systems in the planting season. Many areas across the country face acute load 
shedding, during both day and night, with rural customers affected more disproportionately. Many rural 
farmers and residents interviewed report having access to electricity sporadically and often only  a few hours 
in the day. Although in cases of planned load shedding the government informs consumers in specific areas, 
many parts of the country and Dhaka city continued to experience unplanned outages. 
While the problem was severe in 2009, the situation worsened in March 2010 with the government imposition 
of two-hour long load shedding every two hours in Dhaka. This replaced the regular practice of load shedding 
at every alternate hour in order to convince the public that there were fewer outages (‘Two hour load shedding 
to resume today’, New Age, March 28, 2010). However, the new schedule was met with strong criticism and 
resentment from electricity consumers who felt that they were worse off. Households and businesses with 
stand-by generators found it difficult and expensive to run their generators for two hours at a stretch. The 
previous schedule of one-hour long load shedding every alternate hour resumed in April (‘PM asks for load 
shedding every alternate hour’, The Daily Star, April 8, 2010). Official estimates calculate the load shedding 
shortfall at 1,500 MW. However, unofficial estimates hover around 2,000 MW, demonstrating that the situation 
is worse than the government is willing to admit.
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I.  Lack of incentives for international oil and gas companies (IOCs)
The government’s inability to provide an incentive mechanism that protects national interests yet makes 
gas exploration attractive for IOCs has been one of the biggest governance failures in the gas sector. 
Consequently, there has been no significant new exploration activity for over a decade, putting existing 
reserves under enormous pressure. The scale of investments required, the enormous risks involved and 
public resource constraints for exploration and production activities make it vital to engage the IOCs in gas 
sector development. Academicians interviewed revealed that IOCs produce more than 50 per cent of gas 
while controlling less than 40 per cent of the reserves. The intentions and role of IOCs have been viewed with 
suspicion since several gas field blowouts7 caused extensive loss of natural gas and grave environmental and 
ecological damage. These provoked large-scale criticism of the exploitative role of the IOCs by media and civil 
society. The government’s hesitation in deciding how much foreign involvement would be appropriate, their 
reluctance to take unpopular decisions and inability to maintain focus on the end goal of providing citizens 
with access to modern energy has in turn created the following disincentives for the IOCs to engage in new 
exploration: 
a. Lack of market assurance: Academicians and international donor agency representatives interviewed 
have argued that compared to IPPs, IOCs in Bangladesh operate under more stringent conditions and 
lack market assurance. In 1999, there was a short-term surplus of gas estimated to satisfy demand for 
ten years (Tamim 2009). But due to low foreign exchange reserve holdings and relatively low demand 
for gas at the time, the government was unable to provide market assurance on gas purchase from 
IOCs. A proposal by an IOC for the pipeline export of gas to India was also turned down since the 
PSC terms did not provide for this possibility8. However, this proposal initiated vigorous national 
debate (Tamim 2009). The dominant public view was that the PSCs allowed too much foreign control 
of a domestic resource and that reserves should instead be saved for domestic consumption. Two 
outcomes resulted: (1) The government’s inability to provide some sort of market assurance to the 
IOCs came at a cost as the IOCs stopped drilling for new gas fields, except in areas where they were 
obligated; (2) The government’s policy thrust turned towards intensified domestic use of gas, in order 
to suppress the question of gas export.
The decision to ignore the findings of two reports prepared by two different committees formed by 
Energy Ministry that examined issues related to gas export showed poor decision making and short 
sightedness in the government’s part9. One committee advised that if the government’s decision to 
prevent gas export by the IOCs lead to ‘non-exploration for more gas by the IOCs as well as non-
availability or insufficiency of financing for Petrobangla’s own efforts, then indeed far greater energy 
7  In 1997, there was blowout at a well drilled by Occidental. In 2005 there were two consecutive blowouts in gas 
fields operated by Niko Resources Limited. (‘Bangladesh: gas explosion: compensation from Niko, Unocal demanded’, 
New Nation, June 13, 2006; ‘Two separate blowouts in Feni gas-field: govt. to resolve Niko issue out of court’, New Nation, 
February 7, 2010).
8  When a commercial discovery is made, PSCs allow Petrobangla the first right of refusal. If Petrobangla is unable to 
buy the gas, then IOCs can sell it any local third party. However, in the event the third party refuses to buy, IOCs are al-
lowed to export gas in the form of liquid natural gas (LNG) and subject to other conditions (Tamim 2009).
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insecurity would result, leading to a dead-end situation’ (Committee on Utilisation of Natural Gas in 
Bangladesh 2002, p.58). Thus the Committee recommended that IOCs should be allowed to export 
their share of gas from newly discovered reserves only (Tamim 2009). The rationale for this was 
that additional revenues would act as an incentive to invigorate exploration, increase gas reserves 
and generate revenues for the government to implement necessary reforms and development 
programmes. This finding was supported by the second committee report on demand projections, 
which stressed the urgency of finding new gas reserves in order to avoid a supply shortfall as early 
as 2010 if new discoveries were not made (Committee on Utilisation of Natural Gas in Bangladesh, 
2002, p.58; Tamim 2009). According to a field expert, the government did not act on the report 
findings because they feared a political backlash. By postponing a politically difficult decision that 
is economically advantageous and extremely consequential for the country’s energy situation, the 
government chose to protect its immediate political survival while disregarding strategic needs of 
citizens. At the same time, the government also did not seriously engage its national company in 
exploration activity (Tamim 2009). The result of this negligence was uncontrolled and unplanned 
expansion of domestic gas use, but without significant discovery of new gas fields for over ten years. 
b. Public Interest Litigation (PIL): New gas exploration activities have been almost stagnant since 2001 
due to a writ petition filed at the High Court as Public Interest Litigation in 1998, following a massive 
gas field explosion in the previous year (‘Govt. mulls fresh round of onshore bidding for gas, oil’, 
Financial Express, April 28, 2010).  Following the petition, the High Court issued an injunction against 
all future onshore and offshore gas exploration activities under PSCs. This prevented Petrobangla 
from conducting any exploratory activities with the help of IOCs, and effectively delayed gas sector 
development. In 2006, the injunction order was modified by the High Court to exclude offshore 
blocks from the PSCs. The injunction was finally lifted by the High Court in January 2010 after the 
government filed a prayer to the court for its withdrawal in 2008 (‘Bangladesh court overturns gas 
lease injunction’, Reuters India, January 29, 2010). Interviews with a senior Petrobangla official reveal 
that although the High Court decision is expected to restart on-shore gas exploration activities, any 
discovery (assuming there is successful exploration) is unlikely to produce positive results in terms 
of production before 2015-16. The almost decade-long delay in lifting the injunction, despite the 
growing need for large-scale exploration efforts has resulted in governance that is slow in responding 
to citizens’ urgent need for an increased gas supply. 
c. Long bidding process: Interviews with field experts revealed that long delays in awarding contracts 
to bidders, because of unqualified Petrobangla staff lacking knowledge on the bidding process is 
a major disincentive to IOCs and has delayed the much needed gas exploration activities. For the 
offshore bidding round that was launched in 2008, the decision to award the PSCs was made more 
than a year later and even then, negotiations remained incomplete (‘Bangladesh govt awards offshore 
blocks to ConocoPhillips and Tullow Oil’, Energy-pedia News, August 25, 2009). Given that bids are 
expensive, this is enormous waste of government funds. 
9  The Committees were: Committee on Utilization of Natural Gas in Bangladesh and Committee for Gas Demand 
Projections and Determination of Reserve and Gas Resource Potential in Bangladesh. Their reports were on: 1) the re-
source potential for recoverable reserves and future demand and (2) options for better gas utilization.
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d. Low prices: The relatively low price of gas is a major disincentive for IOCs to participate in gas 
exploration and production. Tamim (2010) states that Petrobangla has purchased gas from IOCs 
at an average price ranging between USD 0.8 per MCF and USD 1.7 per MCF during the last ten 
years. This is extremely low compared to gas trade prices in the international market10 and is thus a 
disincentive for IOCs to operate in Bangladesh. Gas experts believe that the third Licensing Round for 
offshore exploration blocks launched by the Caretaker Government in 2008 received low response 
from potential bidders, particularly the major IOCs due to the comparatively low price of gas11. By 
pandering to political sensitivities regarding foreign oil companies, the government kept better 
known and experienced bidders away and restricted what could have been a more competitive 
bidding process. 
II.  Planning failures and mistaken policies
Despite increased dependency on gas by the power, fertiliser and industrial sectors between 1980-2008 
(Figure 5), sectoral policies and reforms have been invariably formed on an ad hoc basis and without serious 
planning and coordination by the government and between energy entities, such as BPDB and Petrobangla 
(Technoconsult International Limited 2009). Weak governance in the gas sector is reflected in the previous 
misguided policy thrust towards gas-based power generation, intended to meet the immediate fuel 
requirements of power plants. However, this does not ensure adequate fuel supply availability which should 
be a prerequisite. A former bureaucrat stated that it is only in recent years that Petrobangla has acknowledged 
that there may not be a sufficient supply of gas available to meet incremental demand. Concerns over gas 
supply have now compelled the government to shift policy focus from single-fuel to the more expensive 
dual-fuel power plants (Finance Division 2009; ‘5 deals signed on power plants’, The Daily Star, April 27, 2010). 
According to an international donor agency representative, in the absence of a ‘planned approach’, such a 
shift in policy focus is simply a ‘crisis management approach’ that could have been avoided had there been a 
thorough assessment of the supply and demand situation and a long-term gas management strategy based 
on such assessment. There is much indecisiveness over fuel diversification through coal development and 
new gas-based power plants and CNG stations are still being established (Al-Mahmood 2010). This suggests 
that the energy crisis will be extended due to the government’s inadequate planning and slow response 
towards meeting people’s needs.
10  Qatar recently signed a 20-year flat rate LNG contract with Japan for 4 tcf at $10.75 per one thousand British thermal 
unit.(mBtu) (Tamim 2010)
11  Media reports attributed poor bid participation by IOCs to: (1) an inadequate international campaign to attract 
investors; (2) insufficient seismic data on the hydrocarbon blocks offered for exploration; (3) rigid PSC conditions; (4) 
concurrent tenders in India and Myanmar which diverted potential bids away from Bangladesh; and (5) concerns about 
the proximity of maritime boundaries of some blocks to India and Myanmar. (‘Petrobangla draws poor bidding response 
for exploring hydrocarbon’, Priyo News, July 6, 2008; ‘Lukewarm response to offshore bidding’, The Daily Star, May 8, 2008)
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Figure 5: Growth in demand for gas
Source: Petrobangla 2008
In addition to the above governance shortcomings that are specific to the gas sector, there are governance 
failures in gas sector management that are common to the power sector.
III.  Political considerations driven by populist agenda
As evidenced by the government’s populist policy for gas under-pricing, political considerations have a 
detrimental effect on augmenting gas supply. Comparing Bangladesh’s gas prices with its neighbours and 
other Asian countries, Figure 6 illustrates that Bangladesh’s natural gas tariff is the lowest in almost all 
consumer categories (Petrobangla 2008). A key bureaucrat interviewed explained that the justification for the 
government’s populist approach was partly that relatively low energy prices would facilitate industrialisation, 
higher agricultural output and general improvement in quality of life for the general public. But more 
importantly low prices would appeal to households and businesses and thus minimise the threat of vote 
bank alienation. In reality, low gas pricing has led to the wasteful and unsustainable use of gas and high 
opportunity costs in terms of foregone resources that could have been mobilised to support the sector’s 
massive development financing needs (Technoconsult International Limited 2009). 
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Figure 6: Gas tariff in Bangladesh and neighbouring countries
Source: Petrobangla 2008
IV.  Bureaucratic mismanagement
Gas experts believe that with efficient management of existing Petrobangla wells, there is ample opportunity 
for production enhancement up to 300 million standard cubic feet per day. However, this is unlikely to occur. 
The time lag in gas field explorations, neglect in taking up new activities in known fields and the slow progress 
towards improved management in the sector are caused by bureaucratic inefficiency and poor executing 
agency leadership. Similar to the power sector, there is little incentive for senior bureaucrats to take risks or 
build capacity to ensure better governance quality. Centralised decision-making has resulted in unnecessary 
interference by the ministry. Moreover, the poor pay structure in Petrobangla and its companies does not 
match the worldwide trend of high-energy sector salaries, even in government owned companies. As a result, 
bureaucrats who have limited technical knowledge or commitment to the sector’s development often handle 
critical gas sector issues. 
5 Initiatives undertaken by the government and challenges faced
 
The Awami League-led alliance won a landslide victory in the ninth national parliamentary elections held on 
December 29, 2008. The party detailed their energy sector vision and strategy to address the current crisis in 
their manifesto (Awami League 2008). As outlined and analysed below, the government has so far taken a mix 
of long, medium and short-term measures to tackle the energy crisis. While many of these steps are timely and 
important, none of them address the pivotal problem of poor governance: 
5.1  Natural gas exploration in off-shore boundaries 
The government has awarded three off-shore gas blocks in the Bay of Bengal to two IOCs for hydrocarbon 
exploration and extraction (Quadir 2009). However, an academician in the field reports that the process for 
finalising the PSC is yet to be completed even though the round of bidding for offshore exploration has been 
underway since March 2008, indicating that it will be a lengthy wait before this initiative yields tangible 
results. 
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5.2  Withdrawal of nine-year injunction on inland explorations under PSCs 
A nine-year-old injunction that prevented the government from awarding any onshore gas exploration 
contracts to IOCs under PSCs was withdrawn in January 2010 (‘Bangladesh court overturns gas lease injunction’, 
Reuters India, January 29, 2010). Although this development may infuse more dynamism into onshore gas 
exploration activities, it is unlikely to add to gas production capacity in the short term. 
5.3 Upcoming power generation projects
The government expects to generate an additional 9,901 MW power by 2014-15 through both private and 
public endeavours (Majid 2010). Annex 3 provides a detailed list of upcoming power generation projects from 
the last quarter of 2009-10 until 2014-15 (Majid 2010). Provided these projects are completed successfully 
and on time, there will be additional power generation of 552 MW in April-June 2010; 240 MW in 2010-11; 
2,389 MW in 2011-12; 2,500 MW in 2010-13; 1,620 MW in 2013-14; and 2,600 MW in 2014-15. Given that the 
government has acknowledged the need for diversifying the fuel mix (‘Bangladesh plans dual-fuel policy for 
power plants’, Reuters India, May 17, 2009), it is surprising that many of the upcoming power plants continue 
to be gas based, as Figure 7 demonstrates. Immediate efforts to generate more power include a temporary 
diversion of gas from fertiliser factories to the power sector. This required the government to close down 
several fertiliser factories in 2010 (‘Govt. decides to stop gas supply to three fertiliser factories’, New Nation, 
March 31, 2010).
                        
Figure 7: Expected power addition from upcoming power plant projects
Note: (1) HFO = Heavy fuel oil. (2) Sources of renewable energy include solar power and wind power.                
Source: Majid 2010 [Annex 3]
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5.4  Attracting foreign direct investment through road shows
The government organised the Bangladesh Investment Conference and Road Show on Power and Energy 
Projects in London, Singapore and New York between December 2009 and January 2010 in order to attract 
USD 5 billion in foreign investment for nine power projects, (‘Bangladesh seeks $5 billion foreign investment’, 
The Daily Star, December 13, 2009). The impact of the road show is yet to be publicly disclosed.  
5.5 Energy demand management
The government has taken several measures to manage energy flow and save power. According to a BPDB 
official, these measures include reducing business hours for shops; replacing incandescent lamps with 
the energy saving compact fluorescent lamps; introducing the daylight saving time; restricting use of air 
conditioning units during peak hours and providing fiscal incentives for the production of renewable energy. 
However, the measures have been criticised as ‘amateurish’, ‘ill-conceived’ and ad-hoc solutions to the actual 
problem (‘Power crisis: government floundering in response’, The Daily Star, April 1, 2010). Moreover to what 
extent some of the demand management measures could be enforced and monitored is uncertain (‘Darkness 
deepens’, The Daily Star, March 31, 2010). The cabinet permanently cancelled Daylight Saving Time system as 
a measure to reduce the power supply shortage, given its ineffectiveness (‘Cabinet Cancels Daylight Saving 
Time’, The Daily Star, March 22, 2010).   
5.6 Increased power tariff
In an effort to address the politically challenging issue of inefficient energy pricing, BERC marginally increased 
retail power tariffs of four distributing companies by 5.98-6.99 per cent with effect from March 1, 2010 (‘6-7 
Percent rise in power tariff’, The Daily Star, March 3, 2010). Successive governments have found it necessary 
to raise power tariffs at regular intervals to support the enormous subsidies provided to energy entities. 
However, many question whether the increase in utility rates are a lasting, positive solution for increasing 
power supply, particularly given that price increases are not an effective supply-side response to the energy 
shortage (‘Effecting hike to CNG price, power tariff is no sustainable solution’, The Financial Express, June 17, 
2010). 
5.7 Increasing energy trade
The government has held multiple bilateral talks with other countries regarding energy import. These 
include:
a. A memorandum of understanding (MoU) with India for open-ended import and export of power. 
Among other issues, the MoU covers: (a) grid interconnection between India and Bangladesh; (b) the 
joint-venture installation of two coal-fired power plants in Bangladesh with cumulative generating 
capacity of 1,320 MW and (c) training of BPDB staff in India (‘1,320MW plant: Dhaka, Delhi sign MoU’, 
The Daily Star, February 21, 2010).
b. Developing a regional power grid that can potentially allow energy trade among member countries 
(‘SAARC summit opens in Thimpu, Hasina for regional power grid: Himalayan Council, IARC to combat 
impact of climate change urged’, New Nation, April 29, 2010). 
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c. A MoU with Russia to develop a nuclear power plant that can produce up to 1,000 MW. (‘Bangladesh 
signs MOU with Russia for nuclear power’, Reuters, May 13, 2009). However, since the agreement was 
signed in October 2009, there has been no progress on actual installation (‘Outage mounts as gas 
runs low’, The Daily Star, March 28, 2010).  
Although the current government inherited the energy crisis, its initiatives have not addressed the core 
problem of poor governance of the sector at all levels. While it may be still early to state whether or not the 
government will be successful in fulfilling their vision for making electricity available for all by 2021, there 
exist some serious concerns over the government’s capacity to effectively manage the energy sector. Firstly, 
implementation of the Annual Development Programme (ADP) allocation in 2009-10 by the Power Division 
has been disappointing, as in other years. ADP power sector allocation of Tk.38 billion was revised down 
to Tk.26 billion, a cut of over 30 percent (Finance Division 2010; ‘Power Ministry may seek Tk 5,200 crore12 
allocations in coming budget for power sector’, UNB Connect, April 5, 2010). This brings to light the urgent 
need to improve implementation capacity and quicken service delivery. Secondly, the government is yet 
to show full commitment towards the politically challenging decision of redressing energy under-pricing. 
Although there have been increases in power tariffs, there are not enough. Thirdly, although the government 
has expressed concern over the excessive use of gas for generating power, it contradicts itself by continuing 
to permit installation of gas based power plants and CNG stations. Fourthly, political considerations that 
influence decision making within the energy sector undermine the institutional autonomy of bodies such 
as BERC, which is crucial for achieving an effective and responsible regulatory mechanism. Fifthly, the 
government must formulate a pragmatic long-term plan to help guide the reform initiative and take into 
account the bureaucratic and IOC incentive structure, so that their role in the energy sector is more assured and 
service-oriented. Sixthly, even if they were enforceable and duly enforced, the various measures for demand 
management can only have a negligible impact on aggregate electricity usage. These directives to citizens 
do not address the core problem of insufficient power and gas supplies and citizens’ needs, but are rather ad 
hoc measures to ration power consumption. Ultimately there is no alternative to adding electricity generative 
capacity. Lastly, a major policy shift is needed in order to address the underlying problem of primary energy 
shortage. At present, there is no clear indication as to how the government would like to diversify the fuel mix 
for power generation. 
5.8 Renewable energy 
Many global bodies and national governments are looking towards renewable energy sources as a means of 
diversifying their fuel mix and reducing reliance on fossil fuels. In Bangladesh, research and praxis in this area 
is in its infancy, especially government-sponsored initiatives, despite the widespread use of biomass fuels by 
the majority of the population. Box 2 examines the state of renewable energy utilization in Bangladesh and 
looks towards future applications.
6 Recommendations and conclusions
Any meaningful reform in the energy sector will only be possible if carried out in conjunction with far-reaching 
governance reform. The following recommendations aim to strengthen governance in the energy sector and 
help the government provide energy access to its long-suffering citizens. 
12  A crore is Tk.10,000,000, i.e. ten million. 
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Box 2: Renewable energy
Renewable energy systems hold much promise for rural Bangladesh where renewable energy in the form of 
traditional biomass is the primary energy source. Non-biomass renewable energy sources in Bangladesh are solar 
power, wind power, hydropower, and biogas (Asaduzzaman, Barnes and Khandker 2009). The Caretaker Government 
prepared a Renewable Energy Policy in 2008, but its recommendations are yet to be implemented (Power Division 
2008b). Using information adapted from Asaduzzaman, Barnes and Khandker’s detailed review of the sector (2009), 
the major sources of renewable energy are reviewed below:  
•	 Bangladesh’s solar energy programme is one of the most successful and fastest growing renewable energy 
programmes in the world. Solar photovoltaics (PV) are used widely throughout the country, with more than 
430,000 solar home systems (SHS) installed as of 2009 (Asaduzzaman, Barnes and Khandker 2009). Scaling 
up of solar PV systems has been supported by international donors such as the World Bank, UNDP, USAID, 
and implemented through Infrastructure Development Company Limited (IDCOL) and Rural Electrification 
Board (REB) through various NGOs, microfinance institutions and private institutions operating in the rural 
areas. 
•	 Biogas, from animal and municipal wastes, is another promising renewable energy source. Currently 
there are tens of thousands of household and village level biogas plants throughout the country. Biogas 
technology is seen as a potential source of energy for cooking and rural and peri-urban electrification, 
particularly during periods of power shortfalls (Power Division 2008b). 
•	 Progress in the utilisation of wind energy has been limited to coastal areas and islands with strong winds. 
At present, the country has 2 MW of installed wind turbines in operation. 
•	 The potential for hydropower is also limited. Bangladesh has a large facility at Kaptai, installed some 40 
years ago, which produces 1,000 GWh per year (Asaduzzaman, Barnes and Khandker 2009). 
Bangladesh’s renewable energy sector largely developed on an ad hoc basis and the sector’s institutional arrangement 
is yet to mature. Key sector institutions and their focal areas are (Asaduzzaman, Barnes and Khandker 2009):
•	 Grameen Shakti, a Grameen Bank subsidiary, focuses on SHS (5,000 systems installed over the past two 
years); household biogas systems and improved stoves.
•	 The REB centers on household and village scale, off-grid PV systems. It has installed nearly 2,000 SHS.
•	 The IDCOL focuses on household and village scale, off-grid PV systems. It has successfully facilitated private 
sector participation in developing infrastructure projects in Bangladesh since 1997. It is a government 
owned financial intermediary, governed by an independent board of directors with representatives from 
both the government and private sector.
•	 The Institute of Fuel Research and Development, within the Bangladesh Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research focuses on small and medium-sized biogas digesters.
•	 The Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) handles small and medium sized biogas 
digesters.
•	 Bangladesh’s largest NGO, BRAC, works with SHS, having supplied nearly 1,200 systems, and biogas 
installations.
•	 Proshika, a leading NGO, focuses on biogas installations.
There is a great need to utilise the potential offered by renewable energy resources given the limited availability of 
fossil fuel, the environment cost of utilising fossil fuels and the growing need for energy security (Power Division 
2008). However, renewable energy use is yet to assume commercial proportions in Bangladesh and scaling up efforts 
would require capacity building at national and local levels. The size and economic potential of these resources have 
not yet been determined and the capacity of renewable energy development remains low (Power Division 2008). 
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6.1 Planning and coordination 
The energy sector needs to adopt a comprehensive, coordinated, pragmatic and long-term master plan that 
articulates the national energy vision and implementation strategy, in line with resource availability and citizens’ 
interests. The planning process should be inclusive of all stakeholders, so as to maintain political continuity, 
as the timeline for dealing with the crisis will span several electoral cycles. An important lesson learned from 
the gas crisis is that production planning for each energy source should be based on resource availability 
and that there should be greater coordination among the institutions. According to experts, acknowledging 
that the fuel supply shortfall is the main constraint in the energy sector, the government’s best option in the 
short-term is to enhance Petrobangla’s gas production by improving technical efficiency and investment, and 
strengthen efficiency in existing plants. In the long-term, new gas fields should be explored and the coal 
sector developed. 
6.2 Policy implementation 
Rigorous and responsive policy monitoring is vital for ensuring faster and more complete implementation 
of sector programmes that address public needs. Since implementation is often disrupted by lack of political 
commitment and frequent change of leadership within institutions, there needs to be greater dialogue and 
transparency in discussions on controversial policy issues, such as energy trade and foreign investments. 
Parliamentary engagements need to be more relevant, better informed and inclusive. Given the prevailing 
discord between political parties in government and in opposition, increased participation of a wider audience 
will lend political support, reliability and legitimacy to the policy process and outcome. Furthermore, it will 
improve information base for potential private investors. 
6.3 Package of incentives
An endemic problem in energy sector service delivery has been the failure of accountability mechanisms 
i.e. the absence of checks and balances, and a responsibility-reward method for the enforcement of good 
governance. For any reform to be successful and ensure operational efficiency, the bureaucratic incentive 
structure must be aligned with the intended outcome of the policy/overall reform. Designing the right policy 
and institutional framework would require an incentive package which will limit frequent staff/management 
transfer, appoint qualified staff and align wages with performance. Additionally, it is vital to create incentives 
to attract private and foreign investments. Since lack of an assured market was a disincentive for IOCs, it is 
important to design PSCs that offer more flexible options while still protecting national interests. At the same 
time, the process by which IOCs are selected should be a more transparent and inclusive one. An academic 
specialising in energy notes that opponents of IOC involvement should be made aware that the alternative 
to not exploring for natural gas is to import gas at USD 7.0-8.0 per MCF, a price much higher than the price at 
which Petrobangla can buy from the country’s own fields i.e. USD 1 per MCF from IOCs and USD 1 per MCF 
from BAPEX13.
13  Bangladesh Petroleum Explorations and Production Company (BAPEX) is the state owned gas exploration and 
production company.
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6.4  Strengthening regulatory capacity
While there have been some positive governance outcomes from BERC’s interactions with citizens, the 
Commission needs to resolve its own governance deficiencies that undermine its’ relevance. In order to win 
citizens’ confidence as an institution that regulates fairly and responsibly, BERC needs to gain institutional 
capacity and authority in order to be able to ignore political influence. Greater transparency, independence 
and accountability in decision-making, e.g. regarding staff appointment and verdicts of hearings, would bring 
the BERC’s activities closer to fulfilling its mission to improve citizens access and experience of energy provision. 
Some of this could be achieved if BERC implemented the Right to Information Act 2009 (Iftekharuzzaman 
2009). Given that consumer groups in the energy sector have demonstrated the ability to act in an organised 
manner, implementing the Act would provide unprecedented opportunity to further empower the citizens. 
This would improve BERC’s responsiveness to their needs and eventually build an environment of trust 
between the service providers and consumers (Iftekharuzzaman 2009). BERC’s effectiveness could be further 
reinforced by learning from the regulatory experiences of neighbouring countries such as India, which is 
challenged by similar governance bottlenecks and has garnered substantial experience in its attempts to 
establish independent regulatory commissions (Rao 2004).
6.5 Commitment to change
To free the energy sector from political manoeuvring, politically expedient decision making and agendas 
will require strong political commitment to enforce all the necessary governance reforms. Additionally, 
operating companies and the regulatory commission should have the required autonomy so that important 
decisions are not made on their behalf by the Ministry or through political considerations, resulting in greater 
structural clarity. Removing vested interests from energy sector operations and regulation would allow 
faster policy implementation, better institutional coordination, and ultimately more citizen-focused service 
delivery. Functional autonomy of energy entities is essential in resolving the chronic under-pricing of energy. 
Removing governance bottlenecks that support artificially low prices is essential in providing the right market 
signals to stakeholders in both the private and public domain. This will not only allow the market structure 
to attain greater efficiency and transparency, but will also help the reform agenda by promoting greater 
commercialisation of state entities. However, care should be taken to ensure that the majority of citizens are 
not priced out of gaining or retaining access. 
There is no quick and easy solution to the existing energy crisis. Generating good governance is an essential 
part of energy sector reform, and without identifying and removing existing governance bottlenecks, 
investment alone cannot solve the crisis. While this chapter analyses the governance-related reasons for the 
provenance and continuation of the energy crisis, it does not claim to provide an exhaustive assessment 
of governance problems in the sector. The energy crisis is a result of accumulated governance missteps 
over many years. Major weaknesses in the energy policy framework and an uncoordinated and complex 
institutional arrangement of the power and gas sectors have generated governance lapses. In the power 
sector the chapter identifies some good governance outcomes of sectoral reform: (1) participation of the 
private sector in generation and (2) establishment of a regulatory body that interacts regularly with citizens. 
However, reforms were not entirely successful since they did not incorporate into their design some elements 
of good governance such as (1) resistance to political considerations (2) improved bureaucratic incentive 
structure and (3) regulatory autonomy and impartiality. The crisis in the power sector is closely linked to the 
crisis in the gas sector, because gas is the most important source of commercial energy in the country and 
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there is an acute shortfall in gas supply. The gas crisis was brought about by major failures in governance 
that generated uncontrolled, unplanned demand for gas and halted gas exploration activities for ten years, 
resulting in a failure to adequately increase gas supply. This chapter identifies the following combination of 
governance factors that contributed to the current state of the gas sector: (1) IOCs did not carry out necessary 
exploration activities due to poor incentive arrangements brought about by lack of market assurance, a High 
Court injunction on PSCs, low prices and an inefficient and lengthy bidding process; (2) a misguided policy 
thrust that increased domestic availability and use of gas without ensuring adequate fuel supply availability. 
Other governance problems in the gas sector are common to those in the power sector, namely: political 
considerations for maintaining artificially low retail prices and lack of incentives for bureaucratic efficiency. 
The government has so far taken a mix of long, medium and short-term measures to tackle the energy crisis. 
This chapter argues that no significant change in the gas production is likely to take place in the short-term. 
However, experts believe that energy crisis can be addressed in the short-term by making the best use of 
available fuel and power plants i.e. by improving the existing production capability of power and gas sector 
entities by enhancing investment and technical efficiency. Otherwise, the government will be compelled to 
import gas. In the long term, there is no alternative to exploring for additional gas reserves and developing 
the coal sector. This means a long-term, concerted effort by all stakeholders, and with citizens accepting 
that the process will not be painless. Based on the need for a long-term strategy, this chapter proposes the 
following recommendations: (1) pragmatic, citizen-focused planning and careful coordination among sector 
entities; (2) policy implementation with greater dialogue and process transparency; (3) appropriate incentive 
mechanisms for bureaucrats and private/ foreign investors that are aligned with intended policy outcomes; 
(4) an autonomous regulatory body that has the capacity to respond to stakeholder interests and (5) a strong 
political commitment to undertake all these improvements to sectoral governance. Providing reliable energy 
for Bangladesh’s citizens will be a gargantuan task, but one at which governments of today and tomorrow 
cannot afford to fail. 
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Bangladesh’s progress in poverty reduction and move towards food self-sufficiency in the last decade has 
been noteworthy. But while numbers hint at a success story, a more nuanced look at the story behind the 
numbers may bring little comfort. Over 40 per cent of the population still lives below the food-consumption 
based poverty line and the overall incidence of poverty remains high (World Food Programme [WFP] 2010). 
Almost 58 million people still cannot afford an adequate diet that allows for livelihood security (Food and 
Agriculture Organisation [FAO] 2009). Malnourished and highly vulnerable, they lack the income and assets 
to protect themselves against livelihood fluctuations, disease, monga1 or natural disasters. This chapter finds 
that food security governance is characterised by the following: (1) inconsistency and non-functionality of 
key policies, with relevant institutions lacking capacity to carry out essential reforms or undertake actions 
to ensure food availability; (2) despite government commitments regarding land distribution and tenancy 
contracts to increase crop productivity and secure livelihoods, implementation is absent; (3) lack of monitoring 
and presence of corruption and rent-seeking behaviour in many government institutions related to food and 
lastly, (4) despite the evolution of a more pro-poor focus in the Public Food Distribution System (PFDS) and 
in Social Safety Net Programmes (SSNPs), high levels of leakage and weak targeting mechanisms weaken 
outreach and impact. 
This chapter reviews the published literature, including grey literature and newspaper sources, and information 
gathered through a large number of key informant interviews with officials and staff of government agencies 
in the food sector, as well as academics and members of civil society. It starts by briefly outlining the context 
of food security in Bangladesh. Then, using the Government of Bangladesh’s (GoB) National Food Policy 2006 
as a basis for policy analysis, it scrutinises the state of food availability and access by looking at the nature of 
governance challenges in these areas, especially institutional incapacity, bottlenecks in policy design and 
implementation, as well as external factors. The performance of the government in handling the price hike 
of food and essentials in 2008 is then explored in order to give a sense of national disaster management 
3CHAPTER Food Security: Increasing Availability, Diversifying Access & Strengthening Governance
1  Lean-season hunger
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and preparedness vis-à-vis food. The chapter concludes by highlighting the major findings and providing 
recommendations addressing governance shortcomings in the provision of food by the government and 
achieving access to it for citizens.  
1 The context of food security 
Unprecedented shocks to food security are not new to Bangladesh. Its history is dotted with famines, cyclones 
and floods, which have elicited mature responses in dealing with food crises. However, assessing the state 
of food security in 2009 vis-à-vis governance becomes imperative when we consider that the events of the 
previous three years have created difficult governance challenges. The consequences of the recent global 
food price hike have been severe in Bangladesh, as have been the effects of two cyclones. Food insecure 
households typically responded by decreasing diet diversity, consuming smaller food portions, reducing the 
number of daily meals, taking on unmanageable levels of debt and increasing household expenditure on 
food. In December 2008, one in four Bangladeshis was severely food-insecure as a result of the food price hike 
and there was a significant increase in severe malnutrition from 2005 levels (FAO 2009).2 An additional 7.5 
million people joined the ranks of the hungry3. This increased the hungry population to 65 million, or 45 per 
cent of the population, pushing up the rates of poverty that have been on a decline in the past decade (WFP 
2010). The hardest hit have been fixed-income earners and rural households experiencing crop failure. The 
situation deteriorated further as two cyclones in 2007 and 2009 — Sidr and Aila — left around three million 
people in need of food assistance. 
In 2007, the FAO placed Bangladesh on the list of 37 countries suffering from a food crisis and requiring external 
assistance. In 2008, Bangladesh was again classified by the FAO as being on the list of 33 countries suffering 
from severe localised food insecurity. 2009 saw favourable increases in the production of food leading to 
declining food prices. However, by December 2009 inflation reached 9.50 per cent, on the brink of touching 
double digits for the first time in 14 months, once again spiralling food prices out of the reach of many (Matin 
et al. 2009). Food security is a highly visible and sensitive public policy issue in any developing country as it 
directly and immediately impacts the lives of citizens. It tests the social contract between a government and 
its citizens, and is always an important part of the political agenda. This is evidenced by the fact that one of 
the main election pledges of the ruling party Awami League was a reduction in the price of essentials and the 
achievement of food self-sufficiency by the year 2013 (Awami League Election Manifesto 2008). 
1.1 Food security and governance
The concept of food security in Bangladesh has evolved over the years to reflect changes in food-related 
government policies. Food security as understood by the Government of Bangladesh rests on three important 
pillars i.e. availability, access and utilisation of food. This recognises that firstly, the government should 
produce, make possible the production of and/or ensure sufficient quantities of food either through domestic 
production or through imports and food aid. Secondly, it should ensure peoples’ economic and physical 
2  Nationwide survey conducted by WFP, the United Nations Children’s Fund and the Government in November–
December 2008 to assess the impact of high food prices on the population.
3  The number of people who consume less than the minimum daily-recommended amount of food, i.e. 2122 kcals/
day/person.
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access to food through boosting household income and government transfers. Finally, the government 
should ensure proper utilisation of food through dietary diversity and health care (National Food Policy, Plan 
of Action 2008-15). This framework has been used as the chapter’s analytical lens. However, while the chapter 
explores availability and access to food in detail, it does not address food utilisation due to space constraints 
and the fact that the major governance concerns are in the areas of food production and distribution. 
Food security governance, i.e. the process by which the production, distribution and utilisation of food is 
managed by the government, includes a complex web of public and private actors. A plethora of ministries, 
departments and agencies under the government are in charge of production, procurement, storage and 
distribution of food. These are the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (MoFDM), Ministry of Agriculture 
(MoA), Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock (MoFL), Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and 
Cooperatives (MoLGRDC), Ministry of Women and Children Affairs (MWCA), Ministry of Social Welfare (MSW) 
and the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW). The Food Planning and Monitoring Unit (FPMU) 
chaired by the MoFDM includes representatives from all these ministries and is responsible for planning and 
monitoring the overall national food security efforts, including food utilisation and nutrition issues and to 
provide directives to formulate and implement food policy-related programmes around the country (National 
Food Policy 2006). On the other hand, private actors are actively involved in importing food and supplying key 
agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilisers and irrigation equipment. Thus, there is a need to ensure synergy 
among the government policies, institutions and other private sector actors for achieving food security.
2.  Availability of food
The availability of food refers to the existence of sufficient and nutritionally adequate food supplies that are 
accessible to a country’s entire population. It is influenced by four factors — domestic production, commercial 
imports, food aid and procurement. Although all of these factors are important, subsequent governments 
have placed greater emphasis on boosting domestic production and procurement, which will form the basis 
of discussion in this section through the analysis of access to land and agricultural inputs and producer 
price support methods. The overarching objective of the government in making food available for all is to 
achieve self-sufficiency in food through increasing production of all crops (National Agricultural Policy 1999). 
Self-sufficiency means that the entire national food requirement should be grown within the country. The 
government is thus obligated to increase domestic production by making land available to farmers, ensuring 
their easy access to agricultural inputs such as fertiliser, seeds, irrigation and agricultural credit, as well giving 
incentives to farmers by offering high prices for their produce through procurement drives. 
This section finds that attempts to incentivise production by increasing access to land have mostly been 
ineffective. Redistributive land reforms have been unsuccessful, with government lands which landless 
people are entitled to either being expropriated by both corrupt officials and influential citizens, or are left 
undistributed. In addition, tenancy contracts are discriminatory, favouring landowners over tenants. With 
regard to increasing the productivity of land, though fertilisers and seeds are more available in the market 
following Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) reforms, there remain significant distortions in pricing and 
in the quality of these agricultural inputs. On the procurement side, the government procurement drive each 
year does not meet the target because of low price offers, high rent seeking behaviour and lack of storage and 
collection capacities. Various government bodies that are tasked with ensuring food availability are hampered 
by weak monitoring mechanisms and poor institutional capacity.
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2.1  Agricultural production
Over the past three decades Bangladesh has experienced a ‘Green Revolution’ in rice production, with 
production tripling from around 10 million metric tonnes (MT) in the 1970s to almost 30 million MT in FY2007-
08 (Asaduzzaman et al. 2009). This was the result of cultivation of high-yielding varieties (HYVs) with the use of 
chemical fertilisers. Yet, self-sufficiency in the real sense has not been achieved. In FY2007-08, food production 
was 29.77 million MT against the target of 32.55 million MT. Moreover, in FY2008-09 food production was 
32.16 million MT against the target of 34.33 million MT (FPMU 2009). Thus, while food production has been 
increasing, it has still been falling short of domestic demand, with food and grain imports covering this gap 
(Asaduzzaman et al. 2009). In recognition of this, Bangladesh has been implementing a policy of food self-
reliance, i.e. importing food from the world market when prices are cheaper than growing it at home (Deb 
et al. 2009).  Between 2006-2008, the country suffered major setbacks in domestic food production both due 
to natural disasters and lack of adequate agricultural inputs. The price hike in the international food market 
coupled with an export ban imposed by many food exporting countries placed the government in a difficult 
situation in meeting domestic demand. Thus, the debate began to shift back to achieving self-sufficiency 
rather than self-reliance (Deb 2009). Against this backdrop, the current government came to power in early 
2009 and pledged to achieve food security for all. This is reflected in the Awami League’s election manifesto, 
which states their commitment to achieve food self-sufficiency by 2013 (Awami League Election Manifesto 
2008).
Table 1 summarises government policies and governance challenges in regard to the pivotal factors of 
production, i.e. agricultural inputs, namely land, fertiliser and seeds, which are analysed in detail in this 
section. Land administration and land reforms have occupied a central place in the discourse on food security 
in Bangladesh, as this is a rapidly decreasing asset in a country with a burgeoning population. Bangladesh’s 
land-to-man ratio is 0.06 hectares (ha) (Ahmed, Ministry of Agriculture 2010). This is very low, when considering 
that the agriculture sectors’ contribution to the economy is 22 per cent of the GDP, with 48 per cent of the 
country’s labour engaged in this sector (‘Public land grabbed’, The Daily Star, January 12, 2007; Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics [BBS] 2008). Consequently, the need for agricultural inputs to increase productivity of 
scarce land naturally ensues. The following discussion also analyses the effects on the fertiliser industry 
and seed usage (among other agricultural inputs) of SAP reforms, as these had the most wide-ranging and 
controversial effects. 
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Table 1: Policy framework for ensuring food availability
Objective: to achieve food self-sufficiency
National Agricultural Policy 1999 and National Food Policy 2006
 Factors/inputs of 
production
Major initiatives Major governance challenges
Land a.  Ensure maximum utilisation of 
land 
a.   Corruption/lack of oversight in 
distribution of khas land. 
b.   Discriminatory tenancy contracts
Fertilisers a. Ensure adequate and high quality 
fertilisers to farmers.
b. Ban production, import, sales 
and distribution of any fertiliser 
harmful to soil. Form district and 
thana level committee to monitor 
fertiliser distribution 
a. Weak monitoring and oversight 
of fertiliser prices and distribution 
system.   
b. Lack of oversight to eliminate the use 
of adulterated fertiliser and to stop 
fertiliser smuggling.
c. Miscalculation of demand, which 
negatively affects supply.
Seeds a. Ensure quality and availability of 
seeds to the farmers.
b. Encourage private sector to 
produce, import and market seed.
c. Strengthen Bangladesh 
Agricultural Development 
Corporation (BADC)  to provide 
seeds.
a. Lack of the BADC capacity to meet 
adequate seed demand.
b. Lack of capacity to certify quality of 
seeds. 
2.1.1  Land
Land, which is becoming scarcer by the day, is the main source of livelihoods in rural Bangladesh. It is the 
primary factor of agricultural production and a critical asset to achieving food security. Cultivable land in 
Bangladesh is shrinking at the rate of 1.13 per cent per year due to demographic pressures and demand 
from non-agricultural sources (Hossain and Bayes 2009). This is a clear threat to the volume of agricultural 
production. It is not just the dismal land-to-man ratio, but the existing disparity in land ownership is also 
a cause for concern. In 2007, households owning up to 0.4 ha of land constituted about 70 per cent of all 
households but overall controlled only 20 per cent of the total land. On the other hand, households owning 
up to land of two ha and above controlled about one-third of the total land (Hossain and Bayes 2009). As it is 
estimated that a household of six requires a minimum of 0.4 ha of land to feed its members, marginal farmers 
and smaller farms are not economically viable (Hossain and Bayes 2009). 
The government’s task then, is to ensure that limited land resources are used optimally to increase productivity 
for farmers. There is also a need for proper land administration and management in order to increase food 
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production by farmers. Direct support is also required to increase the productivity of land through ensuring 
agricultural inputs for farmers. Both of these issues are explored below:
I. Land administration and management
The following governance issues form barriers to the effective administration and management of land, 
causing greatly unequal access, livelihood instability and poor productivity. 
Ineffective land reform
Unequal land ownership has typically been addressed through attempts at redistributive land reform. In 1984, 
in an effort to make land ownership more equitable, the Land Reform Ordinance prohibited the accumulation 
of land beyond three ha. However, given that only three to four per cent of households in the country own 
above three ha of land, the surplus they own would not be adequate for redistribution among the 10 million 
landless and near landless households in the country (Hossain and Bayes 2009). Thus, this strategy has not 
been adequate. 
Corruption in khas land distribution
A more realistic option for the government has been the distribution of government controlled khas land to 
the landless. While this has been an important part of the political agenda in order to build vote banks, it has 
remained as mere manifesto rhetoric. The 1984 Land Reform Ordinance stipulated that up to five katha (0.08 
acres) of khas land were to be allotted to landless farmers/individuals. However, this directive has remained 
ineffective, partly because wealthy and politically influential people often illegally occupy land put aside for 
distribution (‘Public land grabbed’, The Daily Star, January 12, 2007).
As no comprehensive government survey has ever been conducted on khas land, significant portions of land 
remain unidentified. The absence of an up-to-date, systematic and universally accepted source of information 
on land resource availability and land rights is part of the reason why land reforms are difficult to implement and 
land appropriation so common (Centre for Policy Dialogue [CPD] 2000). Studies show that almost 2.5 million 
acres of excess khas land can be released and distributed among landless people (‘Land Administration Policy’, 
The Daily Star, November 18, 2006). However, approximately 1.3 million acres of khas land, both farm and 
non-farm, including large forest swathes, has been expropriated and held in illegal possession by individuals, 
industries and businesses over the years, demonstrating the endemic nature of the problem. (‘Lost Land Areas 
should return to public’, The Daily Star, February 6, 2010). 
In rural areas, existing khas land distribution is manipulated by local elites. Across 436 upazila’s4, ‘Khas Land 
Allocation Committees’ have members of parliament (MPs) and upazila chairman as advisers, and local 
administration officials such as the chairman and members of the union parishad5 (UP) as members, with no 
4  The six divisions of Bangladesh are further separated into 64 districts, which are in turn divided into 482 sub-
districts called upazila parishad (UZP), or thana. The upazilas are the second lowest tier of administrative government in 
Bangladesh.
5  Union parishads are the lowest administrative level of the government. 
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representatives from those to who the land is to be distributed (Kader 2008). Interviews with key informants 
reveal that high levels of corruption in local government mean that committee members generally allot land 
to relatives and political associates. This exemplifies successive government’s incapacity to enforce land use 
policy and avoid the illegal occupation of khas land.
Discriminatory tenancy contracts
Although land ownership patterns are highly unequal, the command of land under small and marginal farmers 
has almost tripled from 1988 to 2007 (Akanda et al. 2008). This means that farmers have been generating 
livelihoods by renting land through the tenancy market. The share of pure tenants and tenant owners6 has 
risen from 28 per cent in 1988 to 41 per cent in 2007. By and large, small and marginal farm households now 
cultivate more than four-fifths of the total land in rural areas (Hossain and Bayes 2009). However, the effect 
of tenancy on incentives to produce depends on the terms and conditions of rental. The 1984 Land Reform 
Ordinance capped the land rent at 33 per cent of harvest yield (without input sharing) and at 50 per cent if the 
landowners paid 50 per cent of material input costs (Akanda et al. 2008). 
In theory, this should increase returns to tenants, encouraging them to intensify production. But in practice, 
tenant farmers receive much lower net returns than landowners because they pay explicit costs for tillage 
and hired labour in addition to their share of material inputs, family labour and management (Akanda et al. 
2008). Sadly, the major share of income from land goes to only one-fifth of the total landowners in Bangladesh 
(Kader 2007), due to landowners dictating the terms of tenancy. Unfavourable terms for tenant farmers thus 
mean that profits are marginal, which in turn discourages production. The security of tenancy is also an issue 
as fixed-rent contract terms are changed after a certain time. The Ordinance stipulates that the contracts are 
only valid for a period of five years and does not ensure that tenant farmers have equal rights and possession 
over the land and agricultural products. Thus, the current system of land rental invites misgovernance as it 
weights the balance in favour of land owners and against tenant farmers, further endangering the productive 
capacity of the country’s limited land resources.   
2.1. 2 Agricultural inputs 
The second and equally important task of the government is to create an implementable policy framework 
that supports farmers in acquiring agricultural inputs to increase productivity. The supply and prices of crucial 
agricultural inputs such as fertilisers, seeds and irrigation system need to be effectively managed to ensure 
enhanced and sustained growth in crop productivity. This involves adequate supply of and good quality 
fertilisers, proper distribution of seeds and pesticides, uninterrupted and low cost irrigation during the 
cultivation time and farmers’ easy access to agricultural credits to purchase these inputs.
Bangladesh’s post-independence development strategy championed direct government interventions in all 
agricultural sector activities. Its socialist ideology encouraged cooperative farming and the agricultural inputs 
market consisted of a single channelled public delivery system, the Bangladesh Agricultural Development 
Corporation (BADC). Buying and selling in input markets was restricted for the private sector and the 
government distributed large subsidies for fertilisers and irrigation equipment (Murshid 2000).
6  For a detailed description on the form of tenancy in Bangladesh please see Hossain and Bayes (2009), p.63
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However, the beginning of the 1980s marked a sudden shift from state-led to more market-oriented agriculture 
policies. The government started agricultural reforms under the much- debated Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAP) prescribed by the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). These aimed to 
reduce government control in both agricultural inputs and outputs markets. According to Azmat and Coghill 
(2005), the reform initiatives focusing on agricultural inputs were: 
	Withdrawal/reduction of input subsidies (e.g. fertilisers).
	Privatisation of fertiliser distribution.
	Withdrawal of ban on private sector imports of irrigation equipment.
	Shrinking the role of the BADC, the largest para-statal in the agricultural sector in the import, sale and 
distribution of agricultural inputs. 
	Privatisation of seed production beyond the foundation stage, while retaining the government 
monopoly on the five ‘notified’ crops, including rice7.
The process of privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation removed government restrictions on production, 
processing and distribution of agricultural inputs by the private sector. Over the years, the impact of SAP 
reform on agricultural inputs, production and food security have generated considerable controversy. 
Input liberalisation, especially for irrigation has had a very significant impact in bringing about the ‘Green 
Revolution’, i.e. a sustained increase crop yield (Fang et al. 2008; Hossain 2009; Murshid 2000). Four-fifths of 
the poor farmers in rural Bangladesh now use irrigation on cultivable land, either by owning irrigation pumps 
or through a very competitive ‘water market’ (Hossain and Bayes 2009). However, the liberalisation of the 
government monopoly of the fertiliser distribution system and withdrawal of price subsidies have had mixed 
effects. The seed market has also been subject to similar problems. The next section examines the problems 
the farmers face regarding the availability and utilisation of fertilisers and seeds, as these two were identified 
in expert interviews as areas with complex and long-standing governance problems.
I.  Fertiliser management
Among agricultural inputs, fertiliser is the key input, contributing between 50-60 per cent to crop production 
and increasing crop yields (Basak 2009). In Bangladesh, fertiliser utilisation increased sharply with the 
introduction and proliferation of HYV seeds. HYV Boro rice is highly responsive to, and requires an adequate 
supply of fertilisers to achieve target production. Thus, the price, subsidies, quality, quantity and distribution 
of fertilisers critically affect production. Critically, an acute market failure following the SAP reforms in the 
fertiliser market poses a heightened risk to agricultural production, and ultimately, food security.
  
High prices and weak monitoring mechanisms
Until 1991, fertiliser production, import, distribution and marketing were handled by the BADC. Post 
liberalisation, private dealers bought fertilisers from the factory gates or ports and sold at their own prices. 
In the early days, this policy offered private traders flexibility in price-setting and trading. However in 1995, a 
7   A ‘notified crop’ is one where the private sector follows procedural guidelines, e.g. receiving government permission 
prior to its import and marketing. The other notified crops are: rice, wheat, jute, potato and sugar cane (Azmat and Coghill 
2005).  
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serious fertiliser crisis forced farmers to buy fertiliser at incredibly high prices. A lack of government regulation 
and monitoring systems meant that fertiliser availability could not be adequately monitored. Additionally, a 
lack of buffer stocks and government-appointed dealers mean that the government was unable to bolster 
fertiliser supply. The crisis forced the government to rethink the distribution policy and tackle the following 
major challenges: preventing monopoly in the fertiliser market and ensuring accountability of the traders in 
distributing fertiliser among the farmers. 
Figure 1: The fertiliser distribution system in Bangladesh
Figure 1, above identifies the existing fertiliser distribution channels. The total production and import of Urea 





















Dealers’ shops at 
different unions
Farmers
Department of Agricultural 
Extension (DAE)
Supply: Private importers (with implicit 
subsidy)
8  TSP = TripleSuperPhosphate, MoP = Muriate of Potash, DAP = Diammonium Phosphate.
Source: Shah et. al 2008
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through Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation (BCIC) appointed dealers. The import and marketing of 
the remaining TSP production, as well as DAP and other fertilisers are controlled by the private sector (Basak 
2009). Figure 1 shows that though the Department of Agriculture Extension (DAE) identifies and monitors the 
fertiliser demand and supply distribution process, the appointment process of fertiliser suppliers is carried out 
by the BCIC. Around 4,800 dealers are appointed by the BCIC at the district, upazila and union levels to keep 
stocks of urea obtained from the BADC. These dealers in turn serve 14,000 union level sub-dealers who sell to 
farmers at a rate fixed by the dealers (Asaduzzaman 2009). However, misgovernance is rife in the process due 
to a number of factors: the lack of clear rules for the selection process of private traders/dealers means that 
many dealers are political appointees, while others are dishonest. Also, despite the presence of a monitoring 
process in theory, private traders continue to set excessive prices in many areas. 
Inelastic demand, unscrupulous hoarding and international price volatility means that fertiliser prices have 
increased substantially. Urea is heavily subsidised and a 15 per cent implicit subsidy on imported TSP, DAP and 
MoP can be obtained through a lengthy bureaucratic process. Since the 1980s reforms, the price of Urea has 
increased by 24.7 per cent, TSP by 187 per cent and MoP by 180 per cent (Sarwar 2008). The fertiliser market is 
highly inelastic and demand spikes every two seasons of crop production. Therefore, dealers hoard fertiliser to 
stifle supply and increase prices, especially during crises. For example, informant interviews reveal that while 
a farmer may require 10 bags of urea, he may only receive as few as three bags from government appointed 
dealers. He has to acquire the rest from other sources such as the black market at a much higher price, thereby 
increasing his cost of production and reducing his profits. 
Although the government sets factory gate prices of fertiliser, it lacks the capacity to enforce and monitor 
whether the dealers maintain the set price. The existing monitoring committees do not have any enforcement 
powers to penalise private dealers as they are only tasked to report mismanagement. Box 1 offers a temporal 
snapshot of how government subsidies during 2008-09 attempted to temper fertiliser price fluctuations. 
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Bottlenecks in fertiliser supply 
One of the major problems in the fertiliser sector is that farmers cannot access an adequate amount of fertiliser 
during August-October and January-March, the growing seasons for the main rice crops like Aman and Boro. 
Fertiliser factories have been unable to adjust their production schedule according to demand, partly due to 
the severe shortage in the supply of electricity and gas to production facilities, and partly due to the inability 
to meet demand because of poor production capacity. The present production by the BCIC’s six Urea plants 
has been at about 78 per cent of the rated capacity (Quader 2009).
Another reason for the inadequate supply of fertilisers is demand miscalculation. The total fertiliser requirement 
estimated for 2008-09 was too low given the targeted level of yield for various crops (Deb et al. 2009). The 
production strategy should emphasise means of increasing crop yields. Table 2 highlights a gap of 960,000 
MT between the total estimated demand and the fertiliser required to attain the high yield goal. In FY2008-09, 
this gap was estimated to be 990,000 MT. Figure 2 shows that meeting fertiliser demand is heavily dependent 
on imports. This is worrying, given international market volatility for fertilisers such as Urea, TSP, DAP and 
MoP. Thus, a fertiliser availability policy must take into account optimising production as well as ensuring an 
uninterrupted supply of imports in order to ensure an adequate and timely supply to the farmers. 
Box 1: Fertiliser subsidies: 2008 and 2009
During 2008, fertiliser prices rose very sharply. The cost of TSP and MoP rose from Tk. 16 in 2007 to Tk. 50 and 
Tk. 40 per kg in 2008. The cost of Urea was maintained at Tk. 6 per kg only by a high implicit government 
subsidy of up to USD 800 per tonne on imported urea. Comparatively, TSP and MoP received only a 15 per cent 
subsidy and imports declined while prices increased rapidly. This created an imbalance in the use of different 
types of fertiliser. Given the cropping intensity of farming in Bangladesh and the low soil organic matter in 
many districts, it is imperative for the government to be involved in fertiliser procurement and distribution to 
ensure fairness in distribution in a time of perceived fertiliser shortage. A failure to do this compromises the 
nation’s food security and further aggravates already serious soil fertility and soil nutrient imbalances. Given 
the current situation of the international fertiliser market, the government is promoting state-to-state trade, 
which seems to be a good initiative in the short term (Deb et al. 2009).
The new government has decided to provide subsidy on non-Urea fertilisers to promote balanced fertiliser use 
and reduction in the cost of production. On January 13 2009, the government fixed the price of TSP, MoP and 
DAP at Tk. 40, Tk. 35 and Tk. 45 per kg, respectively (Deb et al. 2009). It has introduced a process of distributing 
fertilisers in accordance with the amount of land farmers possess. The Union Revenue Officer (Tahasildar) is 
entrusted to check the land record to ascertain the area of land in possession of farmers. Farmers then receive a 
card or a slip from the block supervisors (Sub-assistant Agriculture Officer) of their respective unions to procure 
fertiliser from the officially enlisted dealers at a subsidised price according to their fertiliser requirements. Yet, 
in many places dealers do not sell at the new price and the small number of fertiliser outlets lead to long 
queues. The current distribution system is time consuming and cumbersome, lacks adequate monitoring of 
the dealers, and provides government officials with many opportunities for corruption. In informal interviews, 
farmers have expressed dissatisfaction with the current system. 
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Table 2: Fertiliser demand to attain high yield goal in FY2008-09
Fertiliser MoA
1 estimated demand 
in FY 2008-09
Fertiliser required to attain high 
yield goal FY2008-09 Gaps in FY2008-09
Urea 280,500 350,000 600,500
TSP 500,000 500,900 90,00
MoP 400,000 500,000 100,000
DAP 200,000 300,200 100,200
Total 390,500 490,400 900,600
[Units: Metric Tonnes (MT)] 
Source: Deb et al. 2009
Figure 2: Fertiliser demand, production and import in FY2008-09
Units: Lakhs (1 lakh =100,000)
Source: Kafiluddin et al. 2008
Supply shortages are also exacerbated by a few large private traders who generally lack the incentive for 
maintaining adequate warehouse facilities, proper distributional channels and monitoring the seasonal 
demand of fertilisers, safe in the knowledge that they will be able to sell at any price. Some traders also sell 
fertilisers outside their districts of registration, perpetuating the scarcity of fertilisers in certain localities. Since 
the price of Urea in neighbouring countries is higher than the government set price domestically, fertiliser 
smuggling also aggravates fertiliser shortages. For example, the price of per kilogram of Urea is less than Tk. 
6 in Bangladesh while it can retail at Tk. 20 in Myanmar. Thus, Bangladeshi smugglers benefit from a huge 
price difference of Tk. 15 to 16 per kg. Estimates suggest that annual urea smuggling to Myanmar amount to 
150,000 MT, worth Tk. 2250 crore9 (Islam 2005). These unscrupulous practices on the part of dealers exacerbate 
the inconsistency of supply during critical times.
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Low quality fertilisers
There is lack of enforceable legal mechanisms to protect the quality of fertilisers. Poor quality and adulterated 
fertiliser leads to poorer quality and quantity of crop yield for farmers. Interviews with experts suggest that 
there should be provisions to take strict action against companies and traders who import and produce fake 
fertiliser. A Soil Research Development Institute (SRDI) study shows that the production and marketing of 
spurious fertiliser is growing rapidly (2009). In the case of TSP, Diammonium Phosphates and organic fertilisers, 
the percentage of fake fertiliser on the market was found to be 60, 30 and 70 per cent respectively (SRDI 2009). 
The SRDI reported that in FY2008-09, the overall figure of adulterated fertiliser was an alarming 52 per cent. 
In January 2009, almost 2,575 tonnes of substandard TSP fertiliser was seized in Jessore (‘Tk 10 cr low quality 
fertiliser seized in Jessore’, The Daily Star, 31 January, 2009). However, such interventions in the proliferation of 
adulterated fertiliser are few and far between and this remains a governance problem that adversely affects 
farmers across the country. 
II.  Seeds 
Good quality seeds can increase rice yield by 8 to 10 per cent, and Bangladesh has seen the introduction 
of several high yield and hybrid seed varieties in recent times. In 2002, these seed types accounted for the 
production of an additional 2.1 million metric tonnes of rice (CPD 2003). Yet the government agency in charge 
of seed production and marketing has largely been unable to ensure efficient seed delivery and secure the 
active participation of private and public actors, thereby hampering the possibility of maximising productivity. 
Lack of good governance within the seed production, marketing and distribution system has meant that 
existing seed prices do not incentivise production. Neither are the seeds subjected to strict quality control 
to avoid weeds, pests and disease. The lack of coordination in research, development and promotion of new 
seed varieties also severely limits productivity. As a result of these issues, crop yields suffer, posing a grave 
threat to agricultural production in Bangladesh.  
Low price incentives for growing and marketing seeds
The government’s 1998 seed policy allowed the private sector and non-government organisations (NGOs) 
to operate in the seed production, import and delivery system. The BADC also has an extensive marketing 
network with 1300 licensed seed dealers who can sell BADC seeds with its brand name. But the main challenge 
in the seed market is lack of incentives for the production of breeder seeds10.
The BADC, NGOs and private dealers commission contract growers to grow breeder seeds and sell it to them. 
However, because the BADC’s price is not as competitive as the other actors, growers are reluctant to be 
contracted by them. Consequently, the BADC is able to provide only five to six per cent of total rice seed 
required, which means it has no control over the prices that seed dealers charge the farmers. Private seed 
dealers make a profit of Tk. 1-1.50 per kg for marketing BADC rice seeds, which is much lower than the margin 
9  1 crore (cr) = 100 lakhs.
10  This is a new variety of seed that has the highest purity, and is produced, developed, controlled and provided di-
rectly by the breeders.
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in marketing seeds supplied by private agencies and NGOs. The selling prices of private sector paddy seeds 
were 50 per cent higher than the price of BADC seeds (CPD 2003). Given that the shortage of BADC seeds 
forces farmers to buy from private dealers, they buy seeds at much higher prices. 
Weak research-extension link
 
There is a lack of public-private coordination in research for the development and promotion of new seed 
varieties. The Bangladesh Rice Research Institute (BRRI), the Bangladesh Institute of Nuclear Agriculture (BINA) 
and the Bangladesh Agricultural University (BAU) are the major institutions responsible for rice research. 
However, because these institutions are under three different government ministries, farmers cannot easily 
obtain comprehensive up-to-date information about seeds. Despite the fact that using the same seeds for 
multiple harvests reduces crop yield, they continue to use a number of varieties that were released more 
than three decades ago. This is a reflection of the weak research-extension linkage, ineffective public sector 
extension system and the absence of a sound seed market (Hossain and Bayes 2009).   
Quality control of seeds not enforced
The government-established Seed Certification Agency (SCA) authorises seed certification and variety release. 
Its role is to maintain seed quality and enforce the market price of seeds. However, the SCA’s manpower crisis 
results in inadequate seed market monitoring and results in the presence of poor quality seeds. It is estimated 
that the SCA needs more than 600 seed experts to effectively certify all the seeds in Bangladesh but the 
current number is far below that target (‘600 post of seeds experts to be created’, The Daily Star, March 20, 
2005). Also, the government has not established an internationally accredited laboratory that is permitted to 
issue seed quality certificates. This makes it difficult for private seed companies to import seeds to Bangladesh 
because the standards of certification are absent and quality control is hard to implement.
2.2 Producer price support
Aside from increasing domestic production, the second priority of the government has been the procurement 
of food grain produced throughout the country. Food prices in Bangladesh vary year-to-year and season-to-
season. Annual fluctuations are generally the result of erratic climatic events such as floods, cyclones and 
droughts and are tempered through private and commercial imports of food grain. Seasonal variations are 
generated by seasonality in production. The government uses a two-pronged policy approach to protect both 
producers and consumers of food from seasonal price variations: the domestic procurement programme and 
Open Market Sales (OMS). This section focuses on procurement as it directly affects production, and therefore, 
food availability. In order to provide adequate production incentives for increased domestic production and 
increase farmer’s income, the government attempts to procure food grains at prices higher than the average 
production cost (National Food Policy, Plan of Action 2008-15). Yet the government’s efforts have been largely 
unsuccessful in this regard due to a variety of governance failures in the procurement structure.
Ineffective procurement system does not benefit farmers
Cultivating a particular crop requires investments on various agricultural inputs. Producers, i.e. farmers, thus 
need to know what the return to their investment is likely to be. If expected prices are low compared to 
the cost of inputs, they might lose the incentive to make similar investments in the future, thereby making 
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the production cycle suffer (Islam 2010). Thus, it is crucial to set a procurement price that sends the right 
production signals to farmers before the planting season begins. Correctly forecasting the size of the Boro and 
Aman harvests is crucial to price setting. However, this is more difficult in the case of Aman, which is grown 
during the monsoon, and procurement prices have usually been lower than the average wholesale market 
price. As a result the government has been unable to meet procurement targets. For Boro however, the price 
has been set excessively high (Shahabuddin 2009). 
Procurement prices which are substantially higher than the market price heavily drain the public exchequer and 
produce illegal behaviour such as rent-seeking and corruption amongst traders, rice millers and government 
officials involved in the public procurement system (Shahabuddin 2009). The Directorate of Food (DoF) enters 
into contracts with private rice millers to buy rice. The rice millers in turn buy paddy from local traders, mill the 
paddy into rice, and deliver the rice to the DoF (Mondal 2009). Interviews with experts reveal that when there 
is a large gap between the market price for paddy and the procurement price for rice, rice millers and corrupt 
DoF officials are able to split the difference. Rent-seeking behaviour also occurs during efforts to maintain 
quality. While procurement officials are entrusted to make sure that rice millers buy only good quality paddy, 
the large number of millers and incentives for collusion between government officials and millers mean there 
is little quality monitoring of the purchased paddy (Adams 1998). 
That the government buys rice from the rice millers and not the farmers directly is a serious weakness of the 
procurement mechanism. Because the government’s procurement centres are few and far between, farmers 
are not generally able to sell rice directly to them. Given the high cost of transport and the pressure to repay 
debts taken to meet production costs, farmers sell rice to local traders, millers and hoarders at lower prices 
(Shahabuddin 2009). There are also no farmer cooperatives whereby they can demand higher procurement 
prices for their harvest. Also, most Bangladeshi farmers lack sufficient land access to produce a net marketable 
surplus to sell to the government. Over the full year, most are net consumers of food. The 2005 Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) indicated that 70 per cent of rural households are net consumers of 
food. Thus, even if procurement prices are high, they are unable to take advantage of them. For the average 
farmer, therefore, the effect of the government’s procurement programme is quite small (Adams 1998). 
Shortage of food grain storage capacity
Shortage of storage capacity is another reason why procurement drives fail to reach targets. In 2009, the 
government’s target of procuring 1.2 million MT of Boro rice and paddy accounted for less than seven per cent 
of the projected Boro output of 18 million MT. The government’s food department has a total grain storage 
capacity of only 1.4 million MT. However, half the granaries were already filled with old stock, leaving little 
room for new stores (Ahmed 2009). The government’s inability to procure enough food grain is a disincentive 
for farmers to produce for the next year. In October 2009, the MoFDM announced that it had taken measures 
to establish 141 food warehouses to increase the government’s food grain storage capacity. Most of these are 
to be in the northern region, called the ‘nation’s granary’ (Mondal 2009). This would increase the government’s 
food grain storage capacity to 2.2 million MT. While still vastly inadequate, it would be a positive step towards 
facilitating procurement. 
However, ensuring food security is not only a matter of increasing the country’s food production, but also to 
administer and distribute food, food-aid and food related development initiatives in an efficient and timely 
manner to the neediest populations. Given that most Bangladeshi households are net consumers of food, the 
56
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2009
task of ensuring access to food is an important one for the government. The PFDS, the government’s major 
food distribution channel, will be examined in detail in the following section.  
3 Access to food
Ensuring food security is not simply a matter of increasing production and availability of food grains. Hunger 
and famine are not just caused by a reduction in the availability of food, but also by the inability of the poor 
to get access to food (Vyas 2000). Over 40 per cent of the population lives below the food-consumption 
based poverty line, lacking sufficient resources to afford a diet of 2,122 kilocalories (kcal) per person, per day 
(WFP 2010). Poverty incidence remains high in rural Bangladesh: 48 per cent among households headed by 
a member working in the agricultural sectors and 67 per cent for landless rural households (National Food 
Policy, Plan of Action 2008-2015). Regardless of whether they are food producers or not, many poor and 
vulnerable households do not enjoy food security as they are unable to afford a minimum basket of nutritious 
food items through their own food production, cash earnings, market purchases and other resources. Given 
that the lowest income group spends about 63 per cent of their income on food, the slightest threat to income 
can seriously compromise their food security (WFP 2010). 
While poverty leads to chronic food insecurity, the population also remains vulnerable to transitory food 
insecurity caused by sudden natural disasters and food price hikes. These events have a direct detrimental 
effect on people’s livelihoods, manifested by indebtedness, sale of assets and loss of cultivable land, all of 
which again affect their ability to access food. Worryingly, different areas of the country enjoy varying degrees 
of access to food highlighted by the fact that 79 per cent of the aggregate reduction in the poverty headcount 
is attributed to only two divisions – Dhaka and Chittagong (National Food Policy, Plan of Action 2008-2015). 
Among a range of distributional schemes, the government’s initiatives to address regional inequalities in food 
insecurity under the rubric of SSNPs are explored below.
The focus of government policy has gradually expanded to ensuring accessibility of food at the household 
and individual level (National Food Policy 2006). A core objective outlined in the National Food Policy (2006) is 
to increasing purchasing power and people’s access to food through transitory shock management, effective 
implementation of targeted food assistance programmes and employment generating income growth. 
These policies address the government’s short, medium and long-term objectives. The first calls for disaster 
preparedness and management through maintaining an adequate national security stock, including both 
government and private stocks. The second involves targeted food operations such as Vulnerable Group 
Development (VGD) and Food-for-Work (FFW) schemes, known as SSNPs. The third involves implementing 
micro-credit or training programmes, distribution of land and other entrepreneurship development activities. 
This section focuses on targeted food assistance programmes, beginning with an analysis of the hub of all 
food distribution activities, the PFDS. It will then explore the SSNPs by looking at their financing and allocation, 
administration and leakages. Given the availability of data on it, the VGD has been chosen as an example of 
the SSNPs.  Its targeting performance, leakages and impact on beneficiaries are all evaluated. Findings suggest 
that though the PFDS has evolved a more pro-poor focus, its distribution channels do not reflect this. Despite 
increasing budget allocations for SSNPs, the targeted interventions are not pro-poor. Targeting mechanisms 
in general have been found to be weak with high levels of leakage. However, the VGD programme showed no 
major abnormalities in its targeting mechanism, though leakages were found at multiple levels. Overall, its 
impact on income and nutrition is quite positive. Lastly, beneficiaries felt that the government’s response to 
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the 2008 food price hike, the 100-Day Employment Generation Programme (100 DEGP) was a success, despite 
facing many administrative and implementation problems. 
3.1 The Public Food Distribution System (PFDS) 
Towards a pro-poor focus
The PFDS began as a public food rationing system. Though in principle the subsidies extended to the entire 
population, in practice the rations had an urban and middle class bias, with very few ration dealers operating 
at the rural level. The Modified Rationing (MR) programme was designed to provide subsidised food grains to 
the rural poor. However, various field studies revealed that around 50 per cent of all MR food grain was leaked 
(or sold) on the open market, and that 80 per cent of all remaining MR food grains went to urban groups. As 
a result, no more than 12 per cent of the rural population ever received benefits from the MR programme 
(Adams 1998). Negligent government supervision of private ration dealers allowed rent-seeking dealers to 
divert part or all of their food grain allotment for sale in the open market. In 1989, Palli (village) Rationing (PR) 
replaced MR and worked in a similar way, with the exception that Members of Parliament (MP) were entrusted 
to select private ration shop dealers. But this resulted in collusive behaviour, with dealers splitting profits with 
the MPs. During this period, only around 30 per cent of the PR actually reached the poor (Adams 1998). 
In the 1980s, major external donors pressured the government to reduce all government subsidies on food as 
part of the SAPs. The emergence of targeted interventions allowed national leaders, especially authoritarian 
regimes, to gain popular legitimacy by directly reaching the rural poor. This was partly achieved by building 
direct relationships with local political elites, which proved crucial to the delivery of safety net programmes 
as will be seen later (Hossain 2007). Thus, the PFDS came to have a much more pro-poor focus, though it was 
still rife with governance issues.
The rationale for the PFDS is that it addresses key aspects of market failure and ensures re-distribution. This 
means making food grains available to poor households who would otherwise not have access to adequate 
food, distributing food during emergency situations and stabilising market prices to avoid excessive price 
increases. In addition to the core food insecure population, other segments of the population who are 
susceptible to sporadic food emergencies fall into two broad categories. The first are the urban dwellers 
depending on the market for their supplies. In the event of supply shortages leading to unaffordable prices, 
government supply channels, such as Open Market Sales (OMS), are released to ease the pressure on prices. 
The second are members of the rural subsistence economy who are generally self-sufficient. But in the event 
of poor harvests and/or natural disasters, they lack the necessary resources for purchasing food from the 
market. These groups are targeted with special relief and development programmes (MoFDM 2005).
As it is the core of the government’s food security related initiatives, it is important to examine the PFDS’ 
operational performance. Its 15 distribution channels can be broadly categorised into eight monetised (sale) and 
seven non-monetised channels. The latter consists of food-based safety net programmes, which make up 71 per 
cent of PFDS’ total distribution. Rice takes up 68 per cent of total non-monetised distribution (Ahmed 2007). The 
effective delivery of food that a beneficiary is entitled to depends on institutional governance and coordination 
in executing operations and stock management, while ameliorating leakages and economic and social costs. 
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Problems in food stock storage and rotation
The PFDS’ current national food stock levels are at 800 thousand MT. To manage import arrival uncertainty 
and enable emergency distribution, it is advised that the government maintain stock levels of one million MT., 
300 thousand MT of this are held as a buffer stock for unprecedented food security threats (Shahabuddin et 
al. 2009). Though the PFDS aims to provide safety nets, stabilise prices and provide emergency relief, it cannot 
achieve these three objectives simultaneously. Keeping in mind budgetary constraints, there are inevitable 
trade-offs between these priorities (Shahabuddin et al. 2009). The ‘optimal stock’ is thus a dynamic concept, 
depending on distribution and procurement. Unnecessarily high levels of stock imply increased costs due 
to storage losses, quality deterioration, high transit costs and suboptimal use of the administrative structure 
(Ahmed 2004). 
A study found that 35 per cent of distributed food grain was more than nine months old (IFPRI 2004). In FY 
2001-2002, due to the Directorate of Movement, Storage and Silo (DMSS) depending on district stock reports 
that did not specify the age of stored stock, the cost of the stock deterioration was estimated to be Tk. 105 
crore (Ahmed 2004). Rice cannot be stored for more than six months without quality deterioration and stocks 
have to be rolled over twice a year. In contrast, wheat can be stored for longer periods. Stock deterioration is 
not just inefficient, but has negative nutritional implications for those receiving food aid.
Losses in the PFDS
Due to the elimination of inefficient safety net and rationing programmes, losses in the PFDS have substantially 
declined since the 1990s. Transit and storage losses decreased from 3.5 and 1.5 per cent respectively in 
the 1980s to 0.3 and 0.72 per cent between 1998 and 2002. However, the average value of losses was still 
large, at Tk. 23.6 crores for rice and wheat (Ahmed 2004). Food aid arrivals also frequently coincided with 
the government’s procurement season, resulting in higher losses due to frequent movements and higher 
stock rotation time. Adopting a private trader arrangement, where transporters assume sole responsibility for 
delivering the full invoice quantity in order to cut losses has been suggested (Ahmed 2004). 
Is distribution really pro-poor?
The PFDS’ allocation and distribution over the past three years are shown in Table 3, highlighting two 
encouraging observations. Firstly, approximately 92 and 93 per cent of the PFDS’ allocation was distributed 
during FY2007-08 and FY2008-09 respectively. Secondly, around 60 per cent of the PFDS distribution is 
targeted to the poor through non-priced channels, implying a pro-poor focus. However, the OMS has the 
highest (FY2007-08, FY2009-10) or the second highest (FY2008-09) allocation in the past three years. It is 
questionable why the government has allocated so substantially to this distribution channel given that this 
is a priced channel with very low caloric transfer values of 23 kcals/person/day (see Table 5).  Its distribution 
has only been around 50-60 per cent and it is largely implemented in urban areas. Comparatively, the VGD 
has seen more than 100 per cent distribution, indicating that the need for targeted programs exceeds the 
amount allocated for them. Thus, there is a pressing need for the government to both expand the targeted 
programmes through higher procurement and allocation of food grains and to re-evaluate the efficacy of and 
resource allocation for OMS. 
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Essential Priorities (EP) 256 81.64 256 85.55 279
Other Priorities (OP) 27 77.78 26 84.62 45
Large Employers (LE) 12 103.33 133 7.52 22
Open Market Sale (OMS) 389 68.69 370 52.7 600
Flour mill/fair price  
Sub total 684 74.62 785 56.82 946
Non-priced
Food for Work (FFW) 185 83.78 331 119.34 375
Test Relief (TR) 150 50.67 263 139.92 400
Vulnerable group 
Development (VGD) 265 100.75 265 105.28 265
Vulnerable Group Feeding 
(VGF) 274 68.61 500 101.4 550
Gratuity Relief (GR) 64 59.37 64 67.19 64
VGF (Relief )  
Hill tracts/others 75 126.67 92 122.67 75
Sub total 1013 103.71 1498 112.42 1729
Total 1697 91.98 2283 93.3 2675
  
% of PFDS going to  
non-priced channels 59.7  65.6  64.6
Source: Adapted from the Food Planning and Monitoring Unit (FPMU), GoB
The number of beneficiaries the PFDS actually reaches also requires close examination. The bulk of PFDS 
assistance distributed during FY2007-08 was provided through the OMS, VGF and the VGD. A study estimated 
that 30.5 million individuals would be reached through the PFDS in 2007 based on distribution; ration sizes and 
the duration of assistance of each programme (Fang et al. 2008). However, this does not attempt to account 
for ‘overlap’: where a beneficiary household is participating in more than one programme, resulting in lower 
than the estimated level of benefits (Fang et al. 2008). Given that the number of food insecure people had 
reached 65 million by that time, the government’s targeting of less than half that population reflects a chronic 
gap in the PFDS’ coverage that year. No estimates of beneficiaries are available for FY2008-09 and FY2009-10.
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To further explore the PFDS’ reach and its impact on their food security status, the next section on SSNPs 
evaluates performance, targeting and leakages.
3.2 Social Safety Net Programmes (SSNPs)
 
With poverty figures of 56 million and a food insecure population of 65 million, SSNPs acquire a great 
importance in the government’s agenda to reduce vulnerabilities (WFP 2010). SSNPs are designed to help 
and transfer resources to poor and vulnerable groups with the aim of poverty reduction, social empowerment 
and employment generation, and are critical given the high incidence of poverty and food insecurity in 
Bangladesh. There are 30 SSNPs which include direct transfers to the poor, whether in cash or in kind, and 
with or without a work requirement (Ahmed 2007). Among these, four are unconditional and three are 
conditional food transfers. The unconditional food based programmes are the VGD, Vulnerable Group Feeding 
(VGF), Gratuitous Relief (GR) and Community Nutrition Programme. VGF and GR are generally used in times of 
natural disasters or seasonal downturns, whereas the VGD and Community Nutrition Programme are ongoing. 
The conditional food based programmes are the FFW, Test Relief (TR) and Food Support for the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts (Ahmed 2007). Since the SSNPs’ food-based programmes are its’ largest and are distributed via the PFDS, 
this section contains an overall analysis of the SSNPs’ budget allocation, administration and performance. The 
findings show that though budget allocations for SSNPs are increasing, the targeted interventions are not 
pro-poor, with weak targeting mechanisms in general suffering from high levels of leakage. 
Increasing budget allocations for SSNPs 
Government spending on SSNPs has historically been low and declining in Bangladesh, at less than one per 
cent of the GDP and 4.4 per cent of public expenditure. These figures are lower compared to what other 
countries at similar levels of development were spending on social protection programmes (World Bank 
2006). Recently however, given higher GDP growth rates the government was able to set higher targets for 
providing social security to the poor. For the FY2007-08, SSNPs accounted for 13.32 per cent of the budget 
and 1.8 per cent of the GDP. Of the food-based programmes, OMS, VGF, FFW and VGD received the highest 
budget allocations respectively. In FY2008-09, the share further increased to 16.94 per cent of the budget, 
which was 2.76 per cent of the GDP (Bhattacharya 2009). It is a positive step towards food security that SSNPs 
are beginning to gain priority in the government’s development outlook.
Targeted programmes not pro-poor
Increased budgetary allocations alone however reflect little about the programmes’ reach to the neediest 
populations. The question is how pro-poor the SSNPs’ targeted programmes are (e.g. VGF, VGD) relative to the 
non-targeted programmes (e.g. OMS). Overall, the coverage rates in Table 4 suggest that the programmes are 
pro-poor, as the percentage of households that benefit from targeted programmes progressively decline for 
higher quintiles (Ahmed 2007). However, 41 per cent of the beneficiaries of all targeted programmes are in 
the top three quintiles compared to 45 per cent of all non-targeted programmes. As the difference between 
the two is marginal, the targeted programmes cannot be said to be more pro-poor and efficient than the non-
targeted ones (Ahmed n.d.). Changing this is essential to ensuring that those who require food aid the most 
are being served. 
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Table 4: Incidence of targeting by per capita consumption quintiles










VGD 31.7 29.1 19.4 14.3 5.5
TR 38.9 22.2 18.9 13.3 6.7
VGF 36.1 25.0 20.7 13.0 5.2
Old Age Pension 31.9 20.0 21.1 20.5 6.5
Total (targeted) 34.2 24.6 20.0 15.2 6.0
Total (non-targeted) 30.9 23.8 21.6 16.2 7.5
Source: Household Income & Expenditure Survey (HIES) 2005 in Ahmed (2007)
System leakage
SSNPs have an estimated 20-40 per cent leakage (Rahman 2006). Studies point to leakages of the magnitude 
of 10-50 per cent for food-based programmes and 5-25 per cent for cash-based programs (World Bank 2006). 
These show a strong correlation between the number of intermediaries in a programme’s transfer process and 
its degree of leakage. A recent FAO report estimated that 11-12 per cent of SSNP funds drained out through 
several channels (‘12 pc Social Safety Net Lost on bribe, flaws’, The Daily Star, February 19, 2009). One per 
cent of the benefit leaks out through bribery, seven per cent through poor targeting and three to four per 
cent due to receiving less than the prescribed amount. Having close relationships with local representatives, 
paying bribes and belonging to the vote bank of an influential member of local government are important 
qualifications for receiving benefits. The same study reported that around 14.5 per cent of the beneficiaries 
engaged in bribery (of whom two-thirds managed to access benefits), while one-fifth received benefits 
through social connections. A startling one-third of the beneficiaries were selected purely on the basis of 
poverty. The study concluded that local government managed the programmes reasonably well with limited 
overlapping, an overall low degree of leakage and misuse of funds (‘12 pc Social Safety Net Lost on bribe, 
flaws’, The Daily Star, February 19, 2009). It is difficult to accurately judge efficacy given that there seems to be 
no unanimous agreement on the level of leakage.
Weak targeting mechanisms
Low coverage results partly from weak targeting mechanisms, which are homogenous among all programmes. 
As a general guideline, the implementing ministry sets a quota taking into account the total number of 
beneficiaries, the number of beneficiaries per union and the amount of transfer per beneficiary. The quota also 
caps the number of male and female beneficiaries per union or ward. The quota employs certain targeting 
criteria according to the theme of the programme, which could include income levels, assets, household 
structure and demographic features. Based on this, local union officials, in consultation with other local 
agencies employ different targeting criteria to identify beneficiaries. This is a questionable practice (Ahmed 
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2007). For example, there is considerable doubt about targeting criteria using land possession as a way of 
differentiating between the poor and non-poor. Currently, people who own at most five decimals of land are 
classified as very poor. However, given the fact that 59 per cent of the poor have less than five decimals of land, 
as does 36 per cent of the non-poor; a random selection of households could lead to selecting over one-third 
of the non-poor (World Bank 2006). Thus, scarce resources are potentially being diverted to the non-poor.
Another problem with targeting is that budget allocations do not take into account geographic variations 
in poverty across different divisions in Bangladesh. In 2005, the change in poverty due to SSNPs was most 
prominent for Sylhet (CPD 2005). Though Sylhet has the highest share of SSNP participation and beneficiary 
households – receiving 24.31 per cent for rural and 11.25 per cent for urban household – Khulna deserves the 
highest allocation due to poverty incidence while receiving the lowest allocation — 11.03 and 4.23 per cent 
respectively for rural and urban households respectively. The VGF has the highest number of beneficiaries – 
33.34 per cent of the total – with Sylhet having the highest number of beneficiaries. Following this was the 
VGD programme, providing assistance to 17.11 per cent households, with Dhaka having the most beneficiaries 
(Ahmed 2007). The government and donors jointly fund most of these programmes. However, while donors 
generally have interests in targeting based on food insecurity and vulnerability maps, governments at times 
targets less food-insecure areas – a reflection of their own political agenda and the need to reward local 
political actors who are very influential in the PFDS.
Though Bangladesh’s growth rates in recent years have resulted in decreases in the percentage of the poor, 
the absolute number of poor people has not declined (Ahmed 2007). The combined coverage of the SSNPs 
among the bottom 10 per cent of the population is only 23 per cent while for targeted programmes it is 
approximately 16 percent. Also, coverage in urban areas is very poor, with five per cent SSNP membership 
compared to 15 per cent of rural households (Ahmed n.d.). As a result, the overall level of coverage stands at 
only four to five million or 10 per cent of the poor. Accounting for leakage and targeting errors, only around six 
to seven per cent of the poor are actually covered (Ahmed 2007), is regarded as very modest by international 
standards. NGOs and microfinance institutions have had remarkable success in their ability to reach the poor 
through a combination of labour intensive and community based targeting which are not always feasible for 
government bureaucracies to adopt (Sharif 2009). Nevertheless, the government should adopt a community-
based beneficiary selection system linked to the proxy means test (PMT), which accurately selects poor 
households. Efforts to de-subsidise the PFDS and increase targeted food programs over the years should have 
resulted in better coverage and reduced leakages. Why this has not happened could partly be explained by 
institutional weaknesses.
Weak policies and institutional misgovernance
Thirteen line ministries including the MSW, the MoFDM and the MWCA carry out the planning and 
implementation of SSNPs. The government has engaged other stakeholders such as NGOs and microfinance 
organisations to aid in the implementation of these programmes. However, the involvement of multiple actors 
has caused considerable overlap in programmes, straining the administrative and resource capacity of the 
government. An analysis of the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) has shown that over 11 per 
cent of households participated in at least two of the three SSNPs analysed in the survey — the VGD, Food for 
Education (FFE) and FFW (World Bank 2006). There is little to no coordination between the several ministries 
in charge of implementing different SSNPs. For example, both the MSW and the MoFDM run the public work 
programs but have little knowledge about each other’s activities. 
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There are no integrated national guidelines for developing SSNPs. Coordination is hindered by the fact that 
many programmes are directly financed with donor assistance to individual ministries. Most programmes 
are also ex-post coping initiatives, responding after natural disasters or food shocks. Ex-ante programmes 
are preventative and allow for protection before risks emerge. However, these require resource and financial 
investment that the government has not been able to provide (Ahmed 2007).
A rigorous internal monitoring and evaluation system is required to assess the impact on beneficiary’s food 
security status of each SSNP. This is important for ensuring quality, proper ration allocation, appropriate card 
possession and regular detection of malpractices. Four factors are crucial here: the type of safety nets based on 
an appropriate risk analysis, the right blend of programmes, efficient targeting to the intended beneficiaries 
and administrative efficiency in operating the programmes. Regular evaluations are required to measure the 
intended impact of the programme and to assess whether people are graduating to a less vulnerable position. 
This has been done in the past. Due to high costs and leakages, the Palli rationing programme was abolished 
and replaced with the innovative FFE programme in 1993. There has also been a shift from food to cash based 
programmes given the high level of leakages of the former. Recently, the FFE was transformed into a cash-
based stipend programme and the FFW programme is replacing the Cash-for-Work (CFW) (Ahmed n.d.). 
3.2.1 Vulnerable Group Development 
One of the most well-established and largest targeted food-based programmes under the SSNPs is the VGD 
programme. It is implemented nationwide and covers approximately 750,000 (7 lakh) women from ultra-poor 
households who participate in development activities and receive monthly rations of rice, wheat or atta in 
an 18-month programme cycle (Data Analysis and Technical Assistance [DATA] 2007). Since the VGD is one of 
the most widely evaluated programmes11 (both by government and non-governmental actors), this section 
examines it as an example of food-based SSNPs, exploring targeting, leakages, impact and the political 
economy of VGD delivery. However, there were no similar governmental impact evaluations of the VGF and 
GR, reflecting a lack of monitoring and evaluation measures for these programmes. Findings reveal that while 
the targeting mechanism functions without any major abnormalities, leakages at multiple levels hamper the 
efficacy and impact of the VGD. 
11  Many studies have conducted impact evaluations of VGD cycles in different years. See Ahmed et al. 2009, Ahmed et 
al. 2007, DATA 2007, Hossain 2007 and Ahmed 2004 for further details. The statistics quoted in the analysis above are not 
compared across studies but rather give a flavour of the programme’s features.
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Programme characteristics 
No major targeting abnormalities 
The fact that many different actors have been involved in informally scrutinising the VGD beneficiary selection 
process has resulted in no major abnormalities in the process (Hossain 2007). Ninety-four per cent of VGD 
cardholders fulfilled at least one of the five selection criteria of the programme, as is the minimum requirement 
(Ahmed et al. 2004).  However, 77 per cent of the beneficiaries did not hold their VGD cards, reporting that 
Union Parishad (UP) officials kept them. Around 10-16 per cent of the cardholders said that UP members made 
them ‘share’ their card with a non-cardholder. As a result, they received only half their ration entitlement. 
Although this is a clear violation of programme rules, it is difficult to see this phenomenon purely as a form of 
corruption or leakage as it could be an ad hoc attempt to address the gap between the current size of the VGD 
and the large number of eligible candidates who have been inadvertently excluded from the programme. 
Indeed, 86 per cent of VGD cardholders who had to share their cards considered that the non-cardholder 
recipient either as poor as or poorer than themselves (Ahmed et al. 2004).
A 2007 study on the beneficiaries of the 2005-06 cycle, disaggregated the components of the VGD — the 
Income Generating VGD (IGVGD) and the Food Security VGD (FSVGD) (DATA 2007). The IGVGD programme 
exclusively targets poor women who receive a monthly food ration over a period of 24 months. IGVGD also 
has a built-in mechanism to provide credit to its participants. The FSVGD programme also targets poor women 
and provides a combination of food and cash to programme participants. Given the fact that 67 and 63 per 
cent of the IGVGD and FSVGD households would have belonged to the poorest 30 per cent of all households 
in the income distribution in the absence of the programmes, the programme’s targeting mechanisms worked 
reasonably well. However, only 31 and 21 per cent of participants respectively fulfilled the criteria of being 
female-headed households (FHH). In addition, the study showed malpractice among the selecting authorities. 
Female UP members who have the task of selecting 50 per cent of the VGD programme’s women are not 
allowed to do so due to pressure from male members of the UP. UP chairman and members are also alleged to 
have taken bribes ranging from Tk. 500-1000 from each woman in exchange of FSVGD cards, using them as a 
tool to get votes in UP elections. Despite this, there is a general consensus that the VGD programmes are well 
targeted to very poor women (Ahmed et al. 2007; Hossain 2007), further explained in subsequent sections.
Leakages at multiple levels
Whilst the VGD demonstrates targeting efficiency, corruption and leakage are rife. One of the largest problems 
in the programme is the ‘short ration’ i.e. the gap between what the programme officially distributes and what 
recipients actually receive, estimated at an extremely high 15-21 per cent (Hossain 2007). A portion of this loss 
is attributed to the transport and handling of grains for distribution to the beneficiary. UP chairpersons and 
members distributing food grain are supposed to receive transport and handling costs from the government, 
but complain about long delays and in some cases non-receipt of their dues. The UP leaders themselves cover 
transport and handling costs by selling the grain, depriving the rightful recipients in the process. They also 
report receiving 3.5 per cent less wheat than originally allocated from the Local Supply Depots (LSD). This 
could be an indication of illicit sales at or en route to the LSD, a matter which implicates the district officials 
and the Directorate of Relief and Rehabilitation in misgovernance (Ahmed et al. 2004). 
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Another common problem has been the absence at the distribution sites of a standardised ration-weighing 
system with respect to rice and wheat. This makes efforts at estimating leakage difficult, as it is not possible to 
say with certainty as to whether beneficiaries’ entitlements have been deliberately withheld or whether it is a 
consequence of weighing inaccuracies. Leakage at the beneficiary level is the difference between the transfer 
entitlement and the amount of transfer actually received by an officially listed beneficiary. Using this definition, 
the average leakage was calculated at 7.53 per cent, or 2.25 kilograms per month per beneficiary. In 2007, this 
leakage was worse for the FSVGD compared to the IGVGD (Ahmed 2007). Cash payments were also received 
unevenly in both programmes due to delays in fund release from the donors to the government, irregular flow 
of funds from Bangladesh Bank to local commercial bank branches due to administrative problems and also 
because the FSVGD was in its last phase in 2006 (Ahmed 2007).
Other methods of leakage also threatened the programmes integrity. The leakage due to ‘under coverage’ was 
0.48 per cent, i.e. when the actual number of beneficiaries is less than the officially determined number for 
whom the food was allocated. Using an inclusive definition of leakage, the total leakage amounted to 13.57 
per cent of the total wheat allocation. Other studies note a leakage related ‘inclusion error’, i.e. food secure 
individuals receiving assistance, to be a rather high 24 per cent (Fang et al. 2008). 
As has been mentioned before, the amount of leakage increases with the number of intermediaries in the 
process, implying that programmes targeting a large number of people are likelier to have higher leakage. It 
is difficult to assess the overall state of leakage from the VGD programme, given that there is no agreement on 
leakage related figures, though it is evident that this figure is quite high. A representation of the VGD delivery 
mechanism is featured below in Figure 3  highlighting where leakage takes place. It is evident that many of 
the problems occur at the lowest administrational levels, but also at the local supply depots.
66
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2009
Figure 3: VGD delivery mechanism
Government of Bangladesh 
World Food Programme 
Other bilateral donors
Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs (MOWCA)
Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (MOFDM)
Defines policy frame
Coordinates between ministries, directorates and NGOs
Directorate of Relief and Rehabilitation
Ensures efficient execution of the programme 
Evaluates fund flow and credit
Upazila Parishad VGD Committee
Ensuring proper beneficiary selection
 Allocating VGD cards to unions 
Supervising wheat delivery and ensuring
quantity and quality.
 Collecting funds for transport and 
ancillary expenses in time
Union Parishad VGD Committee
Ensuring appropriate selection process
 Ensuring delivery of 30 kgs of wheat by exact 
quantity and quality
Ensuring timely distribution
Ensuring the safety and storage of collected wheat
Beneficiary
NGOs and microfinance 
institutions with training and 
savings components of the 
programme




Sharing of cards leads to 
receiving only half of the 
entitled ration
Size of transfers and multiplier effects are 










Delays in giving 
transport & 
storage costs to 
Unions
UP women 
members often not 
given chance to 
select beneficiaries
Cards kept by UP officials 
 Leakage of 2.25 kgs of 
wheat per month per 
beneficiary 
67
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2009
Impact on food security
Evidently the most important outcome of an SSNP, in this case the VGD, is its efficacy in improving beneficiary 
food security status. This can be achieved through directly improving the nutritional status or through 
boosting income and/or assets that enhance the capacity to purchase food. The VGD seems to have fared well 
in both these dimensions but again, with little gains for the ultra poor.
Income increases, but not for the ultra poor
At first look the VGD seems to have a strong impact on the household income and poverty reduction. The 
combination of food and cash transfers from the FSVGD increased household income, by 32.3 per cent, while 
the IGVGD food transfers increased income by 27.8 per cent. In monetary terms this means that for a Tk. 100 
transfer, income increased by Tk. 167 and Tk. 151 for the FSVGD and IGVGD respectively (Ahmed 2007). The 
transfers reduced extreme poverty by 20 (IGVGD) and 30 (FSVGD) per cent. However, the size of the transfers 
and their multiplier effects on income are not sufficient for most households to graduate out of extreme 
poverty. Most of those who graduated out of poverty were already closer to the poverty line. The rest only 
benefit from the consumption of temporary food aid (Ahmed 2007). 
Atta transfers bring positive nutritional outcomes
Ensuring that the VGD brings positive nutritional outcomes is a challenge because it depends on beneficiaries’ 
nutritional status before assistance and the type of food and caloric transfer value of the assistance used to 
fill the consumption gaps. Across many transfer programmes it was found that atta transfers bring about the 
largest improvement in food security, especially for poor women (DATA 2007). The government has nutrition-
oriented complementary interventions under the VGD such as the atta fortification in Milling and Fortification 
Units (MFUs) and the collaboration between the VGD and National Nutrition Project. The micronutrient-
fortified atta in sealed bags preserves nutritious value, ensures the weight, maintains quality standards and 
avoids leakage and pilferage (Matin et al. 2009). 
The net effect on food consumption is larger for the FSVGD because 93 per cent of the rations are micronutrient 
fortified atta (as opposed to 40 per cent in the IGVGD, the rest being rice rations) and the amount consumed 
is far higher than would have been consumed without the transfers (DATA 2007). Participation by an adult 
female in either the IGVGD or FSVGD programmes did not lead to increased calorie intakes by pre-school 
children. However, the food interventions that provided rice such as IGVGD had a larger effect on men’s calorie 
intake, whereas the opposite was true in the case of FSVGD which provided atta, increasing the share of food 
that went to women relative to men (Ahmed 2007). 
Caloric transfer values are calculated taking into account ration sizes, duration of assistance and the amount 
of beneficiaries covered. Table 5 shows that for the VGD programme initiated during the food price hike in 
FY2008-09 this was estimated at 177 kcals/person/day. With an average consumption gap of 228 kcals/person/
day for the food insecure population, the VGD fell short by 51 kcals/person/day. To ensure food security for its 
3.8 million potential beneficiaries, the VGD would have needed to transfer 19 thousand MT of food for the year 
2008-09. This is beyond its current capacity, and highlights the need for substantial expansion. 
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In sum, although the VGD’s contribution to increasing household level calorie intake has been noteworthy, 
more efforts are needed to target the rest of the households who still do not consume three square meals a 
day. Efforts need to be much more nuanced in order to improve the nutritional status of different groups:  pre-
school children, women and men. 
Table 5: Assistance requirements of SSNPs


























OMS 254 23 231 23 12.4 288000
VGD 228 177 51 5 3.8 19000
VGF 228 25 203 20 22.5 458000
FFW 228 150 78 8 8.3 66000
TR/GR/HT 228 77 151 15 11 166000
CFW-GoB 228 107 121 12 10 121000
Non-GoB 
programmes
228 292  n/a 8.1 n/a
Total     76.1 1118000
 
* Transfer values in the table reflect differing durations across the programmes, and are therefore not directly 
comparable
**  Beneficiaries refer to programme participants and their family members. The total of 76.1 million includes 
those likely to receive assistance;  Includes recipients associated with inclusion based targeting errors.
Source: Fang et al. 2008
Political economy of VGD delivery 
Despite high levels of leakage, the VGD programme seems to be favourably viewed by several studies, begging 
the question of why it is perceived to work well (Ahmed 2004, DATA 2007, Hossain 2007, Ahmed et al. 2009). The 
answer lies in the political economy of VGD delivery, with local political actors occupying a central role in the 
process. Upazilas and union parishads implement programmes and policies, with district and divisional levels 
playing a less visible role. The efficacy of local social and political leadership is judged by its capacity to attract 
state resources to the community. Programmes like the VGD create a platform through which local political 
leaders can earn support in poor areas (Hossain 2007). The targeting and selection of beneficiaries, allocation 
of VGD cards and the delivery and distribution of grains are avenues through which local elite’s powers are 
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manifested. Many informant interviewees have acknowledged that these actors have complete discretion 
over the success or failure of SSNPs. This is due to an absence of realistic alternatives to food distribution 
by this political class, as well as the lack of an effective administrative structure that reaches the grassroots 
level. As a result, there is a ‘trade-off between the informational advantage of communities which improves 
targeting efficiency and an accountability disadvantage’ (Hossain, 2007, p. 12). In other words, the question is 
whether the local political class extends full support and fairness to the programme’s beneficiaries or behave 
as patrons to reward their clients, thus compromising accountability to the community (Hossain 2007). 
As it turns out, there seems to be a balance between the two interests, with the VGD being well targeted to 
very poor women, a politically strategic move. But while the women selected are almost all eligible, many more 
are necessarily excluded – perhaps even 90 per cent, despite their eligibility (Hossain 2007). Thus, beneficiary 
selection serves twin objectives, both of the programme as well as the local elite – of targeting very poor 
women while also exercising selective patronage among them. This gives rise to active lobbying amongst 
the most vocal and organised poor women. By raising their profile and making it politically costly for them to 
be excluded, they secure a chance of being selected in the programme (Ahmed 2004). In interviews ministry 
officials noted that UP officials withhold cards as a manifestation of the control they enjoy. 
Given this situation it is very difficult to label the entire process as corrupt and ineffective. The system is faced 
with a dilemma in the absence of a better outreach and distribution programme. On the one hand corruption 
acts as an incentive for a well-functioning programme with minor problems, while on the other removing 
these incentives risks even greater leakages and bottlenecks in implementation of the programme. 
3.2.2 The 100-day Employment Generation Programme (100 DEGP)
In 2008, the global surge in food prices plunged the country in a food crisis. From June 2006 to June 2008, 
wholesale and retail prices of local coarse rice increased by 78 and 82 per cent respectively. In response 
to inflationary pressures and seasonal unemployment during September to November, the government 
introduced the 100-DEGP in September 2008 to reach the jobless poor in order to increase their purchasing 
capacity. Unlike the VGD, a long-term SSNP, this was a short-term initiative that was allocated Tk. 20 billion 
in the FY2008-9 budget. It is the government’s largest employment generation programme and is intended 
to reach two million beneficiaries with the objective of generating 200 million ‘person’ days of employment 
per year. This section analyses this programme as a government response to transient vulnerabilities and 
concludes that while it faced a multitude of administrative and implementation problems, it has been an 
overall success. Given that the price hike occurred not too long ago, not many impact analyses and evaluations 
of the government’s response have been carried out. This section adapts key arguments made by Fiorillo et al 
(2009) and Khatun, Rahman and Nabi (2009) in their studies of the food price hike and its consequences for 
food security.
Mis-targeting and under coverage of beneficiaries
Last year, the National Food Policy Capacity Strengthening Programme (NFPCSP) carried out an assessment 
of the first phase of the programme. As per the guidelines, unemployed and unskilled poor aged between 18 
and 60 as well as landless and marginal farmers were eligible. The study however found that the programme’s 
beneficiary identification process did not conform to the implementation guidelines. Although the programme 
was supposed to target five per cent of the extreme poor in each upazila using poverty maps, this did not 
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happen. Instead, the programme’s selected individuals from the most vulnerable areas such as the monga 
prone, haor baor, char12 and flood affected areas. It also did not achieve its objective of tackling seasonal 
unemployment (Fiorillo et al. 2009). There was substantial mis-targeting and 2.2 per cent of the beneficiaries 
belonged to the richest 20 per cent of the population. However, approximately 67 per cent of the beneficiaries 
were from the poorest 40 per cent, while only 37 per cent were from the poorest 20 per cent of the population. 
Field officials were not properly trained on how to identify the extreme poor and also on whether only the 
extreme poor should be targeted (Khatun et al. 2009). However, food insecurity levels of the beneficiaries were 
significantly higher than the non-beneficiaries. 
The guidelines instructed influential members of the community to select beneficiaries. But in many cases the 
UP chairman or members did not consult these individuals and distributed cards to personal acquaintances, 
in order to build vote banks (Fiorillo et al. 2009). The selection procedures were undisclosed to the public. 
Although a union-level supervising officer was entrusted to review and check the beneficiary list, they had 
limited authority to challenge the choices made by the UP chairmen and members. Many beneficiaries also 
had to pay bribes ranging from Tk. 100 to 500 per person in order to be included (Khatun et al. 2009). However, 
some positive targeting measures emerged: they conformed to the officially set age range (18-50), avoided 
overlap with beneficiaries of other SSNPs and attracted a large number of previously unemployed women’s 
participation (28 per cent) (Fiorillo et al. 2009). 
The programme’s total registered members numbered 1,997,075, but only 1,793,720 beneficiaries on average 
were employed per day. Table 6 shows that the first phase of the programme utilised 76 per cent of its Tk. 12 
billion allocation. 





















Dhaka 539,895 10,915,090 3256920000 2499770040 77 24,687 11,950 48.4
Barisal 142,180 2,833,020 853080000 681974900 80 22,743 9,090 40.0
Chittagong 321,680 6,453,110 1930080000 1490524200 77 6,301 3,479 55.2
Khulna 219,400 4,401,180 1316400000 1024977340 78 11,139 4,784 42.9
Rajshahi 656,520 13,170,610 3939120000 2963979000 75 8,135 3,800 46.7
Sylhet 117,400 2,355,120 704400000 474098200 67 28,040 17,805 63.5
National 1,997,075 40,128,130 12,000,000,000 9,135,323,680 76 100,775 50,908 50.5
Source: Adapted from MoFDM and HIES 2005
12 Haor baor-Freshwater wetlands; Char-naturally reclaimed land.
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Work incomplete in first phase
In 2008, the first phase of the programme was from September to the end of November, i.e. the lean season when 
daily labourers and marginal farmers are unemployed. However, projects could not be started and completed 
within the set time period. A 15-day adjustment slot to address the variability in agro-ecological characteristics 
in different parts of the country was assumed as a built-in flexibility in programme implementation. However, 
this may have caused delays in programme execution. Additionally, it was not viable to implement some of 
the projects, e.g. construction, as haor and char areas remained submerged due to floods during the project 
period. As a result, most unions ran the programme for around 50 days, rather than the 60 prescribed, leaving 
the beneficiaries with lower than the prescribed amount of wages (Fiorillo et al. 2009). Table 6 reveals that 
of the total number of projects started, only around 50 per cent were completed. The selection of 100 DEGP 
projects was not carried out in a participatory manner, as directed by the guidelines. The decisions were 
centrally made, though this could have been a result of the limited time stakeholders had to prepare and plan 
before the programme. 
Fund misappropriation
The government made use of the pre-existing system of the ‘Cash-for-Work’ programme to distribute 100 
DEGP funds throughout the country. While this was to minimise leakage, it instead led to considerably high 
transaction costs. Every single daily payment of the 100 DEGP benefit involved a form that had to be signed 
by six officials. This was extremely cumbersome, given the dearth of financial and human resources at field 
level. There were long delays in receiving funds to administer the programme, which affected the logistics and 
supervision of the work. Fund distribution to the upazila’s was not adequate for the number of beneficiaries 
they had. As a result, instead of daily, payments were made often on a weekly or even bi-weekly basis (Fiorillo 
et al. 2009). During payment, a large number of beneficiaries were not required to put their signatures or 
fingerprints in any records, certifying payment. This left much scope for fund misappropriation. Often, the 
number of names in the record book was higher than the number of labourers who were actually working at 
the site. Since the release of funds depended on the recorded number of workdays, the false workdays meant 
that a significant amount of resources was transferred to the project provider’s pockets (Khatun et al. 2009).
Beneficiaries report positive impact
The programme beneficiaries felt it had a positive impact, with more than three-fourths noting an improvement 
in their overall economic condition. Seventy-seven per cent of participating households observed an 
improvement in either the quality or quantity of food consumption, or both (Fiorillo et al. 2009). They also 
reported an investment in productive and non-productive household assets. 
Since the 100 DEGP was a response to the emergency arising from the food price hike, the government 
made a trade-off between a speedy intervention to relieve the suffering of the poor and taking ample time 
to prepare the programme. This lack of appropriate planning manifested itself in all the stages of programme 
implementation. The lack of proper grievance redress mechanisms meant that the potential beneficiaries of 
this programme were also victims of this. Ministry directives prioritised reporting and addressing grievances, 
and upazila nirbahi officers13 were responsible for following up all complaints with an enquiry. Although 
13  The chief executive of a thana/sub-district. This title was later changed to ‘thana nirbahi officer’.
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beneficiaries attempted to complain, no grievances were recorded (Fiorillo et al. 2009). Experts agree that the 
100 DEGP needs to be transformed from an employment generation initiative to an employment guarantee 
scheme to make the provision of work mandatory. Placing it within a legal-institutional framework would 
provide a legal guarantee for jobs to be provided within 15 days of issuing of the beneficiary cards and for free 
medical treatment for injuries, among other benefits (Khatun et al. 2009).
This section demonstrates that ensuring access to food for the poorest of the poor has not been achieved 
primarily through the lack of good governance in the institutional framework that governs food access. Though 
the PFDS has evolved to a more pro-poor focus, its distribution channels do not reflect this. While budget 
allocations for SSNPs are increasing, the targeted interventions are not pro-poor. Targeting mechanisms are 
generally weak with high levels of leakage. The VGD, which is the flagship SSNP, showed that even though 
targeting occurred through unofficial channels, it did reach the appropriate groups.  However, leakages were 
found at multiple levels in the programme. Overall, its impact on income and nutrition were positive. As 
a response to a contextual food emergency, the government’s 100 DEGP had positive impacts on income 
and food consumption for the beneficiaries it reached, despite a multitude of design, implementation and 
administrative flaws.  
4  Recommendations and conclusions
4.1  Availability of food
I. Ensure security of land ownership and access
The security of land ownership and access is missing, even though this is a key incentive to farmers to produce 
more. The government should ensure that tenancy arrangements have proper documentation and are 
enforceable by both parties. A land survey that calculates the amount of khas land is urgently necessary to aid 
land distribution to the extreme poor. To ensure transparency and safeguard against land misappropriation, 
the land distribution committee needs to incorporate representatives from the landless community and have 
enforceable monitoring mechanisms. 
II. Re-evaluate fertiliser policy and administration practices
The supply of fertiliser is chronically inadequate compared to the demand. Government agencies need to 
correctly ascertain the yearly demand of fertiliser for both agricultural and commercial purposes in order to 
plan to meet it.  Monitoring mechanisms need to be implemented to ensure proper distribution of fertilisers, 
appropriate price control, execute quality control and prevent cross-border smuggling. A Citizen’s Committee 
comprising of farmers, dealers, members of local government and government administration officials can be 
formed to monitor fertiliser delivery and quality.
III. Increase incentives for seed production
The government should increase seed production by expanding the capacity of the BADC and establishing 
a special seed production zone through public-private partnership (PPP). Increasing the budget allocation 
for research and development will increase domestic production of hybrid seeds and development of new 
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varieties. Also, farmers having expertise and indigenous knowledge in quality seed production should be 
provided with proper price incentives to grow seeds.
IV. Re-evaluate procurement drive system
The food procurement strategy should be based on correct predictions of market price, so that farmers 
have an incentive to sell to the government. The government also needs to develop a grassroots system 
of collecting and storing paddy, including increased storage capacity at the union level. The establishment 
of rural government procurement centres would mean that farmers can directly sell their product at these 
points. 
4.2  Access to food
I. Improve targeting efficiency
Given the poor record of SSNPs in targeting the poorest, the government should devise more efficient 
targeting mechanisms. This can be achieved through the use of WFP poverty maps, data on district level food 
prices and PFDS distribution figures available from the Directorate of Food. Given the unequal distribution of 
wealth and poverty incidence, geographic targeting becomes very important. Even though very few SSNPs 
use these mechanisms, self-selection based on a work requirement, proxy means testing and community 
based targeting mechanisms are effective and should be taken up more programmes. 
II. Institutionalise monitoring and evaluation
Continuous monitoring of programme implementation allows for progress assessment against objectives 
and identification of procedural impediments. As exemplified by the VGF and the GR, programme evaluations 
are tellingly absent in most SSNPs. Assessing programme impact with regard to increasing food security, 
income and asset generation, in addition to judging the quality of targeting and resource leakage, is crucial 
in deciding whether to expand or downsize a programme. The government often lacks evaluative capacity in 
the relevant ministries to implement such measures, but institutionalising these processes is essential, as is 
the importance of contracting out independent external agencies to carry out randomised evaluations. 
III. Improve inter-ministerial coordination
The government should develop a national policy on the SSNPs that facilitates inter-ministerial and inter-
departmental coordination in the delivery of the programmes, minimise overlaps between programmes and 
standardise targeting criteria for programmes that are similar. Re-evaluation of existing food policy with a 
focus on implementation is also necessary. Forums or platforms of exchange between ministries on policy 
developments, administration and weaknesses in programme delivery should be explored in order to better 
inform operational performance. 
IV. Strengthen local government
Local political actors greatly influence the delivery and efficiency of the VGD, among other SSNPs. However, 
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this does not rule out the importance of creating independent, self-governed and functional local government 
structures. Donors and foreign implementing partners may have occupied too large a role in designing and 
implementing food programmes over the years, compromising local ownership of, and responsibility for, 
food security. Decentralisation and capacity building of local government is crucial to facilitate accountable 
programme implementation.   
Overall, an examination of the food availability and access scenario shows that while the government is willing 
to ensure food security, it is not deeply committed to implementing the steps required to reach this goal. 
Though commitments regarding land distribution and tenancy contracts are present, their implementation 
in practice is absent. Many government institutions either lack the capacity to carry out implementation and 
monitoring processes, or are subject to corruption and rent-seeking behaviour. This is true also in the case of 
key agricultural inputs such as fertilisers and seeds as well as in the procurement drive. These factors impede 
high yielding food production and may explain why the country is yet to achieve food self-sufficiency. 
On the other hand, reforms in the PFDS have been far reaching and the government has shown willingness 
to scrap programmes that were riddled with corruption and leakage. Targeted interventions were prioritised 
but the goal to reach the ultra poor has not been achieved. However, it must be kept in mind that these were 
donor-driven reforms. In order to really ensure food security for all, the government should increase capacity in 
the relevant ministries and institutionalise these reforms to create ownership. This must be reflected with true 
political will to avoid politicisation of food policies and programmes, so that the deserving reap the benefits.
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4CHAPTER Digital Bangladesh:The Beginning of Citizen-Centric e-Government?
In its election manifesto, the incumbent Awami League government declared a desire “to make Bangladesh 
digital [by] 2021” (Awami League Election Manifesto 2008). This unprecedented political initiative provides 
an opportunity to use Information Communications and Technology (ICT) tools to further develop and 
strengthen poverty reduction and improve citizen’s quality of life. The Digital Bangladesh (DB) vision is 
being developed by the United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) funded Access to Information (A2I) 
Programme and is based in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). It envisions utilising ICT tools to increase socio-
economic development by the year 2021 and consists of four pillars: (1) developing human resources for 
the 21st century; (2) connecting citizens in ways that are most meaningful; (3) taking services to citizen’s 
doorsteps and (4) making the private sector and market more productive and competitive through the use of 
ICTs (Access to Information Programme 2009). The two key pillars of the DB vision— ‘connecting citizens’ and 
‘facilitating pro-poor services at the citizens’ doorstep’ — if successfully implemented will exemplify innovative 
and pluralist service delivery models that cater to the poor.
Given that the primary goal of governance is to improve citizen wellbeing, quality of life and ease of access to 
government services, this chapter focuses on the two citizen centric pillars of the DB vision and asks how and 
what is required to achieve these goals by using technological innovation to enhance service delivery. This 
chapter is based on a review of the existing literature, extensive interviews with experts and key informants 
and site visit to two Union Information Service Centres (UISC) which are providing connectivity to citizens in 
Tangail and Sirajganj. However, many other important ICT initiatives that are occurring within and beyond 
the DB agenda such as the Support to the ICT Task Force (SICT) under the Planning Division are outside the 
purview of this chapter due to space constraints. 
The following section sets the context for the chapter by examining the current status of ICT in Bangladesh, 
finding that overall ICT development is very poor and that many improvements will have to be made if ICT 
service delivery is to become a reality. The chapter then describes the Digital Bangladesh vision and places it 
within the greater, long-term Access to Information (A2I) project undertaken in Bangladesh. In an attempt to 
provide definitional and conceptual clarity, the following theoretical section compares the Digital Bangladesh 
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concepts with core definitions of electronic-government, which is commonly called ‘e-government’.  The 
analysis suggests that while the DB agenda is similar to traditional conceptions of e-government, it also 
contains additional elements specific to increasing service delivery in Bangladeshi context. Following this is an 
in-depth review of the current ICT legal and regulatory framework and an analysis of whether it can adequately 
support DB’s ambitious plan of connecting citizens and delivering services to the citizen’s doorsteps. As it 
stands, the current legislation is not sufficient to support the service delivery models that are planned under 
the DB agenda. In order to create an enabling environment, there is not only need for change in legislation 
and regulation, but also for reform within the institutional structures that oversee the legislation’s formulation 
and implementation. A review of the flagship initiative of the DB agenda, the Union Information and Service 
Centres (UISC) follows. While these centres aim to bring information to the people by connecting citizens and 
providing services, initial observations from site visits indicate that they are not sufficiently accessible to the 
poor and measures such as community awareness and participatory approaches are required to improve this 
service delivery model. The analysis provides both long and short-term suggestions to enhance their access 
and impact. The chapter closes with recommendations that prioritise institutional, regulatory and process 
reform, as well as the depoliticisation of the ICT from development agenda and continuation of consistent 
efforts to address the digital divide that prevents poorer citizens from accessing services. There need to take 
incremental, but sustained steps if Digital Bangladesh’s citizen-centric mandate is to be a reality.
1 The context of ICT in Bangladesh
Bangladesh has not kept up with ICT development worldwide, even compared to other nations in a similar 
economic position, and the overall ICT infrastructure is poor. As it exists, the current state of ICT is woefully 
inadequate to support DB goals.
Computer adoption and internet 
usage is low, with comparatively high 
hardware and access costs that make 
it unfeasible for the majority of the 
population to utilise ICT.  As of 2007-8, 
the proportion of internet users 
was only 0.35 and the proportion 
of households with computers 
was only 1.9. (UN-ITU 2008; 2007) 
Both poor telecommunications 
infrastructure and extremely 
poor landline teledensity of 1.028 
million, i.e. less than 1 per cent, 
also make internet access difficult 
(Bangladesh Telecommunication 
Regulatory Commission [BTRC] 
2010). Box 1 summarises the state 
of ICT in Bangladesh. The quality of 
internet speed is unsatisfactory, with 
individual bandwidth varying from a 
Box 1: ICT statistics for Bangladesh1 
•	 Proportion of households with computer: 1.9 (2007). 
•	 Proportion of households with internet access: 1.3 (2007)
•	 Fixed-line telephones per 100 inhabitants: 0.84 (2008)
•	 Mobile phone subscribers per 100 inhabitants: 27.9 
(2008)
•	 Internet users per 100 inhabitants: 0.35 (2008)
•	 Domain names registered under .bd: 5,987 (December 
2007)
•	 Broadband subscribers per 100 inhabitants: 0.03 (2008)
•	 Internet domestic bandwidth : No data available
1 “The access indicators are presented as the proportion of households 
with [equipment, Internet access]. Indicator values are calculated by 
dividing the number of in-scope households with [equipment, Internet 
access] by the total number of in-scope households.” (UN-ITU 2007; 
2008)
Sources: UN- ITU 2008; 2007
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very slow 128 Kbps to high speeds of 8 Mbps (Hoque 2005). Although the Bangladesh Telecommunications 
Company Limited (BTCL) decreased internet charges by 20 to 40 per cent in February 2008 and charges for 
monthly office use decreased to about USD 10 from USD 14.3, access rates are still high compared to that of 
neighbouring countries. For example the rate in Bangladesh is ten times higher than that in India (Raihan 
2009). 
Public sector ICT infrastructure and usage is quite meagre, with inadequate hardware resources (Taifur 2006) 
and a lack of information technology expertise in most government offices. Many of the existing Personal 
Computers (PCs) are outdated and insufficient — for every 100 employees there are 30 computers at the 
ministry level and 8 computers at the division level. On an average at the ministry and division level, only 48 
per cent of PCs are connected to the internet (Taifur 2006). 
In comparison, the mobile telephone sector has grown rapidly. Deregulation and the introduction of 
competition policy account for the phenomenal sectoral growth. Despite analysts predicting mobile 
teledensity at a low 10 per cent by 2010 (Raihan 2007), the real figure had crossed 22 per cent by 2007 (BTRC 
2008). As of June 2010, all the mobile service providers had 59.98 million subscribers combined, which is 
approximately 36 per cent of the population (BTRC 2010; ‘Free complaints irk telcos’, The Daily Star, August 11, 
2010). Mobile coverage stood at over 85 per cent in 2008. Growth and competition among mobile telecom 
operators have led to a reduction in call rates, with Bangladesh offering the lowest mobile phone call rates in 
South Asia (Samarajiva and Zainudeen 2008; quoted in Raihan 2009). Some operators offer calls for only USD 
0.4 per minute, the floor rate fixed by the regulator (Raihan 2009). 
Despite impressive strides in mobile telephony, Bangladesh’s overall ICT status is weak vis-à-vis other nations. 
The World Economic Forum (WEF)-INSEAD prepared ‘Global Information Technology Report (GITR) 2009-
2010’ reviewed Bangladesh’s placement on 3 key ICT indicators: (1) environment (infrastructure, market and 
political), (2) readiness and (3) usage. These indicators gauge preparedness to leverage ICT advances for 
increased competitiveness and development in general and in comparison to other nations. GITR 2009-2010 
reports that Bangladesh ranks 118 out of 133 countries. Other than Nepal, all other South Asian countries 
ranked higher. India ranks at 43, highlighting its leadership in ICT compared to its neighbours (see Box 2). 
Bangladesh falls among the bottom five in terms of investment in human resources, citizens and business 
usage, while in some of the other indicators it ranks among the bottom twenty (e.g. political and regulatory 
environment, government readiness and government usage of ICT). The country’s overall low ranking 
highlights the urgent need for improvements in areas such as (i) improving the regulatory framework, (ii) 
developing human resource capacity, (iii) providing greater access and increasing usage of ICT by citizens and 
(iv) investing in ICT infrastructure.
The lack of ICT infrastructure, low level of ICT preparedness, penetration and usage mean that the DB agenda 
in regards to citizen connectivity and service delivery is an ambitious one. In order to create the possibility of 
achieving these goals, the government has to address problems highlighted below.
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Box 2: Bangladesh’s ICT status  
Overall, Bangladesh ranks 118 among 133 countries but fares worse than most of its South Asian counterparts in the ICT 
sector.
Criteria Bangladesh India Sri Lanka Pakistan Nepal
Overall rank 118 43 72 87 124
Infrastructure: India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan rank higher than Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s low ranking on infrastructure is 
due to factors such as low level of secured internet servers, lack of widespread and consistent electricity supply and low 
internet bandwidth. Bangladesh is ranked as one of the lowest in the world (130) in human resource capacity, i.e. in terms 
of investment by companies in staff training and employee development. 
Market and political environment: Bangladesh is at its weakest in terms of lack of venture capital availability to fund 
innovative but risky projects. There is also a heavy burden of government regulation and starting a business can be a 
lengthy process.
Criteria Bangladesh India Sri Lanka Pakistan Nepal
Environment 122 53 84 98 123
ICT infrastructure 128 83 89 115 130
Market 94 35 60 68 108
Political and regulatory 123 46 90 97 115
Readiness: The country is unprepared in terms of education, staff training, research and investment and infrastructure. 
India ranks highest at 22, followed by Sri Lanka at 44 and Pakistan at 59.
Criteria Bangladesh India Sri Lanka Pakistan Nepal
Readiness 100 22 44 59 107
Individual 61 7 47 39 55
Government 117 35 36 90 123
Business 127 23 77 70 122
Usage: Individual usage takes stock of ICT penetration and diffusion at the individual level, whereas business and 
government usage assesses ICT penetration in business and government respectively. Bangladesh fares worst in South 
Asia at usage by all the different stakeholders, highlighting this is the area that requires significant government focus. It 
ranks 130th (out of 133) in the presence of ICT tools in government agencies, showing extremely poor penetration and 
diffusion of ICT in government agencies. India ranks highest at 64, followed by Sri Lanka at 82 and Pakistan at 93.
 Criteria Bangladesh India Sri Lanka Pakistan Nepal
Usage 126 64 82 94 129
Citizens 127 109 101 102 125
Business 126 26 61 80 121
Government 115 48 59 91 124
Source: WEF– INSEAD GITR 2009-2010 
2 What is Digital Bangladesh? 
‘Digital Bangladesh’ (DB) has become a catchphrase these days, one that is synonymous with the incumbent 
government. Despite the extensive use of the term by the government, media and in common parlance, 
what it means in practice remains unclear to many Bangladeshis. This section begins with a discussion of the 
concept of DB as articulated in government documents and then makes an attempt to align the DB agenda 
with accepted core concepts of e-government.   
2.1 The concept
During the 2008 elections, the Awami League election manifesto ‘Vision 2021 Bangladesh: A New Horizon’ 
introduced the concept of ‘Digital Bangladesh’. It was to be an integral component of its vision for 2021, which 
sees Bangladesh as “a middle income country where poverty will be drastically reduced; [and] where our 
citizens will be able to meet every basic need” (Awami League Election Manifesto 2008). The DB concept was 
also reiterated in the government’s updated manifesto (July 2009), which briefly outlined that it will entail a 
digitised government, ICT-enabled services, nationwide internet connectivity, a high-tech park for businesses 
and ICT-trained human resources.
When the incumbent government came to power in early 2009, the task of preparing the implementation strategy 
for DB was given to the Access to Information Programme (A2I), a United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) funded project that provides technical assistance to the e-government cell in the Prime Minister’s Office 
(PMO). However, over a year after the introduction of the concept, a strategy document is still absent. The only 
official conceptualisation of DB is within a draft concept note, which stresses that it is not a technology-focused 
vision, but that it aims to leverage ICT for economic and social development of the country. 
Thus, the basic premise is that DB agenda exists not as an end in itself but as a means to fulfil the larger goal 
of development. The note adds: “the all-encompassing nature of 
the vision demands a fundamental shift of mindset” and “not only 
thinking anew but new ways of thinking” (Access to Information 
Programme 2009, p.6).  
            
The DB agenda is composed of four pillars (see Figure 1) that outline 
key areas in which ICT can be utilised immediately. These are:
1. Human Resource Development aims to “make the best use 
of new technologies to build world class skills in all areas of study 
especially mathematics, science and English” (A2I Programme 2009, 
p.6). 
2. Connecting Citizens focuses on reducing the digital divide by 
strengthening ICT awareness and capacity of communities, ensuring 
innovative channels for citizens and providing local language and 
locally relevant digital content. This pillar also focuses on establishing 
two-way channels to promote participation of grassroots in policy 
discourse.
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3. Digital Government for pro-poor services aims to provide citizens with efficient and effective access to 
services at their doorstep.  The first subcomponent of the pillar is e-services, which intend to ensure services 
‘anytime’, ‘anywhere’ and to ‘anyone’ at an affordable price.  The concept of ‘pro-poor’, i.e. affordable services 
is joined to the idea of ‘services at the doorstep’, i.e. easily accessible to the whole population. Developing 
strategies that would aim to achieve the two simultaneously may not be simple, as pro-poor strategies 
require participatory and targeted approaches. The second subcomponent under this is e-administration, 
involving strengthening the planning, implementation and monitoring process of the government including 
field administration through the use of decision support systems. These systems would entail the easy 
sharing of data and information across various agencies of the government across ministry and geographic 
boundaries.
 
4. Private Sector (ICT in business) deals with three broad issues namely access to market, business productivity, 
and developing the ICT industry for local and export markets.
In addition to the four pillars, the DB agenda also includes five other ‘enablers’ that will mainstream DB into the 
national development agenda: (1) providing an appropriate institutional framework, (2) ensuring an adequate 
policy and legal framework, (3) developing infrastructure for banking and financial transactions, (4) providing 
appropriate delivery channels for taking services to citizen’s doorsteps and (5) identifying modalities where 
the private and public sector can work together to enrich government services.  The DB agenda correctly 
focuses on areas in dire need of immediate attention, as highlighted in the section above on the ICT sector in 
Bangladesh. It is a long term-vision which views ICT as an enabler for socio-economic and human development 
by 2021. The next section examines how DB fits in with conventional definitions of ‘e-government’. The chapter 
argues that while DB agenda is aligned with traditional e-government definitions, to achieve its vision DB will 
need to emphasise changing current government culture, not just digitising processes.
2.2 ‘Digital Bangladesh’ and ‘e-government’
I. What is e-government?
‘E-government’ is more than the presence of a government website on the internet (Backus 2001). The concept 
of e-government is the use of ICT tools in a government’s daily operations. Two perspectives are common 
when discussing the concept. A transactional view of e-government is the ‘interface’ between government 
and citizens, and how that is affected by the use of ICT tools (Silcock 2001 and West 2005, quoted. in Mayer-
Schönberger and Lazer 2007, p.2), and the online delivery of public services (Mayer-Schönberger and Lazer 
2007). In a broader view of e-government, the focus shifts from the interface between government and 
citizens to reforming public administration. Over the years, a number of definitions have conceptualised 
e-government. 
The World Bank’s E-government Handbook (2002, p.1) defines e-government as:  
“ … The use of information and communications technologies (ICT) to transform government by 
making it more accessible, effective and accountable. E-government includes: providing greater access to 
government information; promoting civic engagement by enabling the public to interact with government 
officials; making government more accountable by making its operations more transparent and thus reducing 
the opportunities for corruption; and providing development opportunities, especially benefiting rural and 
traditionally underserved communities.” 
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The United Nations (UN) Public Sector Report’s (2003, p.3) definition emphasises that “a government that 
applies ICT to transform its internal and external relationships’. It notes that the utilisation of ICT increases 
government obligations to ‘remain useful, legitimate, transparent and accountable” and its use is justified if 
it provides people with enhanced public administration and service provision capacity (UN 2003, p.3). Both 
the above definitions focus on ways of bettering governance operations to increase development outcomes 
through “using information technology to improve the delivery of government services to citizens, businesses 
and other government agencies” (Palvia and Sharma n.d., p.2). Given the development objectives of DB, the 
working definition of e-government used in this chapter is the one above from the World Bank as it emphasises 
the core principles of good governance.
Within e-government definitions however there is a distinction between the transformational objectives for 
internal government operations and the objectives for external services. The external objective at the front 
end of e-government is to meet public needs and expectations by simplifying their interaction with various 
online services. These include Government-to-Citizens (G2C) and Government-to-Business (G2B) services 
(Backus 2001).  The internal objectives at the back end of e-government are to facilitate a speedy, transparent, 
accountable process to perform government activities (Backus 2001). These include Government-to-
Government (G2G) solutions.1  Figure 2 below illustrates the interactions between the external and internal 
main groups within e-government:
Figure 2: Interactions between main groups in e-government
Source: Backus 2001
1  “Front-end and back-end are terms used to characterise programme interfaces and services. A “front-end” 
application is when users interact directly. A “back-end” application serves indirectly in support of the front-end services, 
usually by being closer to the required resource or having the capability to communicate with the required resource”. 
(http:/searchdatacenter.techtarget.com 2010)
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Gartner (qouted in Backus 2001, p.4) formulated a four-phase e-government model that describes how 
e-governments mature in different phases and what that entails. In the first phase of  information, 
e-government means being present on the web and providing the external public with relevant information. 
Internally, the government can also disseminate information using an intranet. In the second phase, interaction 
between the government and the public is enhanced using various applications. People can ask questions via 
e-mail, use search engines for information and download forms and documents. These applications reduce 
the time taken for citizens to interact with the government. Internal government organisations also use 
local area networks, intranet, and e-mail to communicate. In phase three, the transaction phase, complete 
transactions can be done online. Internally, the government processes also will have to be redesigned to 
provide good service. In the fourth transformation phase, all information systems are integrated and the 
public can get G2C and G2B services at one virtual counter. The goals of DB and their link to the different 
phases of e-government development are discussed below. 
II.  The link between Digital Bangladesh and e-government
Given the rapidly evolving nature of e-government in Bangladesh, this chapter utilises a flexible framework to 
capture key issues. Using Gartner’s (quoted in Backus 2001, p.5) four phase e-government maturity model to 
asses DB’s objectives, it emerges that in order to ‘connect citizens’ and bring ‘services to the citizen’s doorsteps’ 
would require the government to be in the interaction and transformation stage of e-government rather than 
the information stage that it has just entered (see Figure 3). These goals are also reflected in the activities 
being implemented through the Access to Information Programme discussed later in the chapter particularly 
through the establishment of the online or mobile short message service (SMS) based bill payments and a 
case appeal tracking system.
Figure 3:  E-governance maturity model
Source: Adapted from Backus 2001
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Table 1 further places the DB agenda in the context of e-government maturity by comparing e-government 
solutions present in the different stages of e-government maturity model (Gartner quoted in Backus 2001) 
with the ones that the DB plans to undertake. It illustrates that Bangladesh is in the information stage of 
maturity, and that DB has begun initiatives in the G2C and G2B sector that may allow Bangladesh to enter the 
interaction and transaction phase. However, without any G2G back end initiatives in either the interaction or 
transaction phase, Bangladesh’s entry into the two phases will be limited. 
Table 1: E-Government maturity and Digital Bangladesh




Local/departmental/ national information, 
mission statements and organisational 
structure, addresses, opening hours, 
employees, telephone numbers, laws, rules 
and regulations, petitions, government 
glossary news.
Ministry websites exist with postal 




Business information addresses, opening 
hours, employees, telephone numbers, 
laws, rules and regulations.
Already exists in Bangladesh.
G2G: Government 
to government
Knowledge base (static intranet), 
knowledge management (Local Area 
Network [LAN]).
Many government offices already 
have their own knowledge bases. The 
planning division under the Science, 
Information and Communications 
Technology (SICT) Programme took 





Downloading forms from websites, 
submitting forms, online help with 
filling in forms (permits, birth/death 
certificates), intake processes for permits 
etc., e-mail, newsletters, discussion groups 
(e-democracy), polls and questionnaires 
personalised web pages notification.
The pillar on citizen services focuses 
on this. A government website already 
exists where one can download official 
forms. However, polls, questionnaires 
and discussion groups are not included 




Downloading forms from websites, 
submitting forms, online help with filling 
in forms (permits), intake processes for 
permits etc., e-mail notification.
The ICT in business pillar focuses on 
this. The Board of Investment (BOI) has 
started an e-registry in order to provide 
easy, one-stop access to information 
about laws, rules and regulations 
regarding governing business activities 
in Bangladesh. Information concerning 
the most basic business licences and 
other formalities are also available.
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Objectives E-government solutions Digital Bangladesh
G2G: Government 
to government
E-mail, interactive knowledge databases, 
complaint handling tools.
Some government agencies have 
e-mail but not interactive knowledge 
bases. DB does not mention enhancing 
government e-mail, interactive 
knowledge databases and complaint 
handling tools as a specific aim. However, 
the second subcomponent under the 
pillar on citizens’ services mentions that 
systems will share data and information 
across various agencies. Efforts to begin 




Licence applications/renewals, renewing 
car tags, vehicle registration, personal 
accounts (mytax, myfines, mylicenses etc.), 
payment of (property) taxes, payment 
of tickets and fines, paying utility bills, 
registering and voting online.
DB wants to accomplish this through 
two pillars: connecting citizens and 
providing services at citizens’ doorsteps. 




Licence applications and renewals via 
website, payment of taxes, procurement.
BOI website enables the tracking of 
service requests online and will soon 
allow businesses to register online.
G2G: Government 
to government




Personalised website with integrated 
personal account for all services.
DB wants to accomplish this through 
two pillars: connecting citizens and 
providing services at citizen’s doorsteps, 
however it is not available yet.
G2B: Government 
to business
Personalised website with integrated 
business account for all services.




Database integration. DB does not mention this as an 
objective.
Source: Adapted from Backus 2001
There are 53 ‘quick win’ citizen services under the two pillars of connecting citizens and bringing services to 
the citizens’ doorsteps that are being supported by the Access to Information Project (see Annex 3 for the 
complete list). The idea of the ‘quick-win’ projects is to highlight the impact of the service delivery mechanism 
to the citizens and allow the government the necessary time before they are implemented nationwide (Access 
to Information Programme 2010a). The presence of the quick wins and an analysis of them strongly suggest 
that the DB strategy is limited in its objectives and will only achieve the transaction phase of e-government: 
Citizen services: 20 projects focus on citizen services and they include initiatives as diverse as the provision 
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of mobile phone access to all government doctors at the upazila level to the establishment of Community 
Information Centres that provide livelihood information on different sectors.
GOB automation: Fifteen projects aim to develop databases/automate different government programmes 
and this ranges from developing simple databases to monitoring and tracking aid and resource allocation, to 
computerisation of land management systems to provide land records services to citizens. 
Websites: Ten quick wins include the 
development of websites and these usually 
relate to the development of basic websites.
Other: Three are in the other category and 
this includes content development to the 
development of the Bangladesh television 
channel.
Unclear: It was unclear for five projects 
what those wanted to accomplish based on 
information provided in the A2I website.
While many of the 53 initiatives will bring benefits 
to citizens in terms of providing information and 
specific services such as bill payment, 30 of the 
initiatives will most likely not add any significant 
changes or improvements to the existing system 
and only about 24 (of these 13 will be in citizen 
services, six in database development) may 
bring about some improvements to government 
infrastructure and systems. None of the 
initiatives will bring about the major changes 
to processes and procedures in the long term 
that are required to transform the government 
to e-government (see the list of quick wins in 
Annex 3). Moreover, there are no plans in place 
to ensure funding and maintenance that would 
enable these activities to continue beyond 
the project period, or beyond the political 
sponsorship of the current government. Box 3 
reveals the short sightedness of the DB plan and 
its inherent inability to sustain itself over time. 
While DB is aligned with more conventional e-government definitions, the concept and activities under it 
appear to be short-term goals. In order to meet the long-term citizen-centric mandate that will encompass 
all the pillars, strong foundations are required in the following areas: an appropriate institutional framework, 
an adequate policy and legal environment, developing the financial infrastructure required to sustain 
Box 3:  Will the quick wins be short lived? 
The A2I programme website highlights the creation of 
the 64 district web portals and internet connectivity 
between the Cabinet Division and offices of Deputy 
Commissioners as a success story. These are part of the 
A2I supported quick win initiatives. The programme 
provided technical assistance and hardware to the 
Deputy Commissioner and upazila nirbahi offices and 
facilitated their connectivity to the central government. 
At first glance, this looks like the first step to digitising 
Bangladesh’s field administration. However, unless the 
hardware and websites belonging to the district level 
administration are included in the departmental Table 
of Organogram and Equipment (TO&E), there will not 
be any budgetary allocation made for their running 
and maintenance.
 
Discussions with the related government officers in the 
Cabinet Division found that while implementing this 
initiative no plan was made to include the new assets 
in the TO&E. Additionally, given the scarcity of technical 
knowledge within civil administration, how the web 
portals were to be run and regularly updated had not 
been addressed. Soon after the web portals were set 
up for district administration level several of them were 
hacked.  The problem of maintenance, both in terms of 
budgetary provision and technical expertise suggest 
that these quick wins will not be sustainable over the 
long term, nor meaningfully transform government.        
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e-government initiatives and the creation of adequate delivery channels for e-government services. Most 
importantly, Bangladesh must change government organisational culture and processes in order to enable 
DB goals to be established and e-government to develop through its different stages of maturity. 
3 The ICT Institutional and Regulatory Framework – The need for an enabling  
environment
Bangladesh has a relatively young ICT sector and an evolving regulatory framework with a few laws and 
policies regulating the ICT sector, while multiple institutions implement these laws. This section reviews key 
legislation including the ICT Policy 2009, ICT Act 2009, Telecommunications Act 2001, the Broadband Policy 
2009, and the Right to Information Act 2009. A review of the policies, the existing literature and in-depth 
discussions with experts reveal that due to legal and institutional weaknesses, existing government policies in 
their present form are likely to have little impact in improving service delivery as envisioned by the DB agenda. 
While present policies contain action points geared to enhancing access to services, the overall policy agenda 
is too broad and there is insufficient prioritisation on where to focus both budget and implementation. This is 
in keeping with the evaluation of Bangladesh’s lack of infrastructure, enabling environment and preparedness 
for ICT utilisation in the section on ICT context. 
3.1 Overview of ICT laws
I.  The National ICT Policy 
Bangladesh introduced its first ICT Policy in 2002. The policy had the ambitious vision of delivering services 
to citizens (ICT Policy 2002, Paragraph 3.6.1), stating that the “Government shall implement ICT systems to 
provide nationwide coverage and access by any citizen to the government databases and administrative 
systems which can be used to extend public services to the remotest corner” (Paragraph 3.6.2). Due to weak 
implementation capacity, this policy was never fully realised. However, it led to the creation of an ICT Cell in 
each ministry (National ICT Policy 2008, proposed). The ICT Focal Point in each ministry cell is responsible for 
implementing specific action items in the ICT Policy and coordinating all ICT related activities.   
While the government first passed the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Act in 2006, it was 
not based on or had any connection to the ICT Policy of 2002. Major portions of the new Act were based on 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the Singapore Electronic Transactions 
Act and the Indian Information Technology Act 2000 and contained provisions to facilitate electronic 
communications and allow electronic filing of documents (UNESCAP n.d.). However, the rules and regulations 
to implement the Act were never formulated and thus the Act was not implemented. 
Post election, the incumbent government revived the ICT policy and legal framework to enable their DB 
vision. The government approved the new ICT Policy in 2009. The e-government agenda, while not specifically 
mentioned in the policy, is embedded in the vision of using ICT tools to bring about a “transparent, responsive, 
and accountable government” (ICT Policy 2009, p. 3, para. C). Table 2 below outlines the ICT regulations, 
legislation and implementation initiatives undertaken since 2001. It shows a raft of ICT related plans on the 
table awaiting implementation.
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Table 2: Overview and status of ICT policies





Ministry of Post and Telecommunications 
and Bangladesh Telecommunications 
Regulatory Commission (BTRC)
Approved and resulted 




Ministry of Science and Information 
and Communications Technology and 









Ministry of Science and Information and 
Communications Technology, BCC, Ministry 
of Post and Telecommunications, BTRC and 
other ministries
















Prime Minister’s Office (PMO),Ministry of 
Post and Telecommunications, Ministry of 
Science, Information & Communication 
Technology (MoSICT) and other ministries
Under preparation
The ‘current’ 2009 policy includes 306 planned action items for all the key sectors which if implemented will 
lead to an improvement in the provision of service delivery. The draft ICT Policy 2008, which later became ICT 
Policy 2009 mentions that the 306 action points are incorporated in an effort to build ownership, which the 
previous policy lacked. The planned implementation and monitoring is to be carried out by the Ministry of 
Science, Information & Communication Technology (MoSICT) with support from the Bangladesh Computer 
Council (BCC).
Table 3 highlights the strengths and weaknesses of ICT policy at a glance. Its main shortcomings are that 
the 306 action points are not prioritised and that it fails to address institutional reforms and changes that are 
needed, particularly in the administrative rules and procedures, to implement these actions. The policy also 
does not provide a role for civil society and the private sector to engage in implementation, nor does it allow 
citizens to file grievances through electronic means which can enhance accountability relationships between 
the government and citizens. 
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Table 3: Strength and weaknesses of ICT Policy in Bangladesh
          Strengths            Weaknesses
Enhances scope of citizen’s access to 1. 
information and services.
Recommends filing of2.  public grievances 
through electronic means.
Provides institutional buy-in and incentive 3. 
mechanism to leverage ICT.
Gives ICT Focal Points budgetary authority.4. 
Provides for separate allocation in the 5. 
national budget for implementing action 
items. 
Makes all public tenders online.6. 
Lacks ICT mechanisms that will allow citizens 1. 
to voice grievances to policymakers.
Lacks attention to the cross-government 2. 
institutional challenges.
Insufficient prioritisation of action items.3. 
No role for private sector and civil society.4. 
Lacks attention to administrative rules and 5. 
procedures
Needs to include business process 6. 
engineering
Lacks focus on automation.7. 
 
  Source: ICT Policy 2009
II.  The ICT Act 2009
In addition to the ICT Policy 2009, the ICT Act 2009 was also promulgated. This was almost exactly the same 
as the ICT Act 2006, which was never adopted. The only change was an amendment to Clause 18, which 
had stipulated that the Controller of Certifying Authority (CCA) should be appointed within 90 days of the 
promulgation of the (2006) Act. The CCA is the issuing authority of licences to entities that authenticate 
electronic signature. Since the ICT Act 2006 was never adopted, the clause expired and an amendment to 
the clause became necessary to establish the CCA. This is a necessary step for citizens to conduct online 
transactions in a secure manner and its lack of institutionalisation has hindered e-commerce in Bangladesh. 
Key staff at the BCC said that following the adoption of the 2009 Act, the Executive Director of the BCC has 
already been appointed as the controller. The draft rules for the operation of the CCA have been prepared and 
the BCC is taking steps to establish the office of the CCA. 
The ICT Act 2009 (amended 2006 Act) contains provisions (articles 5-12 and 16-17) that provide legal 
recognition to electronic records and digital signatures. It also contains provisions for e-communication that 
includes clauses on attribution, acknowledgement and dispatch of electronic records (articles 13-15). The ICT 
Act 2009 also has provisions (articles 54-84) that define the different types of crimes and stipulated timelines 
in prison for violation of e-security and privacy and damage to information systems and networks. 
However, a weak point of the Act (Article 11) is that it has not been made mandatory for the government 
and its agencies to accept, or prepare, electronic records or deeds. This may create problems for institutions, 
particularly the financial institutions intending to deal in electronic deeds (Saber, Srivastava & Hossain 2006). 
In addition, the data privacy and security provisions are not sufficient and the Act does not link the provisions 
in the Act to any necessary reforms or business process re-engineering that may be necessary to implement 
the Act. Table 4 below briefly summarises the strengths and weaknesses of the ICT Act 2009.
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Table 4: Strength and weaknesses of ICT Act, 2009
Strengths Weaknesses
1. Provides legal recognition to electronic 
records and signatures.
2. Contains provisions that define and stipulate 
timelines in prison for cyber crimes.
1. Needs to strengthen data privacy and security 
provisions.
2. Failure to implement the Copyright Act 2000.
3. Does not mention necessary changes in administrative 
rules and regulations. 
4. Needs to make it mandatory for government agencies 
to accept electronic deeds.
Source: ICT Act 2009
III.  Other ICT related legislation
As outlined in Table 3, there are a host of other legislatory tools that seek to regulate the technology sector 
in Bangladesh. However, these are not coordinated and often overlap in their areas of concern, while most 
have large gaps in implementation. The Telecommunications and Telegraph Act 2001 was promulgated 
following the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector from domination by the government owned 
Bangladesh Telegraph and Telephone Board (BTTB) to a dynamic industry with many private telecom players. 
The liberalisation of the telecom industry has been seen as a huge success in Bangladesh’s technology arena. 
The government created the Bangladesh Telecommunications and Regulatory Commission (BTRC) under the 
Act to oversee regulatory activities in the sector, and compared to other regulatory bodies it has been active 
in its tasks. 
The International Long Distance Telecommunication Services (ILDTS) Policy was drafted in 2007 and the 
Telecommunications and Telegraph Act 2001 has been amended. Both have been sent to the Parliament 
for approval. The proposed amendments in the latter will give the Ministry the authority to issue and renew 
licences, approve services and set telecom operators’ tariffs at prices that are consumer friendly. The Act 
also includes clauses that will bring the hitherto unregulated Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) business 
under a legal framework. However, experts have raised concerns about the draconian nature of some of 
the amendments and worry that it may have a negative affect on the sector, rather than provide consumer 
protection. Many have questioned the Ministry’s ability to handle licence issuance, as well as pointed out 
its lack of expertise on telecom tariff pricing. Some predict that this will delay the approval of tariffs set 
by telecom companies, resulting in less competition between operators to offer lower tariffs, ultimately 
depriving the customer of competitive prices. It may also affect the business of new and smaller operators 
(‘Tough law on way for errant telcos’, The Daily Star, June 13, 2010).  The amendments also have controversial 
provisions that include a fine of up to Tk. 300 crore for breaching the Act and approval for BTRC to impose 
unilateral changes to clauses in operator licences. Under the proposed bill, the regulator or police can file 
a case on suspicion, arrest any telecom company official without a warrant and deny operators the right to 
appeal regulatory decisions (‘Tough law on way for errant telcos’, The Daily Star, June 13, 2010). 
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The National Broadband Policy was approved in 2009 to facilitate the growth of high-speed internet services 
at affordable prices across Bangladesh (Taifur 2009). The policy aims to develop network access, encourages 
content development and use of open source software (Taifur 2009). If properly implemented the Policy will 
improve internet tariffs and increase access. To protect the ICT sector and the country’s software products, the 
government amended the Copyright Act 2000 in 2005. However, due to lack of law enforcement, software 
piracy continues to be a problem (Raihan and Habib 2007). 
The milestone enactment of the Right to Information (RTI) Act 2009 can be a primary enabler for citizen 
empowerment through equitable access to information and for improved, transparent and accountable 
governance on the part of the government. However, the delivery of information to citizens using ICT tools 
will require a detailed implementation strategy, increasing the capacity of the Information Commission to deal 
with the devolution of information control, a change in the culture of secrecy that surrounds the government 
and its bodies, the creation of a RTI-friendly legal environment and the presence of RTI-friendly technology 
infrastructure (Iftekaruzzman 2009).  In addition, citizens will have to be made aware of their right to demand 
information and be given tools that enable them to utilise this right. 
The framework on ‘Standards and Interoperability Norms’ is currently being prepared to harmonise different 
benchmarks and procedures so that different government departments can communicate. Its implementation 
will allow multiple government agencies to provide integrated services under ‘one roof’. Alongside this, a DB 
implementation strategy is being prepared by the UNDP funded Access to Information Programme located 
in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). A2I programme officials have noted that this strategy will be integrated 
into the five-year plan of the current government. The strategy includes ten sectors: (1) Agriculture, (2) Health, 
(3) Land Administration, (4) Local Government, (5) Social Safety Nets, (6) Disaster Management, Environment 
and Climate Change, (7) Commerce and Investment, (8) Law Enforcement and Judiciary, (9) Parliament and 
(10) Civil Service. The draft strategy was available for consultation with the public in mid-2010 (Access to 
Information Programme 2010b). 
3.2  Overview of institutions 
There are multiple institutions implementing ICT related policies and legislations in Bangladesh, as delineated 
in the Figure 4. The following analysis examines, in conjunction with interviews with key experts, the role 
and capacity of each ministry to implement policies and e-government projects. The findings reveal that 
the institutions responsible for the oversight and nurturing of the ICT sector have limited implementation 
capacity and unclear, sometimes overlapping mandates that severely weaken sectoral policy execution and 
programme implementation.
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Figure 4: Key government entities involved in the ICT sector in Bangladesh
The Ministry of Science, Information & Communication Technology (MoSICT) formulates ICT policies, helped 
by technical support from the Bangladesh Computer Council (BCC). The BCC is also responsible for regularly 
monitoring implementation of ICT policy. However, neither the MoSICT nor the BCC have the capacity to 
implement and coordinate the different ICT projects existing in different ministries (Raihan and Habib 2007). 
This is reflected in MoSICT’s inability to coordinate the ICT allocation in Annual Development Programme 
(ADP) for use by different ministries to develop ICT tools and usage. The allocation for ICT under the ADP in 
FY2010 is expected to be Tk. 138.58 crore, as opposed to Tk. 126.39 crore in FY2009, signifying the growing 
emphasis placed on ICT integration by the current government (Centre for Policy Dialogue [CPD] 2009). 
However, execution of various proposed ICT projects has been slow, with the budget analysis for FY08-09 
indicating that the 2007 implementation rate was exceedingly unsatisfactory, ranging from 0.5 to 29.5 per 
cent completion (CPD 2009). Accordingly, the aforementioned GITR ranks Bangladesh 127 out of 133 nations 
in the government’s procurement of advanced technological products. While experts agree that far-reaching 
institutional reform is required to ensure that MoSICT is capable of carrying out ICT development and project 
execution, government officials and policymakers seem reluctant to engage with this. 
The Ministry of Post and Telecommunication (MoPT) is responsible for the development of the 
telecommunications sector in Bangladesh, while the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission 
(BTRC) is the licensing authority that regulates telecom service providers. A key issue for MoPT, BTRC and MoSICT 
is convergence. Convergence means the provision of multiple services with varying content over the nation’s 
high-speed internet network. The resulting ‘converged’ services within the telecommunications, broadcasting 
and computing sectors will significantly change the mode of operations and bring into direct contact two 
markets — telecommunications and media — that have traditionally been regulated very differently (Singh 
and Raja 2008). As convergence has already begun, the joining of Domestic Data Communication Service 
Provider (DDCSP) licences with nationwide Internet Service Provider (ISP) licences in 2008 should ameliorate 
some convergence operational issues. However, the growth, regulation and service provision in the sector will 
be better served with the integration of the MoPT, MOI, and MoSICT (Raihan and Habib 2007).
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The Ministry of Information’s (MoI) role is to disseminate information through both electronic media i.e. 
Bangladesh Television and Bangladesh Betar and print media. The Ministry is also responsible for the 
implementation of the Right to Information Act 2009, which it has  failed to successfully achieve, much to 
the detriment of national governance 
outcomes. 
Following the formulation of the National 
ICT Policy in 2002, the government formed 
‘ICT Task Force’ (chaired by the Prime 
Minister) tasked with mainstreaming ICT 
throughout the government. It consisted 
of all the major stakeholders in the ICT 
sector including key ministries, private 
sector representatives and members of 
civil society. A Support to ICT Task Force 
(SICT) project was formed in the Ministry 
of Planning in 2003 to identify and 
implement e-government projects and 
functionally take over some of MoSICT’s 
responsibilities (Taifur 2006). However, 
until the end of 2009 the taskforce met 
only thrice since its establishment (Raihan 
and Habib 2007). Discussions with experts 
reveal a general consensus that the SICT 
failed in the successful mainstreaming of 
ICT and implementation of e-government 
projects. 
An ‘E-government Cell’ was established 
in 2006 under the Prime Minister’s 
Office, tasked with the coordination and 
monitoring of ICT related activities within 
government (Taifur 2009). The United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
funded Access to Information Programme 
(A2I) was responsible for providing 
technical assistance to the Cell. So far, the 
A2I Programme has carried out the strategic 
planning for the DB initiative. As the A2I 
Programme is donor funded and driven 
agenda, there is little or no ownership 
of the initiative within the civil service. 
When the Programme ends, the drive to plan and implement the DB agenda’s pillars may also run out of both 
ownership and funding. The project based policy implementation that has characterised the government 
Institutions Responsibility
GOB Ministries
Ministry of Science 








Support MoSICT and provides 
training
Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications 
(MoPT)




Regulatory Commission  
(BTRC)
Regulate telecom industry
Ministry of Information 
(MoI)
Disseminate information 
through print and electronic 
media
Task Forces
UNDP funded Access to 
Information Programme 
(A2I)/E-government Cell in 
the Prime Minister’s Office 
(PMO)
Oversee Digital Bangladesh 
agenda
ICT Task Force renamed as 
the Digital Bangladesh Task 
force
Mainstream ICT in 
government, advise ministries 
and monitor milestones
Support to ICT Task Force 
(SICT) in Ministry of 
Planning (now defunct)
Provide support to Task Force 
and identify and implement 
e-governance projects
Table 5: Role of institutions in the ICT sector
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approach to ICT in Bangladesh is a major issue. Project cycles inevitably end, taking funding, knowledge, 
ownership and sustainability with them without leaving behind a long-term institutional infrastructure. 
As part of the DB initiative, the ‘National ICT Task Force’ was restructured and renamed the ‘Digital Bangladesh 
Task Force’ in early 2010. This is a ministerial level taskforce that is responsible for monitoring milestones 
in the DB policy and strategy document, and for advising various ministries on challenges to achieving DB 
milestones. The Prime Minister chairs it and the Secretary of MoSICT is the Member Secretary (Access to 
Information Programme 2010b).2 
Specialised committees and taskforces have also been established, including the ‘National Information 
Management Committee’ chaired by the Planning Minister to develop a digital citizen identification 
platform based on the national identity card system for service delivery. It is also working to ensure technical 
interoperability across all major government e-service delivery systems. This will allow citizens to identify and 
authenticate themselves across different government agencies in a legally compliant manner while receiving 
services (Access to Information Programme 2010b). The ‘National ICT in Education Task Force’, chaired by the 
Education Minister, was established to determine how ICT tools can improve educational skills and quality. The 
‘Domestic Network Coordination Committee’ chaired by the Principal Secretary has the mandate to explore 
options to provide high-speed broadband connectivity to union parishads and schools (Access to Information 
Programme 2010b). 
Institutional initiatives under the DB agenda have just begun. In order for them to have an impact, the 
instituted task forces and committees have to follow their mandates rigorously. Of the key tasks that have been 
assigned to the ‘National Information Management Committee’, the establishment of the single ID system to 
identify citizens during the delivery of services will be the crucial one, as it will enable a unified method of 
authenticating and coordinating service delivery to citizens. However, the confrontational nature of party 
politics in Bangladesh puts the continuation of DB initiatives beyond the term of the current government in a 
tenuous position. The opposition’s support and input should be actively sought through their memberships 
on the DB Task Force, key committees, and consultation meetings in order to depoliticise the agenda. The next 
section provides some recommendations to improve the institutional and legal framework. 
2  Other members of the Task Force are the Finance Minister, Planning Minister, Telecommunications Minister, 
Commerce Minister, State Minister for the Science, Information and Communication Technology Ministry, the Principal 
Secretary, the Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of the Telecommunications Ministry, the Commerce 
Secretary, the Chairman of the Bangladesh Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (BTRC), the Executive Director 
of the Bangladesh Computer Council (BCC), a representative of the Computer Science and Engineering Department of 
the Bangladesh University of Engineering Technology (BUET), a representative of the Computer Science Department of 
Dhaka University, the President of the Bangladesh Computer Society, the President of the Bangladesh Association for 
Software and Information Services (BASIS), the President of the Federation of Bangladesh Chamber and Commerce and 
Industry (FBCCI), the Executive Director of D-Net, Mr. Anir Chowdhury, Adviser to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) Access 
to Information Programme (A2I), Dr Munaj Ahmed of BUET, Shameem Ahsan of the Bangladesh Association for Software 
and Information Services and Dr. Yeasmin Haque, Professor, Department of Computer Science, Shahjalal Science and 
Technology University.
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3.3 Improving the legal and institutional framework 
In Bangladesh the use of information technology for improving governance is still in its infancy (WEF–INSEAD 
GITR 2009-10). This section argues that despite recent efforts, the government’s vision of using ICT to improve 
citizen’s quality of life by improving service delivery has not been adequately embedded in the regulatory 
framework. Additionally, the institutional framework is also not strong enough to support the implementation 
of the DB service delivery vision. The following are some specific recommendations to enhance Bangladesh’s 
ICT policies and the regulatory framework.
 
I.  Ensure business process re-engineering and adequate ICT infrastructure 
Without business process re-engineering and better infrastructure, the delivery of citizen services will not be 
very effective, with the provision of a few services via mobile SMS or the internet in the guise of ICT service 
provision. In order for ICT to serve as a change agent in traditional service delivery models (e.g. reduction in 
costs, improvement in quality, better monitoring of services) the DB strategy and the ICT policies that it is 
based on should include provisions for business process re-engineering (BPR), allowing automation to make 
processes faster and more efficient for citizens.3  The ICT policies and strategy do not mention the establishment 
of adequate ICT infrastructure (e.g. Wide Area Network, central data service, software applications to automate 
various services). However, this is necessary to allow citizens to conduct transactions using ICT tools and 
applications. 
II.  Establish adequate data privacy and security provisions 
The focus of ICT policy legislation is either on providing greater access to ICT (e.g. the Broadband and 
Telecommunications Policy) or on enabling transactions for citizens (ICT Policy and Act). However, the 
current data privacy, intellectual property rights and security provisions in the law are inadequate to support 
online transactions. As demonstrated in Figure 5, Bangladesh is in the presence stage of e-government. The 
incorporation of copyright and data privacy laws will allow it to move to the advanced stages. 
3  Business process re-engineering (BPR) involves documenting existing procedures and simplifying them into tasks 
that can be completed in fewer steps. However, for fear of losing discretionary authority and their jobs, civil servants thus 
often resist this type of change (World Bank 2004), making it a sensitive but important area.
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Figure 5: E-government phases and legal protection
Source: Adapted from Saber, Srivastava & Hossain 2006
Thus, in order for citizens to feel secure performing transactions online (as they would need to do for e-services), 
the ICT Act should include provisions requiring government agencies and/or businesses to implement a 
comprehensive data privacy and security programme that ensures the confidentiality of sensitive personal 
information and protects against unauthorised access to it. One of the action items in the ICT Policy 2009 is 
the review and amendment of the ICT Act. The committee monitoring the Policy should take this opportunity 
to address data privacy and security issues.
III.  Provide a roadmap for ICT Policy implementation
The ICT Policy 2009 has been drafted as a vision statement, without guidelines as to how to achieve the goals 
within it. Its 306 action points seem disjointed and are bound to experience challenges in its implementation. 
While there are many action points that focus on increasing access of citizen to government services, the 
tools that enhance citizen’s participation are not included in the policy. It also does not provide monitoring 
and evaluation plans for these services. In order to achieve its goal of increasing citizen’s access to services the 
government has to make the policy implementable. The proposed strategy document should align itself to 
the vision and goals of the Policy and include an executable roadmap and guidelines. 
IV.  Implement the Right to Information Act 2009
The implementation of the Right To Information Act 2009 using ICT will be important in making the 
government more transparent and accountable to citizens. ICT tools can be used to make RTI a reality by 
providing the broadest possible distribution of information through e-mail, mobile phone and the internet, 
and by reducing the time required to access information. A key issue that needs to be addressed by the Act is 
that of digitisation and archiving. Enabling citizen’s access to government records both current and historical 
would enhance transparency of government access. The government should also review RTI legislation to 
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avoid duplication of or contradictions with current ICT policies and activities. The implementation of RTI 
involves the appointment of an ‘Officer in Charge’ of information in all ministries, who would essentially be 
doing the same tasks as the E-governance Focal Points that are to be established. These positions involve 
overlapping functions, and could thus be combined.  
V.  Institutional restructuring, reforms and capacity building
DB’s attempts to provide services to citizens using ICT tools are being carried out under a weak and fragmented 
regulatory and institutional framework. Institutional restructuring and capacity building are required 
to mainstream ICT in the provision of government services to citizens. First, a mechanism within central 
ministries (e.g. the Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Finance or Cabinet Division) needs to be institutionalised 
to coordinate ICT projects. This is because MoSICT and the institutions under it do not have the capacity to 
coordinate service delivery by different ministries across the government. Second, as mentioned previously, 
the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MoPT), Ministry of Information (MoI) and MoSICT should be 
merged in order to facilitate convergence. The question remains as to whether the citizens will use online, 
offline, or mobile-based services and content. Strong incentives, such as high content quality, greater access 
and low costs will encourage citizens to avail these services. There are also concerns that certain disadvantaged 
groups may find themselves further deprived due to lack of access, awareness and affordability to ICT, thus 
deepening the digital divide instead of engendering equity. Even if there is widespread access to the internet 
or increasing mobile teledensity over the next few years, the government must ensure online privacy and 
high standards of e-security in order to build citizens’ confidence in online interactions. The above changes 
are vital to enabling the provision and utilisation of ICT enabled services. 
The following section examines the flagship service of the Access to Information Programme, the Union 
Information and Service Centre (UISC) to assess how effective the ICT initiative has been to improve rural 
citizen’s access to government services and information.
4 Union Information and Service Centres (UISCs) – connecting citizens and bringing 
services to citizen’s doorsteps?
 
The main initiative under the Access to Information Programme, the Union Information and Service Centre 
(UISC) is intended to realise the two citizen centric pillars of the DB agenda – (1) connecting citizens and (2) 
delivering services to the citizen’s doorsteps. As of 2009, a hundred UISCs have been established and there is 
a strong political impetus to establish a thousand more by the end of 2010 (Khan 2010). If successful, the UISC 
model will provide ICT access to the majority of Bangladesh’s rural citizen. It uses the Public Private Peoples 
Partnership (PPPP) model, developed from a successful 2007 UNDP initiated pilot programme of ‘Community 
e-Centres (CeC)’ in Madhainagor Union Parishad, Sirajganj district and the Mushidhat Union Parishad, Dinajpur 
district. Figure 6 illustrates the access model: interactions take place between the community, the infomediary 
(the entrepreneur), the union parishad and the information providers.
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Figure 6:  The Community e-Centre (CeC) Model
Source: UNDP 2008
Under the UISC PPPP model, the centres are housed at a publicly accessible location, e.g. a union parishad 
office and are run by a villager or local entrepreneur (Mahmud 2009). Individuals from the community either 
manage the centres by being part of a Supervisory Committee or take part through direct financial investment 
or hardware procurement. As a means of start up funding, the A2I Programme provides additional hardware 
and digital content. The Local Government Division (LGD) is responsible for coordinating the programme’s 
overall activities and building capacity of the relevant personnel and beneficiaries. The local entrepreneurs 
who run the UISCs charge nominal fees from users, which help them to meet the centre’s expenses. Basic 
services that are provided include word processing, printing, online services (internet access and e-mail), offline 
services (information on livelihood issues, government forms etc), as well as computer training (Mahmud 
2009). In the pilot versions of the CeC and the UISC, a government-private partnership was ensured through 
the joint ownership and involvement of locals and the union parishad. A participatory approach was used 
in the design and implementation of the centre. The stakeholders involved included development partners, 
ministry officials, local people and union parishad members (Mahmud 2009). The goal of this approach was to 
elicit support from these key actors and deepen an understanding of on the ground needs and contexts.
The UISC model is not new in Bangladesh. D.Net’s Pallitathya Kendra (PK), i.e. village information centre, has a 
similar model that has been implemented in selected rural areas (D.Net 2010). The PK initiative, established in 
October 2005, was motivated by the rural poor’s lack of access to livelihood information. By the end of 2008, 
there were 105 PKs around the country providing IT skills training on basic computer operations, advanced 
IT courses, ancillary services and livelihood information services (Pallitathya 2010). Citizens use these centres 
to access information regarding common rural agricultural problems, medical issues, financial services and 
socio-legal advice through an ‘Infomediary’, i.e. an ICT-trained person who provides information to customers. 
Based on a policy of non-exclusion, 
the PK reaches those who cannot 
physically come to the centre by 
means of mobile infomediaries 
called ‘InfoLadies’. Their impact on 
rural society is briefly discussed 
in Box 4. The PK experience has 
demonstrated that even in a context 
where the majority of people do 
not have the skills or resources to 
benefit from online government 
services, innovative ICT solutions 
can benefit poor households. 
India’s experience in implementing 
e-centres holds useful lessons 
for Bangladesh. A critique of the 
Gyandoot Intranet Telecentre 
Initiative in Madhya Pradesh 
describes it as a phenomenon 
that transforms attitudes and 
governance negatively, arguing 
that rather than dissolving social 
structures, telecentres re-emphasise 
power relations within the existing 
social structure by placing those 
who can provide ICT access and those who can access above those who cannot (Sreekumar 2007). A study of 
the e-gram telecentre initiative in Gujarat argued that to be effective these centres must be located within the 
social equity and justice framework (Nuggehalli n.d). E-grams have been successful due to their focus on below 
poverty line (BPL) families, their mechanism for community involvement and to enable two-way information 
flows and their ownership by the local administrative system (not by the computer operators). This allows for 
innovations at the centres to be driven by the development mandate of the district administration rather than 
by the business motives of the operating entrepreneurs. 
The following sections review two already established UISCs that have been reviewed through the lens of 
access, quality and reliability, cost and sustainability. 
4.1 A closer look at UISCs
Visits to two UISCs in Sirajganj and Tangail districts and conversations with local entrepreneurs, service users, 
the union parishad Chairman and staff were used to study the UISC model and explore whether they were 
successful in using ICT tools to improve rural citizen’s lives with access to information. Information obtained 
from the field visits are analysed below to determine whether the UISCs can adequately address service 
delivery issues of access, cost, quality and reliability. This chapter argues that that while the PPPP model of 
Box 4: Info Ladies from Pallitathya Kendras
InfoLadies are a group of young women on bicycles equipped with 
notebooks, phones, and medical equipment who deliver ICT access 
to rural people. They are the bearers of information in an information-
scarce society.  Their netbooks come loaded with village-relevant 
content that is translated to Bengali. “From agriculture to health, 
sanitation and disaster management, the content follows simple 
text, pictures and engaging multimedia animations to include all 
users, many of whom are illiterate.” (Kumar 2009) They also carry 
items like blood pressure monitors and pregnancy kits in their bags, 
and are able to send pictures of simple diseases and skin conditions 
to Dhaka for diagnosis. Because rural women suffer most from a 
lack of knowledge about medical, legal and social issues, a female 
information provider bridges the divide, making them more likely 
to be open. While in the past the young, modern InfoLadies were 
regarded as something of a ‘scandal,’ they have now become the 
source of information for individuals looking disparate information 
such as their blood pressure reading or ways to increase crop yield. 
The programme is being piloted by D-Net.
Source: Kumar, ‘Two wheeled triumph’, The Guardian,                       
November 23, 2009
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UISCs are a useful approach to sensitise rural people on what ICT can do for them, the current model does not 
meet the primary objectives of facilitating access to information and delivering pro-poor services.
I.  Access 
In the rural areas familiarity with mobile phones 
is widespread among the villagers (Ahmed 
2010). Discussions with UISC beneficiaries in 
Borohor Union of Sirajganj revealed that the 
centre provides computer/internet access and 
computer training courses mostly to middle and 
high income young villagers, with the majority 
of clients being male and in their early to mid-
twenties. While the prices are reasonable when 
compared to prices for similar services in Dhaka, 
they remain inaccessible for the poor (Box 5).  
Those who run the centre run it as an 
entrepreneurial exercise, with a revenue 
generation target to cover expenses and make 
nominal profit to cover living expenses as their 
main goal. Thus, services are designed and priced 
with this in mind. This has meant that the poor 
and marginalised are priced out of the ICT access 
opportunity created by the UISCs. Given that 80 
per cent of population live on less than Tk. 140 
(approximately USD 2) a day (UNDP 2009), the 
services have to be subsidised to make them 
affordable to the majority of people. However, 
studies have shown that the poor will spend on 
valued non-food consumables such as cigarettes, 
cosmetics and clothing indicating (Rahman et al. 
2009). Thus, if people are aware of the values 
UISCs can add to their lives and livelihoods, they 
will be likely to utilise the services provided. If 
participation of the poor and the marginalised 
can be ensured at the initial stages of service design, this may influence them to utilise the UISC when it is 
operational. 
Training is the UISC’s most popular service. The provision of free computers and access to a rent-free space 
enables the UISC management to charge a fee for the training, reported by villagers as Tk. 3000 that is much 
lower than the prevailing market rate. However, few villagers envision using the UISC beyond receiving IT 
training. Thus, UISCs do not seem different from regular IT training centres or cyber cafes except that it is 
located in the Union Parishad (UP) and has an attendant who can assist customers to download forms, check 
results online, etc. To increase access and reach of the poor, most of whom have no or limited education, 
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Box 5: IT Service Prices at Borohor UISC
 

















Internet use 1 hour 10 20 




Photo printing 1 copy 20 -
Photo taken 1 copy 7 -
Scanning 3 copies 30 30
Compose 1 copy 20 10
Ringtone 
Download
1 copy 15 20
** These are rates in Dhaka, the price will likely be 
lower in districts and regional centres. 
Source: Borohor Union Parishad, APTECH, NITT Dhaka, 2010
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extensive awareness raising campaigns and sensitisation programmes are required to make the UISCs relevant 
to rural life. As shown by D.Net’s Infomediary/InfoLady model, UISC entrepreneurs need to be committed to 
providing relevant content, services that people cannot easily attain and the possibility of mobile information 
and service provision to be embraced by villagers. The provision of a tiered fee structure, where the poor 
receive services at a subsidised rate and middle-class and wealthy people compensate by paying higher fees, 
while administratively costly to operate, will generate high social benefit. It is doubtful whether the private 
sector will bear these costs and a government subsidy may be required (Proenza 2001). D.Net’s Director also 
notes that government support is key to sustaining such initiatives. 
D.Net’s experience with Pallithathya Kendras and A2I’s findings from the two pilot projects demonstrates 
that information needs vary from village to village. Thus, information provided at UISCs should be focused 
on information needs identified by rural communities and the cognition and skill level of the beneficiaries. 
Hence, the local entrepreneurs running the centres must always look for new ways to serve these evolving 
needs through new and enhanced services (Proenza 2001). 
II.  Cost 
All of the UISC users interviewed mentioned that the cost of training is lower than the market rate as the union 
parishad and the A2I Project already provide the space and computers. The centres are located at a convenient 
location, helping beneficiaries save on travel cost. Before the UISCs, villagers had to travel long distances to 
access the IT services that the UISC provides. Beneficiaries were very happy to get government forms, e.g. 
passport forms, etc and assistance from UISC providers in filling them out. However, given that automated 
and online government services are not available, the UISCs have not had an impact on the cost for citizens to 
avail these services. The current value of the UISCs is the ‘potential’ they provide for the future. The larger the 
number of services available at the centres, the greater the benefits for and demand from villagers. The main 
means by which ICT will benefit the rural population is through the provision of multiple services through 
a single site, thus increasing efficiency and reducing cost (Bhatnagar 2004). In the short term, the union 
parishads can conduct a service needs assessment to find out what other services will be advantageous to 
users, and then provide them in conjunction with the UISC management. The D.Net Pallithathya Kendra model 
took this approach and improved service quality and delivery. 
III.  Quality and reliability
According to the UP chairmen, the centres operate from 9 am to 5 pm everyday. The beneficiaries in Sirajganj 
noted that they were happy with the operating hours, the availability of UISC manager, the quality of training 
and other ancillary services. However, as mentioned above, given that automated and online government 
services are not available, the UISCs have not had an impact on the quality of government service provision. 
The primary user complaint is that recurrent power outage lead to frequent interruptions in service. Generators 
provided by the National Institute of Local Government (NILG) and the A2I Programme cannot be used due 
to high fuel costs and the high incidence of power outages requiring almost constant generator operation. 
Stakeholder participation at the UISC design stage could have identified the need for battery-operated power 
delivery systems such as Instant Power Systems (IPS) at the centres. Given how often power outages occur, it 
is doubtful that these would have the opportunity to charge properly between uses. However, they would be 
a cheaper solution over the long-term.
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IV.  Sustainability
The financial sustainability of the UISCs is a concern. Fees from the training courses cover operating costs, but 
are not adequate for the UISC to break-even without external assistance. All entrepreneurs get basic training 
on computers, internet and computer peripheral use from the NILG. In the future, as the services provided 
expand and citizen’s demand become more complex these skill sets will need expansion – an additional cost. 
Critically, the local UISC entrepreneurs lack skills in marketing, financial management and planning, all of 
which are necessary to establish, sustain and expand a successful business. 
In addition to financial sustainability, political sustainability is also a cause of concern. Despite the fact that 
this is a government initiative, the union parishad (UP) chairman’s support is critical for the centres to survive 
and thrive. A change of individual in the UP chairman’s post may cause the centre to be closed, the managers 
to be changed, etc. Some of the UISCs sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the UP. The MOU 
states that during the first two years of operation all income will go to the entrepreneur so that s/he can 
cover costs associated with running the centre. Although such a system may give some protection to the 
local businessperson, the responsibility of honouring this MOU ultimately rests with the leadership of the UP. 
As long as the A2I Project exists, the entrepreneur can seek the assistance of project counterparts if the UP 
chairman fails to fulfil the MOU. However, formal channels do not exist through which the entrepreneur can 
seek assistance in case of lack of compliance on the part of the local political leadership. 
V.  Accountability
Discussion with UISC beneficiaries revealed that information and services provided have not been able 
to change citizen’s accountability relationship with the government. The implementation of RTI requires 
authorities to provide access to government information regarding use of public funds and implementation 
of policy coupled with the use of ICT tools to make this information accessible to all at time or location. This 
has not occurred. However, the very people that RTI aims to benefit are unaware of the type of information 
they are entitled to. Nevertheless, the UISCs can provide a space for constructive engagement between 
government and citizens, becoming an important tool for accountability. By proactively providing information 
online the government can enhance transparency and accountability. Examples of useful information include: 
(1) decisions on procurement and awarding of licences; (2) information from government databases such as 
land records and status of tax-payment; (3) data on performance indicators about government departments 
at both the central and local level and (4) mechanisms to file grievances relating to government service 
providers (Bhatnagar 2003).  Additionally, citizens should also be able to seek information via the internet 
or using mobiles relating to (1) how public funds are being utilised; (2) the basis on which a child’s school 
admission was denied; (3) pensioner records held by government; and (4) the award of tenders (Institute of 
Governance Studies 2010). An interactive mode of exchanging information between government and citizens 
is vital to creating accountable governance.
While UISCs have been providing useful services to middle and high-income villagers by providing them 
computer and internet training, the services available remain inaccessible to the poor. The UISC experience 
in Bangladesh reflects experiences in India where rural ICT initiatives like telecentres rather than diffusing the 
social dynamics, can take their shape and reinforce pre-existing power relations. The issues of sustainability 
and inaccessibility also confirm that it may be better if UISC ownership lies with the local administrative system 
and not with local entrepreneurs, computer operators or private sector companies. If the ownership is with 
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the local administrative system it has the opportunity to achieve the development mandate of the centres. 
The dependence of UISCs on local political support for survival and growth also limits their long-term efficacy 
and impact. 
4.2 Recommendations
This chapter makes the following recommendations regarding future UISC establishment that will allow them 
to provide greater access, be more effective and sustainable over time: 
       
I.  In the short-term
•	 Enhancing community demand and awareness through publicity campaigns so that the poor realise 
UISC’s value and thus access the services. 
•	 Adopting a participatory approach, including a community needs assessment during the design of 
the services and content to be provided so that they meet the needs of the community (including 
poor and vulnerable groups).  
•	 Providing government information proactively and teaching citizens to seek information from the 
government in turn.
•	 Offering flexible, responsive, and innovative public-private investment mechanisms to support the 
establishment of new UISCs. The A2I Project may consider moving ownership away from the computer 
operators to a committee run by the union parishad.
•	 Adopt a tiered price structure that makes it easier for citizens of varied income levels to access the 
services.
•	 Presenting well-packaged, easy-to-replicate community services such as computer literacy training, 
telemedicine, remote learning, financial remittances, and e-government. 
•	 Supplying flexible, ongoing training and support to users and service providers. 
•	 Ensuring low-cost, easy-to-implement technology platforms, including affordable and stable internet 
connections for rural areas. 
II.  In the long-term
•	 An enduring political commitment to the UISC model as an important contributor to development.
•	 Front and back end automation and integration, including business process re-engineering that 
allows for automation in government agencies that would allow for a one-stop web portal that 
provides multiple services to citizens.
•	 Appropriate ICT infrastructure to provide long term UISC support. 
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5 Recommendations and conclusions
The current government deserves praise for providing unprecedented political support to the development 
of ICT tools for citizen empowerment through the Digital Bangladesh agenda. However, the chapter argues 
that it has achieved mixed results on its willingness to implement the citizen-centric initiatives the DB vision 
and strategy proposes. The government’s new regulatory and institutional initiatives — in particular passing 
the ICT Act 2009 and establishing high level committees devoted to the proliferation of ICT for development 
— are positive. However, much depends on whether new legislation is effectively implemented and whether 
these committees are successful in mainstreaming ICT at both governmental and citizen access levels. In 
addition, 53 quick win initiatives that are being implemented across different ministries are directly aimed 
at benefiting students, although the short-term nature of the quick wins is a cause for concern. Although, 
the current manifestation of DB may allow Bangladesh to enter the interaction and transaction phase of 
e-government maturity, this will be severely compromised unless the necessary backend initiatives such 
as business process re-engineering are implemented. A truly transformational view of e-government 
encompassing government-to-citizens, government-to-business and government-to-government backend 
initiatives in addition to comprehensive institutional and process reforms are necessary to truly attain ICT 
enabled development outcomes. A real threat is the discontinuation of the DB agenda beyond the tenure 
of the current government, given its highly politicised nature. The focal point of the strategy must thus shift 
from a merely technology implementation paradigm to one that focuses on utilisation, with built-in outcome 
monitoring.
Without addressing the overall problems identified below, the DB strategy will remain unsuccessful in creating 
meaningful change in citizen livelihoods and wellbeing.
5.1 Implement institutional restructuring and process reforms
The current implementation capacity is weak and a centralised body must be institutionalised that can 
coordinate with ministries and execute the necessary reforms to make achievement of the citizen-centric 
pillars of the DB vision a possibility. In addition, front and back end automation and integration (including 
business process re-engineering that allows for automation) in government agencies would allow for a one-
stop web portal that provide multiple services to citizens.  
5.2 Strengthen the regulatory framework
The ICT Act 2009 must be amended to provide adequate data privacy and security provisions so that the 
citizens can transact online in a secure manner. This is of particular concern in revenue based ICT access 
models such as Union Information and Service Centres (UISC), which are being rolled out nationwide. The 
Policy must have a roadmap and guidelines for the implementation of the 306 action points. Finally, the 
Right to Information Act 2009 must be put into action using enabling ICT tools, so that citizens can access 
information quickly and effectively. 
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5.3 Build ownership within the bureaucracy and depoliticise the agenda
The DB agenda is being planned and implemented by the UNDP funded Access to Information (A2I) 
Programme without building adequate ownership with the bureaucracy. This is vital as it is the main agent of 
policy execution. Bureaucratic ownership could be achieved through the provision of training, support and 
adequate incentives. Resources must also be allocated and steps must be taken so that the current initiatives 
can be sustained over time. In addition, given the highly politicised nature of the agenda, input from the 
opposition leaders must be sought through providing them key membership positions in taskforces and 
committees. True political will from all political parties that is sustained over many electoral cycles is required 
to create a Bangladesh where ICT tools facilitate true empowerment. 
5.4 Bridge the digital divide through greater community awareness and pro-poor service 
provision
UISCs, as they are currently designed and implemented have not been able to meet the needs of the poor. 
Awareness raising and competitive pricing is essential, as people need to see a value to these centres in order 
to use them. In addition, adopting a participatory approach, including community needs assessment, in the 
design of services and content provided so that they meet the needs of the wider community. The Access to 
Information (A2I) Project should offer flexible, responsive, and innovative investment mechanisms as well as 
engender community ownership to support the establishment of new Centres and make them sustainable in 
the long term. 
DB strategy and implementation needs to take into account the above deficiencies and provide a framework 
that is capable of supporting its citizen-centric mandate. If not, ‘Digital Bangladesh’ will continue to be seen 
as just another clichéd political slogan that in reality does not create positive development outcomes for 
citizens, particularly those who are poverty stricken and marginalised.
105
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2009
International labour migration is a crucial feature of the national economy – both as a means of livelihood 
for Bangladeshis living abroad and as a means of income for their families at home. The UN Convention on 
the Rights of Migrants defines a migrant worker as a “person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been 
engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national” (United Nations Educational 
Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] 2010). Government data shows that between 1976-2009 an 
estimated 7.5 million Bangladeshis migrated all over the world for economic reasons (Bureau of Manpower, 
Employment and Training [BMET] 2010), while other sources claim that currently there are 5.4 or even 6 million 
out-migrants, highlighting the paucity of accurate figures1 (International Organization for Migration [IOM] 
and United Nations Development Fund for Women [UNIFEM] 2009). Remittances from migrants have been 
rapidly growing over the past decade and a half, amounting to USD 10.72 billion in 2009, i.e. approximately 
11 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Bangladesh Bank 2010). They contribute significantly to 
economic growth and substantially improve the nation’s Balance of Payments (BOP) position. However, the 
recent global recession has caused dramatic losses in employment opportunities for Bangladeshi migrants in 
many countries, not only in the form of reduced job availability but also in the form of massive layoffs among 
the current labour force. Saudi Arabia, a major migrant destination, has reduced its annual intake from 150,000 
workers to about 15,000 (BMET 2010; Palma 2010). While remittances increased in 2009, the drastically lower 
numbers of new migrants has already resulted in reduced remittances in the first months of 2010 (Bangladesh 
Bank 2010). Not only does this have a negative impact on the economy, but it also severely endangers the 
livelihoods and well-being of those who depend on remittances. However, this chapter finds that the prospect 
of fewer departures and lower remittances are not the only areas which are problematic. 
A migration process overseen by a weak and inadequate regulatory framework and institutions severely lacking 
in capacity, transparency and accountability all contribute to the poor state of governance in the migration 
arena. The extremely long and complicated migration process, high costs of migration, resulting debts incurred 
5CHAPTER International Labour Migration: Making Migrant Worker Welfare Central to Governance
1  Out-migration is when people leave a location (usually their home country or region) to settle in another.
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by migrants prior to departure and unscrupulous migration agencies are some glaring examples. One of the 
major findings of this chapter is that Bangladeshi migrants often pay double of what their counterparts pay 
in neighbouring countries for the migration process due to the severe lack of implementation of policies and 
legislation and an absence of monitoring. The poor treatment that Bangladeshi migrant workers are subject 
to while living abroad and their lack of protection by the Bangladesh government are also causes for severe 
concern. Between 2004-2009, a total of 8,701 Bangladeshi workers died abroad and more than 900 of these 
deaths occured during the first 5 months of 2009 (Palma 2009; Odhikar 2010). Reports of inhumane working 
conditions, unfair employment practices and breaches of migrants’  human rights are common in the local 
media, as are inadequate responses to these situations from the government. Thus, apprehension about the 
governance of the labour migration process is well grounded. 
It is against this challenging context that the subsequent discussions of this chapter are set. The chapter’s 
analytical focus will be on analysing the governance of international labour migration, primarily to the Middle 
East and South East Asia, the key destinations of both official and unofficial labour migrants from Bangladesh. 
It reviews the published literature, including grey literature and newspaper sources, as well as incorporating 
information gathered through a large number of key informant interviews with government officials, as well as 
academics, area experts and members of civil society. The chapter opens with an overview of the discourse on 
the rationale for governing labour migration and then an identification of global and regional lenses through 
which emergent issues of governance of international labour migration in Bangladesh can be examined. 
The second section then examines the legislatory and regulatory framework regarding international labour 
migration in Bangladesh, as well as looking at how well the complex web of institutions involved in migration 
governance functions. The section closes with an analysis of the process of international labour migration 
in Bangladesh, identifying key areas of governance failure both within the state and the private sector. The 
chapter concludes with an argument for re-envisioning the government’s current role to one as a ‘governance 
watchdog’. The chapter makes recommendations aimed at improving the governance of international labour 
migration in all its facets: the migration process, pre-departure, within the duration of the employment abroad 
and return to Bangladesh.
 
1 Governing migration – emergent discourses and global conventions
Based on International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates, there are currently about 190 million people 
around the world living in countries other than their birthplace; of those about 100 million are international 
labour migrants (ILO 2009). A growing number of nations are involved with migration as countries of origin, 
destination or transit, or all three. Contemporary international migration is propelled by a diversity of factors 
including the growing developmental differences between countries, lack of gainful employment and human 
security in certain parts of the world and the growing demand for both high and low-skilled workers in 
destination countries, as well as geographical proximity and historical linkages between origin and destination 
countries (Martin and Widgren 2002). Migration has significant social, economic and political impacts on far 
more people than those who migrate, both in home and destination nations. As Castles and Miller (2003, p.5) 
note: “There can be few people in either industrialised or less developed countries today who do not have 
personal experience of migration and its effects.” 
There is a strong consensus that labour migration issues should be integrated into the mainstream of national 
employment, labour market, poverty alleviation and development policies. The ILO ‘Multilateral Framework 
on Labour Migration’ reiterates this link through principle 15 where it notes that labour migration’s role in 
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employment, economic growth, development and alleviation of poverty should be identified and maximised 
for the advantage of both sending and receiving countries (ILO 2006a). Another study looking at the relationship 
between poverty, migration and remittances for 74 low and middle-income developing countries found that 
international migration has a strong, statistically significant impact on reducing poverty in the developing 
world: “On average, a 10 per cent increase in the share of international migrants in a country’s population 
will lead to a 1.6 per cent decline in the poverty headcount” (Adams and Page 2003, p.1). The same study 
also states that international remittances viewed as a proportion of the country’s GDP also have a statistically 
significant effect on poverty indicators with the poverty headcount measure indicating on average that a 10 
per cent increase in the share of remittances in country GDP leads to a 1.2 per cent decline in the share of 
people living in extreme poverty (less than USD 1 per person per day). Other poverty measures show a slightly 
larger impact on poverty reduction, with a 2 per cent decline in the depth and/or severity of poverty in the 
countries studied (Adams and Page 2003). 
There is an increasing focus on governance in many recent discourses on international labour migration. 
The 2005 ‘Report of the Global Commission on International Mission (GCIM)’ states that, “in the domain of 
international migration, governance assumes a variety of forms, including migration policies and programmes 
of individual countries, interstate discussions and agreements, multilateral fora and consultative processes, 
the activities of international organisations, as well as laws and norms” (GCIM 2005, p.65). A cursory review of 
recent literature reveals that most engagements with the topic have focused on managing and/or regulating 
and protection as centrepieces of governance. The recently published ‘India Migration Report 2010’ strongly 
argues that “India has operated in a policy vacuum” and that “this has led to an adverse selection with the 
less qualified workers, exploitative employers, and greedy middlemen getting together” (Rajan and Kumar 
2010, p.246). It suggests that “the policy has to focus on facilitation and management” rather than merely 
protection (p. 254). Stalker (2008) argues that better admission and recruitment procedures and refining 
bilateral agreements or memoranda of understanding (MoUs) will lead to improved governance.
However, there are warnings against the conflation of ‘migration management’ with ‘migration governance’. A 
recent ILO report succinctly discusses three major pointers in this regard: 
First, they imply that a state has more or less complete control over migration and can 
effectively manage it. Yet the overwhelming historical experience is to the contrary. In practice, it is often 
not possible to turn migration on and off like water from a tap. Policies based on the assumption that 
migrant workers can be brought in when needed and then sent home when no longer needed have 
failed in every region where they have been tried. A second problem with the concept of migration 
management is that it is linked to a view of unilateral migration control by destination countries. 
The dividing line between migration ‘management’ and migration ‘control’ is indeed thin. Third, 
migration management can imply a top-down approach that encourages governments to regulate 
migration in an isolated way, that is, without consulting other stakeholders, such as social partners, 
migrant workers and broader civil society. This is an overly simplistic approach, given the complexity 
of migration. For example, it has been noted that the very use of this term ‘suggests a slightly old-
fashioned, pre-globalisation assumption of state control over migration processes’ (Newland 2005, 
p. 15), whereas in fact states are only one among a number of important kinds of actor. ‘Regulation’ 
is a better term, which deals with the question of overseas employment administration, but it carries 
potentially negative connotations of bureaucratic procedures (2010, p.144).
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The ILO ‘Multi-lateral Framework on Labour Migration’ provides many principles and guidelines in establishing 
and evaluating aspects of good governance, including consistency with international standards and good 
practices, policy coherence, gender sensitivity, transparency and flexibility, social dialogue, and evidence 
or data based policy formulation (2006a). The primary focus of the upcoming discussion is on international 
standards and conventions that emphasise migrant rights. The following section explores the role of specific 
institutions and oversight bodies and discusses the emergent rights-based agenda and governance related 
issues in the Bangladeshi context. 
1.1 Protecting migrant rights — international conventions and standards
Recent years have seen the increased primacy of a rights-based governance discourse in migration debates 
due to advocacy organisations and the global media bringing to light the severity and widespread nature 
of migrant abuse. These debates increasingly draw upon international conventions and globally accepted 
standards as referents for benchmarking and points for advocacy. A brief review of key international 
conventions (both binding and non-binding) that define and advocate migrant rights follow. 
At the broadest level, there are 3 international instruments which together comprise the United Nations’ 
International Bill of Human Rights – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) – which guarantee all migrant workers, irrespective of their status, their entitlements 
to universally accepted human rights. These are briefly discussed below: 
I. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 applies to every 
member of the human family in every part of the world, regardless of whether or not states have formally 
accepted its principles and grants anyone the right to file a complaint. Rights particularly relevant for migrant 
workers are the right to be free from slavery or servitude; equality before the law and equal protection of 
the law; protection against discrimination; effective remedy by national tribunals; freedom from arbitrary 
arrest, detention or exile; freedom of movement and residence; peaceful assembly and association; and 
social security. There are Articles specifically addressing work and employment which grant the right to work; 
free choice of employment; just and favourable conditions of work and protection against unemployment; 
equal pay for equal work without any discrimination; just and favourable remuneration; the formation and 
membership of trade unions; rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic 
holidays with pay; adequate standard of living; and security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability 
or other lack of livelihood (Articles 23, 24 & 25).
II. International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESR)
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was adopted by the UN General Assembly 
in 1966 and is legally binding on those states that have accepted it by ratification or accession. Among 
economic rights is the right to work, including the right to receive technical and vocational training; to just 
and favourable conditions of work; to fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value; to safe 
and healthy working conditions; to equal opportunity for promotion in employment; to rest, leisure and 
reasonable limitation of working hours and holidays with pay; and to form and join trade unions and to take 
strike action (Articles 6–8).
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III. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was also adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1996 
and is legally binding on those states that have accepted it by ratification or accession. The covenant states 
that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude or required to perform forced or compulsory labour. It also 
provides the right to form and join trade unions (Article 8 & 22).
Apart from the three broad international instruments, there are also specific standards and rights provided by 
the ILO to migrant workers. In 1998, the ILO turned its focus on 8 conventions in 4 key areas in its Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. These 
8 fundamental conventions contain what are 
considered human rights regarding employment. 
All member states of the ILO have an obligation 
arising from the very fact of membership to 
comply with these core conventions, regardless 
of whether or not they have ratified them. The 
four fundamental principles are:
1. Freedom of association and the 
effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining: The Committee 
of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEACR) and the Committee on Freedom 
of Association (CFA) have repeatedly 
reaffirmed the fundamental rights of 
workers, including migrants and those 
of irregular status, to form and join trade 
unions and to be protected against any 
act of discrimination on the grounds of 
trade union activities.
2. The elimination of all forms of forced 
or compulsory labour: The Forced 
Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), 11 and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), 
12 prohibit forced and compulsory labour for all persons, irrespective of the type or location of their 
economic activity. Convention No. 29 prohibits work exacted under the menace of penalty where the 
individual has not offered him/herself voluntarily. It also disallows forced labour for private entities 
and severely restricts its use by public authorities to imminent necessity, when it requires that wages 
be paid to workers. Convention No. 105 requires states to implement ‘effective measures to secure the 
immediate and complete abolition of forced or compulsory labour’.
3. The effective abolition of child labour: The elimination of child labour is covered by the Minimum 
Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138), 14 and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), 
15 Convention No. 138 prescribes specific age limits for the admission of children to work, including 
Box 1:  ILO conventions specific to labour 
migration
•	 Equality	of	Treatment	(Accident		 	












their Family Members (1990, ratified in 2003)
•	 Working	Conditions	(Hotels	&	Restaurants)	
Convention, 1991 (No. 172)
•	 Maternity	Protection	Convention,	2000	(No.	183)
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a prohibition on children under 18 years engaging in hazardous work. Convention No. 182 calls for 
‘immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of 
child labour as a matter of urgency’. It defines the worst forms of child labour as (a) slavery and forced 
labour, including child trafficking and forced recruitment for armed conflict; (b) child prostitution and 
pornography; (c) production and trafficking of drugs and (d) work likely to harm the health, safety 
or morals of children. The exact types of work to be prohibited as hazardous work under category 
(d) are to be determined at the national level, after consultation with the employers’ and workers’ 
organisations and taking into consideration relevant international standards.
4. The elimination of discrimination in respect to employment and occupation: The Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111), 16 requires ratifying states to declare and 
pursue a national policy aimed at promoting equality of opportunity and treatment and eliminating 
all forms of discrimination in employment and occupation based on race, colour, sex, religion, political 
opinion, national extraction and social origin. The Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100), 
18 requires states to pursue a policy of equal remuneration for work of equal value carried out by 
men and women workers. The two conventions apply to nationals and non-nationals alike without 
distinction of status.
Apart from these core conventions, the ILO also has another set that are particularly relevant to labour 
migration (see Box 1). Two broad themes in these conventions deserve discussion:
•	 Conventions on social security: There are two related conventions and an accompanying 
recommendation on social security rights that aim at equal treatment of migrant labourers with 
national workers. These are the Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, 1962 (No. 118), 
the Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention, 1982 (No. 157), and the Maintenance of Social 
Security Rights Recommendation, 1983 (No. 167). All current ILO social security standards stipulate 
that the personal scope of coverage applies irrespective of nationality, and almost all contain similar 
clauses on equality of treatment for native and foreign workers in the destination country. 
•	 Convention on private employment agencies: The Private Employment Agencies Convention, 
1997 (No. 181), is particularly relevant to migrant workers especially since private agencies are now 
heavily involved in the transfer of workers between countries. The Convention requires that states 
implement a system of licensing or certification of agencies. It prohibits the denial of workers’ rights to 
freedom of association and collective bargaining; the practice of discrimination against workers; and 
the charging direct or indirect fees to workers. With regard to migrant workers, states are required to 
ensure adequate protection for and prevent abuses against those recruited or placed in their territory 
by private recruitment agencies. States are encouraged to enter into bilateral agreements to prevent 
abuses and fraudulent practices against migrant workers who use private recruitment agencies and 
must have procedures to investigate complaints by workers. In addition, there must be adequate 
protection for among other things, minimum wages, working time and other working conditions, 
social security benefits, and occupational safety and health.
The UN too has been cognizant of migrant rights and has devoted a convention to the protection of migrant 
workers and the furtherance of their rights. The 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families provides a broad range of protections for 
migrant workers and their families in many 
areas of life and work. However, it took 
more than a decade until 20 countries had 
finally ratified it by July 2003, thus giving 
it the full status of a convention. Although 
Bangladesh signed in 1998, no government 
has ever ratified it. 
A quick stocktaking of the impact of these 
conventions and standards reveals that 
overall, the world map of signatories documents a great disparity between signing countries where migrants 
tend to originate, and non-signatories where migrants tend to work. A classic case is the 1990 International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, which no 
European or Middle Eastern country has signed. This lack of commitment can be seen as one indicator of 
governance failure. The convention primarily defines the rights of migrant workers as a human rights issue and 
aims to protect them from any violations. In this document, the term migrant worker is rather comprehensive, 
and ‘refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a 
state of which he/she is not a national’.
 
2 Labour migration in Bangladesh
  
In Bangladesh, as in other nations, the nature of legal provisions and the effectiveness of institutions play 
a major role in strengthening the governance of labour migration. The discussion below commences by 
reviewing the legal framework governing labour migration in Bangladesh before moving on to key institutions 
that play a role in it.
2.1  Legal frameworks and transitions
An early and central piece of legislation in Bangladesh relating directly to migration is the Emigration Ordinance 
1982, promulgated on behalf of the Chief Martial Law Administrator. This is a strong piece of legislation that 
regulates all types of international labour migration, establishing an elaborate and clearly defined institutional 
setup of supporting offices. At the same time, it strongly criminalises any acts of non-compliance, if the same 
is ‘not in the public interest’. This puts the State in charge of defining and deciding whether or not a person 
is permitted to leave the country. Another crucial aspect of the regulation was the granting of licences to 
‘whoever desires to engage, or to recruit, or to assist, any person to emigrate’ (Emigration Ordinance 1982). 
This regulation remains a core piece of legislation in terms of governing the entire process of labour migration. 
Recruiting agencies are prohibited from charging higher than the prescribed amount of fees for their services. 
Cancellation or at least suspension of licences and the forfeit of security deposits can take place in cases of 
improper conduct and violation of the law or prescribed code of conduct. However, the Ordinance stipulates 
that such measures can be taken only after the licensee is given an opportunity to explain their position. 
Maximum punishment is an up to one-year imprisonment and a fine not exceeding Tk. 5,000. Considering the 
enormous profits that could and still can be made in this sector and the slow pace of adjustment to inflation 
over the following two decades, it is obvious that such provisions are utterly insufficient to stop violations 
and fraud. However, the Ordinance leaves no grounds for a review of its provisions — “the decision of the 
Government shall be final and shall not be questioned in any court of law” (Section 10).
Box 2: Key UN Conventions related to labour 
migration
•	 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 
1990
•	UN Convention Against Transnational Crime, 2000
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In December 2002, the government initiated a set of rules under the Ordinance of 1982 which are The 
Emigration Rules 2002, the Rules for Conduct and Licensing Recruiting Agencies and the Rules for the Wage 
Earners Welfare Fund. These document a marked shift in paradigm from a highly restrictive one to one focusing 
on the needs and rights of the workers and are discussed in Box 3.  
Box 3:  The 2002 Rules — aiming at providing an enabling environment
The Emigration Rules are an extended and elaborated version of the Emigration Ordinance 1982. They explicitly 
expand on the authority, duties and decision-making procedures of the Registrar, who is to be the Director 
General of the Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET). As noted in the 1982 Ordinance, 
the labour attaché is liable for providing registration to migrants who are working abroad but do not have 
registration under the Ordinance. The Rules also specify that a number of attachés would be appointed by 
the government and placed in different Bangladeshi missions abroad. Their rank would be the same as the 
registrar and their specific duties and responsibilities are explained in detail (sections 4-7). 
The Emigration Rules strictly reinforce the previous Ordinance’s stipulation that without permission from the 
registrar no agents are allowed to appoint any sub-agents or even change their address. Another important 
feature is the stipulation regarding the provision of group visas. The Rules state “the Bureau shall not accord 
permission to divide the group visa into a group of fewer than eight persons of personal visa” (Section 18/2). A 
crucial provision refers to transportation costs, stating that the employer should bear the transportation costs. 
In case the employers do not bear these expenses, the recruiting agency needs to do so (Section 17). A detailed 
section on complaint disposal is also introduced: in cases of complaints against the employer, the labour 
attaché should conduct an inquiry; in cases of complaints against the recruiting agency, the government and 
the registrar are liable to inspect, settle or clear the issue.  
The Rules for Conduct and Licensing Recruiting Agencies discusses the procedure of registration for manpower 
agencies, including application, validation and license renewal. After the submission of the necessary 
documents and application form by a recruiting agency, the Director General of the Manpower Bureau should 
scrutinise the veracity of papers (within 10 days) and assess the credibility of the applicant (within 30 days). 
After due inspection, the registrar should prepare a recommendation and forward it to the government. 
After reviewing this recommendation, the government can then either accept or reject the application. If 
not cancelled or suspended, licences are valid for one year (sections 3 and 4). The Rules also state that the 
government will settle and update the fees, such as licence fees, security holding, renewal fees etc, from time 
to time. Currently, it is Tk. 100,000 for new licences and Tk. 40,000 for renewals, with a security deposit of Tk. 
1.5 million. Any agent violating the Rules and found guilty may face rigorous imprisonment of up to five years 
or a fine, or both. 
A crucial addition is the renewal section, where it is mentioned that for certain misconduct the government 
may not renew an agent’s licence. This could happen if the recruiting agent is liable for “[..] any misconduct or 
his performance is not satisfactory or he is guilty of any offence relating to overseas employment or if there is 
evidence against him of taking extra money for overseas employment. Licences can also be cancelled if there 
is previous evidence against him for illegal emigration or he contravenes the provisions of the ordinance or 
rules” (section 5/4). One core requirement is that “every recruiting agent shall have to be sure that the migrant 
must not get less salary and enjoys less benefit than those stated in contract” (section 7). Another important 
stipulation is that there should be an oral or written understanding between the employer and the agent 
regarding salary and other benefits. 
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The third piece of legislation is the Rules for the Wage Earners Welfare Fund, which was already mentioned in 
the Emigration Ordinance 1982 and was initiated by the government in 1990. This fund collects contributions 
from multiple sources (Section 3). These include the interest from the security money deposited by recruiting 
agents to the registrar, the benevolent fee and briefing fee; an institutional donation of 10 per cent of the 
fees collected through Bangladesh missions abroad, including attestation fees, welfare fees received for 
rendering welfare services to workers, as well as money received from other sources. The Rules specify that 
the fund should be managed by an 11-member governing body, with representatives from the Ministry for 
Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry 
of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism, Ministry of Finance, and 
representative of the Bangladesh Association of International Recruiting Agencies (BAIRA) and the Bureau of 
Manpower Employment and Training (BMET). It is in the board’s mandate to allocate or utilise the fund worker 
welfare. ‘Welfare’ is further specified to include organising briefings and trainings, establishing welfare desks, 
building worker hostels, providing legal aid to workers and assistance to workers or their families in case of 
injury or death (section 6 & 7).
The changing nature of labour migration and its increasing impact on the national economy has affected 
policy responses from the government. The Overseas Employment Policy, published in the Bangladesh Gazette 
in November 2006 reflects this transition. In its preamble, the Policy reiterates the economic significance of 
labour migration in Bangladesh by pointing out that ‘manpower is a major export sector for Bangladesh 
economy and [… that] the government has taken decision to undertake long term programme for ensuring 
the welfare of the Bangladeshi expatriates’ (2006). The preamble also states ‘in performing this constitutional 
responsibility, the government is responsive and active in generating employment within the country as 
well as creating job opportunities abroad for its citizens’ (Overseas Employment Policy 2006). The Policy also 
specifically emphasises migrant workers’ economic contributions: ‘remittances from Bangladeshi expatriate 
workers have greatly helped to maintain a stable foreign currency reserve and reduced dependence of the 
country on foreign aid’ (2006). 
The policy also recognises the need to support and strengthen the governance of labour migration: 
… promote transparency and instil dynamism in the trade, facilitate qualitative change in 
the trade, reduce fraudulent practices, migration cost and ensure better salary, create an environment 
for accessibility of aspirant migrants to migration process from all areas of the country and to ensure 
overall welfare for the dependents of the Bangladeshi expatriates and migrant workers (2006).
Given this new acknowledgement, workers’ welfare and safeguarding it becomes a crucial responsibility 
of the government. This includes the collection and review of human rights practices and labour laws of 
receiving countries and the provision of legal assistance to expatriate Bangladeshi workers who require it. 
While noting the competitive global job market, the policy also states the need to articulate and press for 
rights and related issues, ‘in league with other labour sending countries’ (Overseas Employment Policy 2006). 
Given its growing economic importance, the government is to continue and even increase labour migration 
to foreign countries. 
To this end, many steps are being taken. One-stop service centres are to be expanded in order to facilitate 
recruitment processes. Passports and police clearances are to be issued within 15 days of application. Increased 
surveillance of the recruitment process includes registration in a database and closer monitoring of recruitment 
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agencies in order to minimise illegal and unauthorised employment by the latter. However, the high costs of 
migration for migrants, particularly when compared to neighbouring countries need consideration. While the 
Overseas Employment Policy can be seen as a major step in facilitating labour migration and safeguarding the 
interests of workers, its basis on the Emigration Ordinance 1982 means that it does not provide a new, rights-
based legislative framework (Siddiqui 2005). 
The incumbent government has also placed labour migration governance on their agenda. The Awami 
League’s 2008 election manifesto includes a section on labour migration, stating that ‘increase in labour 
export and investment of remittance received from expatriate Bangladeshis in productive sectors will be 
ensured (Bangladesh Awami League 2008). They also point out the necessity of producing skilled manpower 
and pledge the promotion of training to meet international requirements. In July 2009, the State Minister for 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr Hasan Mahmud identified two main priorities: to secure and ensure the flow 
of remittances and to utilise them properly (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010). Reducing the cost of transferring 
money within the countries would facilitate the former, while the issuance of targeted bonds at higher interest 
rates for migrants by Bangladesh Bank and the subsequent investment of funds raised in building migration 
infrastructure would greatly help the latter. He emphasised the need to maintain good relationships with host 
countries and to develop a need-based approach to train migrant labour. 
In response to the recent global economic crisis, the government has drafted a 9-point strategy aimed at the 
expansion of existing labour markets and increasing skill development capacity to provide more skilled labour, 
as well as to highlight a ‘special focus on export of female workers’ (Talukder 2009). One major outcome of 
the initiative to support migrant workers is the ‘smart card’, which is a tag with a computer chip, introduced in 
February 2010. This is designed to ease the immigration process, help the migrants while they are abroad and 
help the government to keep accurate information on all Bangladeshi workers overseas. They will be issued 
by BMET and will contain all the information furnished in the passport, such as the migrant’s fingerprint and 
the name and licence number of the recruiting agency so that the authorities can identify all parties involved 
in the migration process. It will also bear proof of the migrant’s valid documents. The card will be instrumental 
for Bangladeshi embassies abroad when workers face problems and emergencies. Importantly, it will also be 
helpful for families of dead or injured migrant workers who face great difficulties in extracting compensation 
from BMET or district manpower offices. The card will also include the names and photographs of nominees, 
making it easy to identify them. 
Overall, there have been substantial improvements in the legal framework for the labour migrants: their legal 
rights and entitlements have been strengthened and welfare schemes have been established. At a national 
level, their contribution has been widely acknowledged and the risks and malpractices of labour migration 
have been disclosed and publicly debated. While government institutions to govern labour migration have 
been in existence since the  1970s (see below), the first substantial amendment to the Emigration Ordinance 
1982 was in December 2002, when three new sets of rules were framed relating to governing the migration 
process, the agents and bodies involved in migration and the provision of worker welfare. The Overseas 
Employment Policy of 2006 further elaborated worker rights and welfare issues, while the pending threat of 
the global economic recession motivated the government to formulate a new 9-point strategy in 2009 that 
kept in mind the urgent need to both increase migration and improve its governance.  
In terms of institutional provisions, these rules and the new policy clearly document a shift in paradigm with 
regard to regulating governance of labour migration. The government now acknowledges its role in facilitating 
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rather than opposing those who intend to leave the country, reflected in the renaming the relevant ministry 
in 2001 the Ministry of Expatriates Welfare and Overseas Employment (MoEWOE). These changes also reflect 
a different understanding at the global level where the crucial role of labour migrants and the need to secure 
their human and labour rights has been increasingly acknowledged. The following section briefly summarises 
the institutions that have been created in order to administer labour migration and discusses shortcomings 
in institutional cooperation.
2.2 Institutional framework of international labour migration
The organisation and governance of international labour migration in Bangladesh is incredibly complex. 
Analysts have called it ‘a maze’ and argue that it needs simplification (Das 2009; Siddiqui 2002). In addition 
to the involvement of various ministries, there are also intricate layers of public and private entities that 
have been designed to facilitate and manage the process of labour migration. However, the institutional 
framework has transformed into a multi-layered network of service providers who mainly follow their own 
interests. Overall, the sector as in many other Asian nations, can be characterised by what Hugo describes 
as “[the] siphoning off of the wages of migrant workers by recruiters, agents and money lenders and other 
intermediaries” (2009, p/41). He argues that “improving governance of international labour migration […] is 
going to involve confrontation with well established vested interests operating inside and outside the existing 
level system which are often not operating in the interests of the migrant[s]” (Hugo 2009, p.41). This is also 
true of Bangladesh, where migrant interests are disregarded between the operation of unscrupulous private 
manpower agencies and the inefficient and over-complicated government bodies tasked with governing the 
migration process. Below is a brief overview of the organisations involved in administering the sector: 
The Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment (MoEWOE) is the nodal ministry for labour 
migration. Until 2001 it was called the Ministry of Labour and Employment, and its renaming signifies a 
change in the ministry’s role. As the name suggests, it has two major functions: to ensure expatriate worker 
welfare and to create and manage overseas employment of Bangladeshis. It is also responsible for facilitating 
the recruitment process, regulating the recruiting agencies and maintaining regular contact with the labour 
wings of foreign missions. As elaborated in Box 3, the Ministry has promulgated three important legislations 
regarding the organisation, management and regulation of international labour migration and migrant 
worker welfare (see also Siddiqui 2005a and Sikder 2008).
Two other ministries of importance are the Ministry of Home Affairs which issues passports and is responsible 
for all emigration clearances at the point of departure and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is responsible 
for all foreign missions. The latter is crucial for negotiating bilateral memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with 
labour receiving countries and being an intermediary between foreign companies and Bangladeshi recruiting 
agencies. While workers are abroad, this ministry is responsible for the provision of consular services and the 
improvement of their welfare. To facilitate these responsibilities, by 2008 Bangladeshi missions had established 
12 ‘labour wings’, mainly in the Gulf region, as well as in Singapore, Korea and Libya. Additionally, the Ministry 
of Civil Aviation and Tourism also supports migrants during departure by arranging security checks, boarding 
passes and other documents. 
Reflecting the growing importance of labour migration, the MoEWOE has received a substantial increase in 
budget allocation of more than 200 per cent over the past four years. While the increase in revenue budget was 
nominal during the 2006/07 to 2008/09 period, this has changed for the current fiscal year when it was more 
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than doubled (see Figure 1). However, the overall increase hides allocation discrepancies within the Ministry 
with a large portion of the budget allocation going to labour offices abroad, the administration at home (i.e. 
the Secretariat) and to international organisations. However, the body in charge of logistical organisation of 
labour migration, the Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training (BMET) discussed in detail below has 
had to face budget cuts (see Figure 2). Overall, their budget is currently less than half of that of either the 
Secretariat or of international organisations. 
Figure 1: Budget allocations to  Figure 2: Budget allocations within   
 MoEWOE (2008-10)  MoEWOE (2008-10)
 
Source: MoEWOE 2009a 
The Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training (BMET), established in 1976 is the MoEWOE’s oldest entity. 
It is responsible for providing employment opportunities at home and abroad and as well as for human resource 
development. It conducts a range of activities including the collection and dissemination of labour market 
information and maintaining an online database of all job seekers who register. It processes foreign demands 
for workers, monitors the activities of local regulating agencies, designs and develops tools for effective 
monitoring and conducts need-based worker training programmes (Siddiqui 2002; 2005a). Importantly, it is 
tasked with ensuring worker welfare while abroad, solving legal disputes and working towards the prevention 
of money laundering. 
BMET is partly staffed by those on deputation from different ministries who usually hold the higher positions. 
It is chronically under-staffed compared to the ever-increasing numbers of labour migrants, with the same 
number of positions now as when it was established in 1976 (BMET 2010). This is in striking contrast to the fact 
that according to BMET’s own estimates, during the 1970s about 6000-10,000 workers left annually, while now 
approximately 2,000 persons leave every day (2010). Political considerations mean that leadership changes 
occur every two to three years including the position of the director general, greatly affecting the overall 
performance of the organisation. A major constraint affecting good governance practices is the fact that 
two different ministries provide BMET’s budget and that coordination between them is often problematic. 
The Ministry of Labour (MoL) provides the development budget and the MoEWOE supplies the revenue 
budget. Opportunities for infrastructural and performance enhancement are at times lost due to ministerial 
miscommunication. For example, the plans of a prominent international development partner to support 
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BMET in establishing a training centre in Sylhet were stopped by the MoL, who felt that they should have 
been involved in the planning process. Similarly, recent years have seen the establishment of 26 new Technical 
Training Centres across the country at a substantial cost of Tk. 550 crore.  However, the request for adequate 
staff has been pending for the past three years.
 
Figure 3: Number of migrants sent by different organisations  
                         
The Bangladesh Overseas Employment & Services Ltd. 
(BOESL), established in 1984 is a semi-government 
office situated at the interface of the public and private 
sectors and the only state entity to export manpower. It 
was founded as a public limited company, with 51 per 
cent of shares held by the government. The BMET states 
that the purpose of creating the BOESL as a company 
‘is to provide honest, efficient and quick services to 
the [sic] valued foreign employers in the matter of 
deployment of manpower development’ (2010). As a 
state owned recruiting agency, one of BOESL’s major 
tasks is to project Bangladesh as a reliable source 
of manpower by promoting it through advertising 
features in different international media. It also helps 
to process the demand for migrant workers from 
foreign governments and private sector companies. It 
also aims to carry out effective campaigns to enhance 
recruitment from Bangladesh in foreign countries and 
to secure already existing employment opportunities. 
BOESL is tasked with facilitating the process of migration 
for prospective migrants, including the arrangement of 
medical tests, employment tests and travel arrangements. Usually, it is assigned to deal with private and skilled 
migration (Fee and Rahman 2006). Despite this comprehensive mandate, BOESL’s contribution to overall 
migration is quite low. Between 1984-2008, it deployed only 14,800 workers (Martin 2009, Sikder 2009). The 
lion’s share of workers were processed by private recruiting companies or left individually (see Figure 3).
BOESL cooperates closely with the Bangladesh Association of International Recruiting Agencies (BAIRA), an 
association of licensed manpower-recruiting agencies established in 1984 (Sikder 2009). BAIRA currently has 
724 member companies and it acts to protect their rights and promote their activities. Additionally, it liaisons 
between foreign employers and migrant employees and amongst various foreign missions in Bangladesh, as 
well as disseminating information regarding government notifications, encouraging workers to remit through 
legal means and recommending appropriate legislation. BAIRA is also assigned to undertake welfare measures 
for workers abroad and their families at home. Another of its major tasks is to collect information about host 
country labour laws and distribute these amongst Bangladeshi migrants for their knowledge and protection. 
Furthermore, BAIRA sets and helps to achieve recruitment targets for its members. Based on the ‘Recruiting 
Agent’s Conduct and Licence Rules’ (2002) member agencies need to renew their memberships annually 
by paying a substantial renewal fee (currently Tk. 40,000). According to the Rules, in order to renew their 
licenses, agencies need to maintain proper documentation regarding their operations. Every agency under 
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BAIRA is supposed to submit an annual report to the Ministry of Labour and Employment documenting their 
calendar year activities in their entirety. Given the wide-ranging and important nature of BAIRA’s mandate, it 
could play a crucial watchdog role over its members, regulating those who do not conform to the required 
standards and promoting industry best practices. However, despite its extensive and important mandate, 
BAIRA is often unsuccessful in adequately fulfilling assigned duties. According to key informant interviews, 
the reason for this was a combination of shortcomings in staff abilities, the impact of agents’ vested interests 
and operational overlap in tasks with other organisations such as BOESL and BMET. The over-complicated and 
poorly coordinated process of international labour migration makes it difficult for the organisations involved 
in its facilitation, management and governance to carry out their functions. The following section briefly 
summarises and compares the process of a migrant’s journey from initial information gathering regarding 
overseas employment to departure both as it should happen and as it actually takes place. 
   
2.3 The process of labour migration 
The process of labour migration is extremely cumbersome, involving interface with multiple agencies and 
institutions, and for the potential migrant it is difficult to negotiate and often expensive. The convoluted nature 
of the process also means that it is inefficient, poorly governed and has many junctures where corruption 
and vested interests come into play. How the process is theoretically organised is very different from how it 
actually operates. Using information gathered from interviews with key informants at government ministries, 
migration management and regulation organisations, recruitment agencies and migrants themselves, the 
following section compares the proposed process of migration with the reality. 
In theory, the process of going abroad to work should proceed as depicted below: 
Figure 4: Proposed/formal recruitment system for overseas workers through a recruiting  
 agency
Source: Based on Miah 2010
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A work order is a document that elaborates on employment opportunities in foreign companies. Generally, 
recruiting agencies provide information for jobseekers on employment opportunities from foreign companies. 
However, sometimes those already working in a host country arrange work orders, i.e. paper documents 
from companies regarding job description and availability for their friends and relatives through their own 
contacts. The process usually begins with the recruiting agency gathering market information on available 
overseas employment opportunities including demand notes, job contracts and power of attorney statements 
regarding specific jobs. The agency then applies with all the necessary documentation to BMET for permission 
to start recruiting workers, while at the same time Bangladesh Missions in the target countries are approached 
so that they can attest relevant documents such as visa advices. Agents gather necessary documents including 
demand notes, job contracts, power of attorney statements, etc. Once permission is obtained, the agency 
starts recruiting workers who if selected then undergo a mandatory medical test, obtain visas, attend a pre-
departure briefing and then receive the final clearance to emigrate from BMET.
Under government-managed recruitment, workers are recruited through BOESL and BMET. Initially, the BMET 
was directly involved in the sending process, a function later on transferred to BOESL. BOESL maintains a 
separate database of job seekers alongside the list maintained by BMET. Foreign companies in receiving 
countries contact BOESL directly if they wish to recruit through them, with Bangladeshi foreign missions acting 
as the intermediary in this process. The receiving companies then issue authorisation letters accompanied 
by other necessary documents. BOESL then consults its database and tries to recruit the workers from it. If 
necessary, it also publishes recruitment advertisements in national dailies. It then shortlists workers from all 
the applicants and sends the list to the employing company for final approval. Upon receiving this, BOESL 
finalises the recruitment. 
However, according to key informant interviews, the process works rather differently in reality, involving 
layers of subcontractors/agents and informal payments. Using Figure 4 as a basis, Figure 5 outlines how the 
proposed process of migration actually plays out with the intervention of illegal middlemen and interference 
from multiple sources. This demonstrates the very important role of village, sub-district and district level 
middlemen play in the sourcing and selection of migrant workers for jobs abroad. They act as subcontractors 
and agents, using illegal payments to insert chosen groups of workers into contention for job selection. Thus, 
workers are not neutrally selected and processed from the job seeker’s lists maintained by BOESL, BMET and 
some reputable agencies, but through contacts, process manipulation and influence mongering. Corruption 
and influence mongering exists at almost every operational level of the migrant’s recruitment, administrative 
and departure process. This creates serious governance issues that not only make the migration journey a 
more challenging one for prospective migrants, but damages the whole industry’s credibility and efficacy. 
These governance issues and bottlenecks are explored in detail below. 
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Figure 5: Operational/informal recruitment system for overseas workers through a 
recruiting agency 
 
Source: Based on interviews and Miah 2010
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3 Governance gaps in labour migration 
The core problematic feature of the labour migration process as it exists is that the private-government nexus 
reaps all the profits, whereas workers bear the direct costs, as well as risks and uncertainties. In the current 
governance context, there are no incentives for any of the parties who reap the benefits in changing this 
arrangement in favour of the workers (Hugo 2009). Any move towards the adoption of a good governance 
framework requires a transition from a system that favours those who facilitate and govern migration to an 
emphasis on the centrality of migrant rights and entitlements. 
This section highlights four areas in international labour migration where governance gaps, poor regulation 
and lack of legislation implementation all have negative consequences for not only migrant workers, but for 
the system as a whole. The first three segments analyse systematic malpractices against workers while the 
last examines the governance failures in adequately managing labour migration abroad. Firstly, it explores 
malpractices in service provision, both public and private within Bangladesh to prospective and current 
migrants. Secondly, it reviews the role of the banking sector which benefits substantially from remittances 
sent by migrant workers. Despite this, they have been reluctant to provide loans to prospective migrants who 
chronically struggle with access to credit. Thirdly, it studies the treatment of migrant workers by their foreign 
employers. While the latter are theoretically required to comply with international and national minimum 
wage and working conditions regulations, they often ignore them. Thus, it is crucial to investigate the lack of 
legislation and standards implementation in the migrant labour receiving countries. 
3.1 Malpractices by local migration service providers
  
In recent years, malpractices by private recruitment agencies and local agents (dalals) have been highlighted, 
discussed and attempted to be addressed quite frequently by the media, the state and as well as civil society 
organisations. As per existing legislation, the state has the responsibility to not only regulate the institutional 
framework of labour migration but also to monitor the process and arbitrate grievances. It provides licenses 
to private recruitment agencies through its legislative and regulatory provisions, in particular the Emigration 
Ordinance 1982, and the 2002 Rules relating to labour migration and worker welfare. However, despite the 
diverse mechanisms set in place to enable this, the state’s inability to hold licensed agencies and unlicensed 
sub-agents accountable has led to a continuation of abusive and exploitative practices that negatively impact 
both migrant workers and thus the industry as a whole. 
The most common offences are related to collecting far higher service charges than permitted under law. For 
example, the government has fixed the cost of migration to Malaysia at Tk. 84,000, but in reality workers often 
pay more than Tk.200,000 (‘Bangladeshis pay high price for migration’, The Daily Star Business Report, March 22, 
2010; Ullah 2009). Similarly, the fees for migration to Singapore are officially set at SGD 2500 (i.e. Tk. 129,120 
approximately), but most workers end up paying SGD 6000-8000 (Tk.310,000-413,000 approximately). One of 
the major findings from key informant interviews is that Bangladeshi migrants often pay double of what their 
counterparts pay in neighbouring countries for the migration process due to the severe lack of implementation 
of policies and legislation and an absence of monitoring. In other cases, ruthless agents send workers without 
proper work permissions who are stranded upon arrival. Afsar (2009) calls this phenomenon ‘the search for 
a bhalo (good) visa’. Many malpractices are related to wages: often workers are forced to agree to wages that 
are below those specified in their contracts and in many cases, wages are not only lower than specified on the 
contract but even lower than the minimum wage of the country they are working in. Workers can even end 
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up at a different workplace or with a different job than the one they have signed up for. For example, trained 
workers are often made to work in semi-skilled or unskilled jobs. Such ‘transfers’ are often carried out in order 
to legitimise lower wages. 
What makes it difficult to track these transactions, manipulations and transfers is that in the majority of cases, 
prospective overseas migrants pay their fees to brokers or agents in cash. Thus there are few or no records 
to document payment transfers, making them unauditable. Additionally, recruitment agents often buy visas 
from unauthorised middlemen in receiving countries, making payments via informal banking channels in a 
process known as ‘hundi’. In key informant interviews, experts argue that it is essential that the government 
makes it mandatory for jobseekers to transfer their fees and agents to carry out payment transfers only 
through banks in order to limit fraud. While the existing Rules prescribe such a procedure, it is rarely followed 
in practice (Palma 2010). 
Prospective labour migrants also face difficulties when interacting with public migration facilitators. While 
passport issuance should be a standard service available from the state, the process is often made more 
complex. Besides overly long queues to submit application forms and collect passports, there are often undue 
delays in passport delivery, police verification and forgery of attestations (IGS 2008). Many migrant workers 
rely on recruiting agencies to obtain passports and travel documents who often do not follow due practice. 
Sometimes workers do not even sign their own passport application forms and find themselves in problematic 
situations when their signatures do not match when they go abroad (Siddiqui 2005). Forthcoming research 
from the IGS reveals that only 4 per cent of respondents described their interaction with manpower export 
offices and passport offices as fully satisfactory. In terms of physical accessibility, almost 70 per cent of the 
respondents stated that passport offices are located at places that are not very convenient, while 65 per cent 
say the same about manpower agencies. Additionally, a significant portion of the respondents did not have a 
clear idea about the location of either of these offices (IGS, forthcoming).
Interviews with experts in the field and migrants themselves revealed that the processes of applying for 
migration opportunities, facilitating the necessary payments and paperwork and finally duly departing for 
the country of destination are fraught with complications, unnecessary delays, unofficial payments transfers 
that are far above the legislated rates and interventions by uncertified agents and middlemen. This means 
that migrant workers, many of whom are illiterate village residents are often manipulated and swindled into 
not only paying higher charges but also into working at lower wages and in worse jobs. Given the information 
asymmetry that exists in the market and the large amounts of money migrants pay to go abroad (often 
borrowed at high rates of interest, as discussed below), they are forced to accept the situation. However, 
the current state of the migration process indicated many large governance gaps where regulation fails to 
implement existing legislation, with workers being those who are most disadvantaged. 
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Figure 6: Complaints against manpower agencies 2008-09
Source: Martin 2009
Currently, the Emigration Ordinance 1982 does not allow for direct legal prosecution by labour migrants with 
complaints needing to be filed via the BMET. Nevertheless, there are an increasing number of complaints (see 
Figure 6). In 2008, the BMET received nearly 400 complaints about recruiting agencies and settled cases worth 
a total of Tk. 90 million (Martin 2009). However, for 2009 the total number of settled complaints has further 
decreased and by the end of the year there were about 600 complaints still in the process of inquiry. While the 
placement and resolution of complaints is a start to redressing some of the malpractices by recruiting agents, 
there are many cases where compensation was not possible due to lack of adequate documentation (see also 
Afsar 2009). 
3.2 The financial sector in the migration process
 
Formal credit institutions play a critical role in the migration process, both in terms of mobilising remittances and 
in providing much needed credit support to prospective migrants. Most discussions on financial institutions 
focus only on the remittance collection role which needs to be scrutinised, systematised and regulated, as 
discussed further below. However, for migrants, loans prior to departure are critical, although they struggle 
to receive these through official credit channels. Martin points out that “at least four Bangladeshi banks have 
pre-departure loan programmes but they make few pre-departure loans” (2009, p.19). He notes that banks 
such as the National Credit and Commerce Bank (NCCBL) (in 2008) have announced migrant loan schemes 
such as the ‘Overseas Employment Loan Scheme’ for those who have valid foreign employment contracts. Yet, 
he argues that there is no data on how many pre-departure loans have been approved or disbursed. 
In analysing pre-migration credit and debt situation of migrant workers, Sharma and Zaman (2009) clearly 
document that only about one fourth of them had their own (and their family’s) cash resources as the main 
source of financing migration, with friends being a large source of co-funding. They also demonstrate that 
mortgaging and selling property and borrowing from moneylenders is still extremely prevalent (see Figure 
7). Another study shows that 33 per cent of respondents borrowed from moneylenders, often at exorbitant 
interest rates such as 10 per cent per month (2009). Prospective migrants are often forced to take drastic 
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measures such as those mentioned above that endanger their families’ livelihoods and entrench their 
future with that of ruthless agents because they are often denied access to formal credit mechanisms in the 
financial sector. They are not perceived as either a priority or a good credit risk by the very banking and credit 
institutions that are more than happy to handle their remittances. Often, migrant families are unable to use 
money remitted for many months as it is used to repay loans taken at high rates of interest to cover the costs 
of the migration process. This situation needs urgent redress so that migrants can finance their departures 
without jeopardising their and their families’ financial futures. 
Figure 7: Arrangements for covering migration costs
Source: Sharma and Zaman 2009
The ever-increasing flow of remittances demands a systematic inquiry into the mechanisms of transfer. Formal 
systems for remittance transfer include banks, postal services, money transfer operators (MTOs), other wire 
transfer services and credit unions. While banks and postal services offer reliable remittance services in almost 
all host and home countries, difficulties with regard to transferring remittances through formal systems 
include high costs, transaction delays, unfriendly customer service and complex paper work. As a result, 
unofficial channels such as the hundi (informal transfer of money) system are vital for migrants. Haque and 
Bashar (2009) found that this type of transfer was very common for migrants in Saudi Arabia but much less so 
for Malaysia, a pattern also found for Nepalese migrants abroad (Graner and Seddon 2004). This means that 
there are remittance inflows that are not being accounted for in the national accounts. 
The nation’s central bank plays a crucial role in increasing the inflow of remittances through formal channels. 
Bangladesh Bank permits banks to establish drawing arrangements with foreign banks and exchange houses to 
facilitate remittances by Bangladeshi nationals living abroad. The World Bank estimates the cost of remittance 
transfers to be approximately between 13-20 per cent of the amount remitted, with banks charging higher 
rates than informal remittance mechanisms (Rahman and Yeoh 2006).  However, transfers from banks usually 
take up to a week in the case of receiving banks situated in Dhaka. If the banks are located in localities in other 
districts (e.g. in rural areas), the delivery time may extend to a few weeks. In some host countries, especially 
Singapore and Malaysia, migrant workers report a lack of customer-friendly attitude among the staff of 
exchange houses established by Bangladeshi banks. Many migrants report negative experiences during 
their contact with such agents (Rahman and Yeoh 2006). Add to this bureaucratic hassles and the absence of 
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banking services in many rural areas of Bangladesh, and it is clear why many favour the informal remittance 
market. Migrants and their families put a high premium on sending the money easily and receiving the money 
quickly, leading to the prevalence of using informal means. 
From a governance viewpoint, the lack of available credit and easy remittance facilities for migrant workers 
presents a bottleneck that creates further governance malpractices. While policy makers have been quick to 
extol the virtues of the contributions remittances make to the national economy, they have yet to implement 
measures that financially facilitate migrants’ departures and family welfare. This is essential not only for 
worker and family welfare, but to ensure that the entirety of the remittance flow contributes to the national 
economy. 
3.3 Migrant maltreatment in destination countries
It is a crucial feature of labour migration that the institutional framework in countries ‘importing’ foreign 
labourers is usually protective of their employers but much less so of the foreign workers. Even when there is 
legislation to safeguard the interests of the latter, the respective governments are often rather negligent in 
implementing these. Siddiqui argues that “since the 1980s [..] employers have changed from being migrant 
friendly to migrant exploitative” (2005a, p.96). Thus, the mistreatment faced by migrants does not end when 
they arrive at their destination countries. There are often complications regarding entry due to inappropriate 
visas, invalid paperwork and dubious job contracts issued by corrupt recruiting agents. According to expert 
interviews, this could lead to deportation and loss of the entire fees paid by the migrant to facilitate the 
migration process. Given the discussion above, this leaves many migrants and their families in dire financial 
straits. Once in service, the main difficulties reported by migrant workers are low, delayed, partial or prolonged 
non-payment of salaries, as well maltreatment by employers, extremely poor working conditions and lack of 
welfare provisions or help from Bangladeshi missions in the receiving countries. 
As previously mentioned, in some cases wages are lower than specified in the working contract and contract 
substitution by employers is a widespread phenomenon. In the latter case, instead of being able to work at the 
jobs they were promised, workers are forced to sign a second contract upon arrival. This usually means lower 
wages and worse living and/or working conditions. Commonly cited examples by key informants were cases 
in Malaysia, where workers whose original contracts were for factory jobs end up working on plantations. 
Ullah’s case studies record how a substantial number of workers were ‘channelled’ into Malaysia on Thai tourist 
visas, despite having paid the ‘regular’, i.e. inflated fees to their agents (2009). Very often migrant passports 
and documentation are not handed over until the day or point of departure, making it difficult for the workers 
to ensure the correct paperwork or visa provisions. In Saudi Arabia, workers are often hired as cooks and 
security guards and then sent to work as agricultural labourers (Siddiqui 2005b).
In many instances, a considerable number of workers try to leave their ‘new’ jobs and seek alternate 
employment. Through networks of Bangladeshi workers who are already working in the host country, some 
migrants manage to obtain jobs with better terms and conditions. However, by leaving the jobs for which 
they had obtained visas, they risk becoming undocumented workers, vulnerable to many additional forms of 
exploitation (‘Lost in migration’, The Daily Star Weekend Magazine, June 25, 2010). Above all, most employers 
withhold all legal documents such as job contracts, travel documents and even passports from the workers in 
efforts to curtail their movements, and in practice prevent them from leaving abusive workplaces (‘Neglected 
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Heroes’, The Daily Star Weekend Magazine, June 20, 2007). In Malaysia, in particular, workers are routinely 
harassed or jailed by law enforcement agencies if they fail to produce valid identification in the wake of minor 
offences (‘Malaysia must end abuse of migrant workers’, The Daily Star, March 27, 2010). In some cases, other 
employers take advantage of these migrants, luring them away with nominally higher wage rates but often 
with worse working conditions. 
A huge issue is that there is a wage differential according to the worker’s nationality of origin that works 
against them with Bangladeshi migrant workers often ending up at the bottom of the scale. Two reasons are 
generally given for this: the first is that they are generally unskilled compared to migrants from other countries 
and the second being that the Bangladesh government cannot effectively bargain with destination country 
governments for better terms and conditions for its workers. According to interviews with key BMET staff, 
a prime example of this is how the Philippines and Indian governments have successfully bargained with 
Middle Eastern nations to pay migrant servants a minimum salary of USD 400, while Bangladesh has agreed 
to a minimum salary of only USD 100-150. While most of the Filipino workers are skilled, the ones from India 
often have qualifications similar to Bangladeshi workers. 
Analysts argue that these malpractices often occur due to an information asymmetry from the workers’ side 
(Stalker 2008). According to both key informant interviews and academics, this position re-emphasises the 
class dimension of the problem arguing that the majority of workers are un/semi-skilled, of rural origin, of 
low social class and poorly educated and do not have any knowledge about the labour laws of the countries 
to which they migrated (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2007). In addition, there is often a language barrier between 
migrant workers and employers. As a result, it is easy for employers to violate existing laws relating to wages 
and working and living conditions as they know that neither the workers nor their own nation’s or the workers’ 
governments will hold them to book for these offences (Afsar 2009). As per legislation, local employers in 
destination countries are required to comply with international and national minimum wage and working 
condition regulations. However, this is rarely implemented. While there is a class dimension to migrant 
maltreatment, it is also a governance issue.
Along with general mistreatment, there are serious concerns regarding the safety of migrant workers. Most 
of the jobs taken up by Bangladeshi migrant workers are classified as ‘3D’, i.e. dirty, difficult and dangerous. 
Between 2004-2009, a total of 8,701 Bangladeshi workers died in various countries with more than nine 
hundred among these during the first five months of 2009 (Palma 2009; Odhikar 2009). Apart from death in the 
course of working abroad, the media, academics and key experts in the field report that working conditions 
for Bangladeshi migrants are often appallingly bad (Afsar 2009; Stalker 2008, Palma 2009, ‘Migrant worker 
rights in spotlight’, The Daily Star, December 18, 2008). In addition to difficult working conditions, female 
migrant workers face additional abuse. The UNDP reports that as many as 85 per cent of those going to Gulf 
states face the threat of physical and mental abuse in the form of rape and sexual exploitation, as well as high 
risks of exposure to sexually transmitted infections and HIV/AIDS (2008). The condition of Bangladeshi female 
migrants in Malaysia has also been severely criticised by the human rights group Amnesty International who 
reported that for some workers conditions are reported to be ‘close to bonded labour’ and migrants were in 
constant threat of verbal and physical abuse, as well as sexual exploitation (‘Migrant workers unpaid, raped, 
abused in Malaysia’, The Daily Star, March 25, 2010). While the government has been urged to intervene to put 
a stop to these practices, much of them continue with stories of worker mistreatment commonplace in the 
media. 
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The media, human rights watchdogs and civil society generally agree that it is the responsibility of state and 
regulatory bodies to ensure that migrant workers who contribute so greatly to the national economy, are 
‘punished’ for their weak social positions by manipulation, mistreatment and abuse. This is further explored 
in the following section. 
4 Recommendations and conclusions
The Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) has identified four major challenges in establishing 
governance in migration at the national level (2005): Firstly, the lack of coherence in national policymaking on 
migration; secondly, the lack of coordination between policymaking and policy implementation; thirdly, the 
lack of capacity, defined as the lack of information, knowledge, institution and resources to process migration 
and fourthly, lack of communication between countries. In order to address these issues, the primary focus 
should be on the challenge of coordination within and between ministries that are involved in the migration 
process. It is also important to ensure consultations between the government and other stakeholders at 
the national level, as well as recognise and address the need for a supportive legal system which would be 
‘functioning, effective and equitable’ with a well trained, honest and informed staff (2005). Similarly, it is pivotal 
to develop an infrastructure to provide educational, social and legal support to migrants. The final criterion 
requires creating various types of bilateral agreements that respect the normative framework of international 
migration and have a clear agenda of protecting migrants’ rights. The recommendations below take into 
account these requirements and would be initial steps towards the governance overhaul the industry needs. 
4.1 Negotiate terms with receiving countries that ensure worker welfare
Given that most countries ‘hosting’ Bangladeshi migrant workers have not ratified international instruments 
of worker protection such as United Nations or International Labour Organization conventions, bilateral 
agreements or memoranda of understanding (MoU) are important instruments through which the protection 
of rights of migrants can be ensured. Successive Bangladesh governments have sent high-level delegations 
to various labour receiving states to negotiate such agreements. However, there is a general reticence on 
part of labour destination countries to sign any bilateral agreement and memorandum of understanding that 
are legally binding (Stalker 2008). Given that sending countries like Bangladesh are in the weaker positions 
in negotiations such as these and cannot dictate terms to their liking, the minimum that the government of 
Bangladesh could do is to develop a minimum set of standards for sending labourers for conditions under 
which migrant labourers have to work. Currently, when an understanding is reached with a partner country, 
the Bangladesh government submits a set of standards with the implicit understanding that the receiving 
country will honour it. However, this does not place the country concerned under any legal obligation.
4.2 Operationally enshrine migrant rights as the core of the governance framework
While labour migration has evolved as a core feature of the Bangladesh economy, the governance framework 
that regulates it is weak and unaligned with the reality of the migration situation in the country. Migrant 
rights should be made the central premise of the governance framework in order to make policies, institutions 
and processes more relevant. Both the 2002 Rules and the new smart cards are positive steps towards this 
new transition. From an international perspective, good governance needs to safeguard the interests of 
the labour force vis-à-vis the host state and employers. If the latter are reluctant to adhere to the regulatory 
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framework, there need to be mechanisms from the side of both sending and receiving countries to penalise 
these companies. Above all, counselling and legal services need to be provided to migrants both at home and 
abroad. This is particularly essential for migrants in the Middle East and Malaysia, where they face a complex 
range of problems.
4.3 Ensure proper functioning of monitoring mechanisms to create a transparent and 
efficient migration process
Improving governance needs to encompass efficient ways of service delivery from both private enterprises 
and government agencies. Proper monitoring mechanisms also need to be set up to regulate licensed 
agencies and shut down operations of illegal agencies and middlemen who are unscrupulously swindling 
prospective migrants. For negotiating labour opportunities there should be healthy competition between 
the public and private sector. Migration fees need to be reasonable with an imposed ceiling on the fees. 
Additionally, proper cost disaggregation needs to be provided to migrants such as visa fee, agents’ charge, 
documentation and processing fees. The provision of passports for migrant workers by the government needs 
to be simplified, made less costly and less time consuming. Strengthening the staff capacity, training and role 
of government bodies such as BMET and BOESL is a step towards addressing recruitment problems. These 
organisations could play an effective role by supporting effectively disseminating information on agents, 
recruitment procedure, fees and minimum wage standards in different countries via local government offices. 
The media and civil society organisations can also disseminate this information. The introduction of smart 
cards may also contribute substantially to improving monitoring. Manpower agencies themselves should 
also set up internal mechanisms for monitoring. BAIRA as their umbrella organisation could be a focus point, 
establishing a code of conduct and best practices among agencies. Regularly maintaining and publicising lists 
of ‘black listed’ agencies could decisively contribute to putting rogue agencies out of business. All transactions 
between recruiters and migrants should be transparent and any financial transactions should be recorded. 
The implementation of fiscally strict manpower agency auditing will go some way towards ensuring that 
these companies are financially responsible. 
4.4 Secure access to credit and efficient means of remittance transfer for migrants
The state needs to reconsider the financial arrangements that are currently in place for migrants. Currently, it is 
migrants who bear the enormous costs of migration. However, given that migrants usually plan their departure 
in groups, where the risk of defaulting is comparatively low, there could be a mechanism for covering these 
costs. Low-interest loans could be provided to prospective migrants and their families for a period of 6 to 12 
months, considerably minimising the propensity to take informal loans at high rates of interest and mortgage 
property to moneylenders. Once migrants are working in destination countries, they need efficient, user-
friendly legitimate means of sending remittances to provide feasible alternatives for using the hundi providers 
that are low cost and provide good service. These alternatives could be established in the form of banks that 
cater specifically to migrants, providing a range of financial services alongside remittance options. 
Given the presence of deep governance gaps in facilitating and managing international labour migration in 
Bangladesh as discussed in detail above, the role of reform and regulation is critical especially in safeguarding 
worker rights and welfare. While there is a pressing need for a plethora of institutional and governance reform 
processes to take place, the most urgent governance issue is the lack of implementation of already existing 
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legislation that seeks to make the process transparent and pro-migrant workers. If the migrants’ essential 
contributions to the economy via remittances are to keep growing, the state needs to re-emphasise its role as 
a watchdog, strongly putting migrant rights and welfare before the vested interests of the recruiting agencies 
and financial institutions. 
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1  Overview
After having predominantly been focused on institutions, the global governance discourse has shifted its 
attention to citizens. The citizen-centric nature of The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2009 reflects this 
transition and grounds its analysis in answering the question of whether citizens’ entitlements are being met. 
The Report marks the Institute of Governance Studies’ first foray into sectoral governance analysises, with 
each chapter addressing whether a key national sector is engaging in responsive service delivery. The State of 
Governance in Bangladesh 2009 contextualises and scrutinises governance, as manifested in policy planning 
and implementation in the key national sectors of food, energy, e-Government and migration. These sectors 
are either essential to citizens’ welfare (food security and consistent energy provision) or they are increasingly 
important to the national economy and future (labour migration and the prospect of e-government). Citizen-
centricity in policy design and efficient policy implementation, evidenced through reliable and equitable 
service delivery, is the bedrock of good governance and overall development. As in previous years, the Report 
optimistically notes Bangladesh’s sustained high levels of economic growth and continuing advances in 
development. With regards to sectoral governance, it also commends each sector’s progress towards a central 
theme of the global discourse: the need to create a long-term vision and an enabling legislative environment. 
There have also been encouraging policy initiatives, successful short-term sectoral programmes and some 
laudable responses to crises. However, while there are reasons to be positive about the future of the sectors in 
consideration, there are also substantial governance gaps that require serious attention and bold corrective 
measures. The three governance gaps that were consistently present in all sectors are the lack of effective 
regulatory bodies that can implement policy in an equitable and coordinated manner, the short-term nature 
of policy planning and the endemic nature of politically populist decision-making and, lastly, the lack of 
commitment to deeply-rooted and far-reaching institutional change.
6CHAPTER Conclusions
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2 Recommendations
The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2009 is cautiously optimistic about the prospects for good governance 
in the sectors examined, noting praiseworthy legislative progress and the presence of successful one-off 
policy initiatives and responses to sectoral crises. As mentioned in the introduction to the Report, it is hard to 
generalise findings across sectors given their differences. It is equally difficult to generalise recommendations 
across sectors. However, the Report takes the view that willingness to utilise the pre-existing regulatory 
framework and the transition to autonomous, transparent and effective regulatory institutions is central to 
making these sectors functional. In addition, the presence of long-term political planning, freedom from 
politically expedient decisions and a strong commitment to deep rooted institutional reform is equally 
important to improving sectoral services for citizens. There are detailed, very specific recommendations 
suggested at the close of each chapter, the key recommendations in each sector are highlighted below.
Chapter 2 – Energy Crisis: Planning Deficit, Policy Failure and Reforms for the 
Future 
An energy crisis characterised by a growing deficit in power and gas supply is severely hampering Bangladesh’s 
development prospects. This crisis also negatively affects the quality of life of citizens, given the impact on 
industrial production, agriculture, business and trade and day-to-day life. While Bangladesh has sustained 
high levels of economic growth over the recent years (5 to 6 per cent), unless the increasing energy shortfall 
in electricity and gas is addressed, it will slow down industrial operations, jeopardise trade and economic 
growth, trigger political instability and cause significant deterioration in citizens’ quality of life. This chapter 
does not attempt to examine all pertinent areas of the energy sector where governance plays a pivotal role. 
It focuses instead on how governance, or lack thereof, impacts the institutional and policy framework, the 
supply of energy and reform implementation in the power and gas sector.  All of these governance areas 
ultimately affect citizens’ access to energy, whether for commercial or personal use.
The government has so far taken a mix of long, medium and short term measures to tackle the energy crisis. 
This chapter argues that no significant change in the gas production is likely to take place in the short term. 
However, experts believe that the energy crisis can be addressed in the short term by making the best use of 
available fuel and power plants, i.e. by improving the existing production capability of power and gas sector 
entities through enhanced investment (both foreign and local) and through technical efficiency. Otherwise, 
the government will be compelled to import gas or establish more fuel based power plants. In the long term, 
there is no alternative to aggressive gas exploration and setting up of coal-fired power plants. Additionally, in 
regard to the electricity sector, the government must seriously attempt to increase energy trade with other 
nations, and most importantly, implement new power generation projects.
Moreover, the government must think beyond populist subsidies in the electricity sector and raise tariffs 
to establish a more sustainable sector. Solving the energy crisis means a long-term, concerted effort by all 
stakeholders, and citizens accepting that the process will not be painless. Based on the need for a long-term 
strategy, this chapter recommends: (a) pragmatic, citizen-focused planning and careful coordination among 
sector entities; (b) policy implementation with greater stakeholder dialogue and process transparency; (c) 
appropriate incentive mechanisms for bureaucrats and private/foreign investors that align with intended 
policy outcomes; (d) an autonomous regulatory body with the capacity to respond to stakeholder interests; 
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and (e) a strong political commitment to undertake all these improvements in sectoral governance. Providing 
reliable energy for Bangladesh’s citizens will be a gargantuan task, but failure to do so will trigger a negative 
domino effect for the economy at large. 
Chapter 3 – Food Security: Increasing Availability, Diversifying Access and 
Strengthening Governance 
Overall, an examination of the food availability and access scenario shows that, while the government is 
willing to ensure food security, it is not deeply committed to implementing the steps required to reach this 
goal. Though commitments regarding land distribution and tenancy contracts are present, their execution is 
absent. Many government institutions either lack the capacity to carry out implementation and monitoring 
processes, or are subject to corruption and rent-seeking behaviour. This is true in the case of key agricultural 
inputs such as fertilisers and seeds as well as in the procurement drive. These factors impede high yielding 
food production and may explain why the country is yet to achieve food self-sufficiency. On the other hand, 
reforms in the Public Food Distribution System (PFDS) have been far reaching and the government has shown 
willingness to scrap programmes that were riddled with corruption and leakage. Targeted interventions were 
prioritised but the goal to reach the ultra poor has not been achieved. However, it must be kept in mind 
that these were donor-driven reforms. In order to really ensure food security for all, the government should 
increase capacity in the relevant ministries and institutionalise these reforms to create ownership. This must 
be matched with true political will to avoid partisan interests affecting policies and programmes, so that the 
deserving reap the benefits.
With regards to the availability of food, the chapter makes the following recommendations: (a) ensure 
security of land ownership and access through a land distribution committee for khas land that incorporates 
stakeholders from the community and has enforceable monitoring mechanisms; (b) re-evaluate fertiliser 
policy and administrative practices through accurate demand calculation and the formation of a Citizens’ 
Committee comprised of farmers, dealers, members of local government and government administration 
officials, which will monitor fertiliser distribution and quality; (c) increase incentives for seed production 
and monitor seed quality and (d) re-evaluate the procurement drive system to make it more sustainable 
and grass-roots focused. With regards to access to food, the chapter recommends: (a) improve targeting 
efficiency of the Social Safety Net Programmes (SSNPs) to make it pro-poor by using self-selection based on 
a work requirement, proxy means testing and community based targeting mechanisms; (b) institutionalise 
monitoring and evaluation by building ministerial capacity to follow up programme progress and conducting 
randomised evaluations by independent external agencies; (c) improve inter-ministerial coordination by re-
evaluating policy coordination, reduce implementation overlap and develop platforms for inter-ministerial 
knowledge exchange and (d) de-centralise and build capacity of local government to facilitate accountable 
programme implementation, especially in the PFDS.
Chapter 4 – Digital Bangladesh: The Beginning of Citizen-Centric e-Government?
This chapter commends the current government for providing unprecedented political support for the 
development of Information Communications and Technology (ICT) tools for citizen empowerment through 
the Digital Bangladesh (DB) agenda. However, it argues that while the DB agenda and strategy are ambitious 
in their aim to extend information and services to citizens, it does not have the infrastructural plan in place 
required to make the citizen-centric initiatives of the DB vision a reality. The government’s new regulatory 
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and institutional initiatives —in particular passing the ICT Act 2009 and establishing high level committees 
devoted to the proliferation of ICT for development— are praiseworthy. However, much depends on whether 
new legislation is effectively implemented and whether these committees are successful in mainstreaming 
ICT at both governmental and citizen access levels. In addition, 53 of the quick win initiatives that are being 
implemented across different ministries are directly aimed at benefiting citizens, although the short-term 
nature of the quick wins is a threat to sustainable service provision. The chapter notes that while the current 
DB strategy may allow Bangladesh to enter the interaction and transaction phases of e-Government maturity; 
this depends on implementing the necessary backend initiatives such as business process re-engineering. In 
order to truly attain ICT enabled development outcomes, a truly transformational view of e-government is 
necessary. This requires government-to-citizens, government-to-business and government-to-government 
infrastructural initiatives in addition to comprehensive institutional and process reforms. One of the biggest 
concerns regarding the DB agenda is its discontinuation beyond the tenure of the current government, given 
its highly politicised nature and lack of ownership from implementing and regulatory bodies. The focal point 
of the strategy must thus shift from merely a technology implementation paradigm to one that focuses on 
utilization, with built-in outcome monitoring and stakeholder involvement.
The chapter makes the following recommendations to create an empowering and sustainable ICT for 
development of e-government paradigm in Bangladesh. Otherwise, “Digital Bangladesh” will continue to be 
seen as just another clichéd political slogan that does not create positive development outcomes for citizens, 
particularly those who are poverty stricken and marginalised. The recommendations are: (a) implement 
institutional restructuring and process reforms through a centralised body that can coordinate with ministries 
and execute the necessary far-reaching transformation; (b) strengthen the regulatory framework by amending 
the ICT Act 2009 in order to provide adequate data privacy and security provisions; (c) build ownership within 
the bureaucracy and depoliticise the agenda to move beyond ‘Digital Bangladesh’ to true e-government 
and (d) bridge the digital divide through greater community awareness and pro-poor service provision that 
respond to citizens’ needs. 
Chapter 5 – International Labour Migration: Making Migrant Worker Welfare Central 
to Governance 
Remittances from international labour migrants are the single largest source of foreign currency earnings 
for Bangladesh, with figures reaching USD 11 billion in mid-2010. However, the sector is shadowed by 
the fact that those very migrants whose hard work propels the national economy forward are the people 
who and exposed to the greatest risks most in the migration process. They are burdened with extremely 
large financial debts prior to departure, experience mistreatment at the hands of unscrupulous agents and 
unconcerned governmental staff, are subject to abuse and degrading work conditions in their countries of 
destination and often have difficulty in remitting money back to their families. This is firstly due to a lack of 
coherence in migration policymaking; secondly, to the lack of coordination between policymaking and policy 
implementation; thirdly, to the lack of capacity (including lack of information, knowledge, institution and 
resources) to process migration and fourthly, to the lack of enforceable agreements with receiving countries. 
In order to address these issues, the primary focus should be on the challenge of coordination within and 
between ministries involved in the migration process. 
It is also important to ensure consultations between the government and other stakeholders at the national 
level. Similarly, it is pivotal to develop an infrastructure to provide educational, social and legal support to 
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migrants. The final criterion requires creating various types of bilateral agreements that respect the normative 
framework of international migration and have a clear agenda of protecting migrants’ rights. Given the 
presence of deep governance gaps in facilitating and managing international labour migration in Bangladesh, 
the role of reform and regulation is critical, especially in safeguarding workers’ rights and welfare. While there 
is a pressing need for a plethora of institutional and governance reform processes to take place, the most 
urgent governance issue is the lack of implementation of already existing legislation that seeks to increase 
the transparency of the process and support migrant workers. If the labour migrants’ essential contributions 
to the economy via remittances are to keep growing, the state needs to re-emphasise its role as a watchdog, 
strongly putting migrant rights and welfare before the vested interests of the recruiting agencies and financial 
institutions. 
The following recommendations take into account these requirements and can be thought of as the initial 
steps towards the governance overhaul the industry needs: (a) negotiate terms with receiving countries that 
ensure worker welfare through bilateral agreements or memoranda of understanding (MoU); (b) operationally 
enshrine migrant rights as the core of the governance framework (as in the 2002 Rules) in order to make policies, 
institutions and processes more equitable; (c) ensure proper monitoring mechanisms of both public (BMET 
and BOESL) and private agencies (BAIRA) in order to create a transparent, low-cost and efficient migration 
process that is free of bureaucratic inefficiency, illegal agencies and unscrupulous middlemen and (d) secure 
access to credit and efficient means of remittance transfer for migrants through the provision of low-interest 
loans and efficient, user-friendly and legitimate means of sending remittances. 
3 Cross-cutting themes
IGS views governance as a multidimensional concept that is not only rooted in the ‘business’ side of governance, 
but that also encapsulates the impact of governance on those who are governed, i.e. citizens. In this vein, The 
State of Governance in Bangladesh 2009’s central theme is Entitlement, Responsiveness, Sustainability. The 
introduction to the Report argues that the citizens of a democratic country are entitled to basic needs and 
service provision from its government. The manner in which these should be met is responsively, i.e. in a 
flexible, effective and citizen-centric manner by the government institutions that are tasked with meeting 
these needs, or in conjunction with private bodies that are under the scope of regulation and monitoring. 
These needs will be met successfully if governments invest in committed, far-reaching and deep-rooted 
institutional change that results in effective, transparent, accountable and well-governed institutions. Ensuring 
the fulfilment of this chain, from entitlement to sustainability via responsiveness, leads to good governance 
outcomes for citizens. 
Given its sectoral approach, this Report argues that citizens have entitlements in each of the sectors under 
examination: the right to consistent and affordable energy; the right to the provision of food and support in its 
production; the right to access government services and information easily and the right to labour migration 
opportunities that are affordable and safe. The Report’s analysis shows that while the government has taken 
important steps towards service provision in all these sectors, much remains to be done to ensure that citizens’ 
needs are met and development objectives fulfilled. The Report’s introduction summarised the cross-cutting 
themes in the findings across each of the sectors using the Entitlement, Responsiveness, Sustainability 
framework. Similarly, the cross-cutting themes in the sectoral recommendations are summarised below: 
(a) Utilise pre-existing enabling legislative frameworks: In all the sectors under analysis, legislative 
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frameworks are in place that recognise and enshrine in law citizens’ entitlements. There is, other than 
very specific cases, e.g. the required amendment to the ICT Act 2009, no need to ‘re-invent the wheel’, 
only to commit to the implementation of the legal provisions that guarantee citizen wellbeing. 
(b) Make regulatory bodies effective: All the sectors have established regulatory bodies tasked with 
their management. However, the Report argues that, by and large, these bodies lack accountability, 
are not transparent or autonomous, and do not coordinate their activities with each other leading to a 
severe lack of responsiveness to people’s needs. Thus, the requirement is that these bodies transform 
themselves. There should be a commitment to long-term, far-reaching and extensive institutional 
change with an aim to increase regulatory capacity, bureaucratic ownership and inter-organisational 
coordination. This would allow for responsive and sustainable institutions to cater to citizen 
entitlements. 
(c) Move from populist to pro-people: This Report has emphasised how governmental short-term 
planning horizons and politically expedient decision-making results in the lack of sustainable 
sectoral institutions and service delivery mechanisms. In order to create national sectors that are truly 
efficient and provide equitable services, governments need to look beyond the 5-year electoral cycle 
and the vote bank. This will often mean having the conviction and vision to be politically unpopular 
in the short-term, to create equitable, efficient and durable sectors in the long term. 
(d) Bold leadership committed to change: The root of good governance, as seen from a citizen-centric 
point of view, is the presence of effective institutions committed to ensuring responsive citizen 
welfare. This Report has shown that all the sectors are characterised by a lack of such institutions, 
creating a cycle of bad governance that perpetuates itself. The plan for institutional reform must be 
bold and sustainable, with a sense of ownership from all stakeholders: public and private sectors, 
opposition parties and civil society, to ensure across the broad commitment. Inclusive planning for 
and implementation of change mean that if governmental commitment wavers, other stakeholders 
will be committed to steering reform back on course to ensure citizen entitlements are met. Most 
importantly, leadership must be dedicated to working for the national issues through consensus 
building. 
4 Looking ahead
The efficient, inclusive and sustainable functioning of the energy, food, e-government and migration sectors is 
essential to ensuring long-term good governance outcomes and improvements in citizen welfare and quality 
of life. Analysing the governance successes and gaps in these sectors is a vital step towards strengthening 
them in order to make them more citizen-centric and institutionally accountable. The recommendations made 
in this Report focus on the need to take advantage of an enabling regulatory framework, make a concerted 
effort to make regulatory bodies effective, broaden policy planning and implementation beyond their five 
year electoral and populist focus and, lastly, strengthen institutions that deliver citizen entitlements.
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ANNEX
Source: Governance Barometer Survey 2009, (IGS, Forthcoming)
ANNEX 1:  DISTRICT-WISE ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY
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